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“Lift your weapons.  Here is the one that resists intentions.” 
Clark Coolidge 1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Physical takings of Indian lands erode the Indian peoples’ political 
and cultural autonomy. 2  As “domestic dependent nations” they are 
distinguished from other minority groups within the United States.3 As 
                                                 
1. The Crystal Text, in PRIMARY TROUBLE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POETRY 443 (1996).   
2. Physical takings of Indian lands involve the wrongful appropriation, 
seizure, or interference with the Indians’ right to otherwise dispose of, or control, their 
lands.  See, JULIUS L. SACKMAN, 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.05[1], at 6-56 
to 6-58 (3d ed. 1997). 
3. Before European discovery, Indian peoples represented fully 
sovereign nations.  But after discovery, their international legal status was that of 
“domestic dependent nations.”  See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) l, 17 
(1831). 
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self-governing societies long before America was discovered by sixteenth-
century European explorers, their rights to self-governance and cultural 
autonomy were embodied in many treaties with European governments.4  
The federal government likewise entered into Indian treaties that 
confirmed the Indian peoples’ land titles and governmental authority.5  
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives effect to 
these sovereign bargains by barring state or private interference with the 
Indian peoples’ lands or their self-governance therein.6  
 But these sovereign bargains have demonstrably failed to 
preserve the Indian peoples’ most valuable asset-their lands.  Many Indian 
treaties prohibited the federal acquisition of Indian lands except with the 
express consent of a majority of the adult male members of the affected 
Indian tribe.7  Indian consent to federal land cessions served to legitimate 
the treaty-making process.  But this idea of Indian consent, along with the 
broader concept of tribal sovereignty, was swamped by the nineteenth-
century land demands of non-Indian settlers who had little sympathy for 
the Indian peoples or their treaty rights.  Indian treaty making in the mid-
to-late nineteenth century became the diplomatic “cover” for coerced and 
patently unfair Indian land cession agreements.8  Millions of acres of 
                                                 
4. Indian Treaties evidenced an “essential [sovereign] equivalence” 
between the European nations and the respective treaty tribes.  STEVEN CORNELL, THE 
RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 46 (1988).  The 
treaties were multifaceted diplomatic instruments whose purposes included mutual 
declarations of peace and friendship, establishment of trading relations, and the 
legitimation of major transfers of land from the Indian peoples to the respective 
discovering nations.  Id. at 46–47. 
5. The United States continued during and after the Revolutionary War  
to regard the Indian peoples as independent sovereign nations.  1 FRANCIS PAUL 
PRUCHA, THE GREATFATHER: THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 
31(1984).  
6. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
7. Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, for example, 
declared that no part of the Kiowa and Comanche lands would be ceded without the 
consent of at least three-fourths of the adult male members of the tribe.  Treaty with 
the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians (Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 
1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.  But Congress, by its Act of June 6, 1900, ratified 
the agreement of the Jerome Commission for the Indians’ cession of their reserved 
lands, even though far fewer than the required number of Indians had consented to 
that agreement.  Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 676.  This disregard of the 
Indian consent provision prompted Lone Wolf, a Kiowa Indian, to sue to enjoin 
Interior Secretary Ethan Allen Hitchcock from implementing that act on his 
reservation.  Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 107 U.S. 43 (1903). 
8. Treaty-based Indian land cessions are characterized by Stephen 
Cornell as the “characteristic form” of dispossession of the Indian peoples during the 
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Indian lands were taken by the federal government in outright 
congressional defiance of the Indian consent provisions of many treaties.9  
Spurious land cession agreements and coerced Indian land transfers in the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century were devastating for the Indian peoples: 
they today retain only some fifty-seven million acres of their lands that 
once stretched from the Atlantic Seaboard to the Pacific Coast.10   More 
significantly, the contemporary Indian peoples’ survival as distinct 
cultural and economic entities has been jeopardized by this rapid and 
massive shrinkage of their land base. 
The demonstrable failure of these Indian treaties to prevent the 
federal taking of Indian lands requires resort to an alternative legal strategy 
for the contemporary preservation of the remaining Indian lands.  A 
modern Indian takings doctrine holds perhaps the best hope for achieving 
this goal.  Such a doctrine is compatible with Chief Justice Marshall’s 
historically imposed Indian bargaining model.11  It also complements the 
contemporary “government-to-government” relationship between the 
federal government and the Indian peoples.12  This proposed doctrine 
                                                 
“Indian conflict years” from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries. CORNELL, 
supra note 4, at 45. 
Peter Wolf estimates that Indian land cession agreements between 1789 and 
1850 transferred some 450 million acres of Indian land to full federal ownership.  The 
amount paid to the Indians for these lands amounted to 90 million dollars or an average 
price of 20 cents an acre.  See PETER WOLF, LAND IN AMERICA: ITS VALUE, USE, AND 
CONTROL 69 (1981). 
9. Cornell emphasizes that in 1800, after nearly 200 years of European 
colonization, the bulk of what are now the “48 states” was Indian land.  But by 1900, 
the Indian lands were almost entirely in non-Indian hands.  What had occurred in the 
interim was not just the dispossession of the Indian peoples of their aboriginal lands, 
but the larger transformation of the American economy as a capitalist society that 
successfully commercialized land, labor, and capital as marketable commodities.  
Indian lands were gradually incorporated into this larger American economy.  
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34–38. 
10. “Indian tribes and (individual tribal members) own approximately 
56.6 million acres of land, an increase of more that 4 million acres since 1980. . . .  
Alaskan Natives hold another 44 million acres as a result of the Alaskan Native Claims 
Settlement Act.  In all, Native American groups hold about 4.2% of the land in the 
United States.”  DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20 (3d ed. 1993). 
11. Marshall's Indian bargaining model derived from older sources such 
as Article III of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance. Act of Aug. 7, 1789 (Northwest 
Ordinance), ch. 8, art. 12, 1 Stat. 50, 52.  That article committed the United States to 
display the “utmost good faith” toward the Indian peoples and pledged that their “land 
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent.”  Id. 
12. President Richard Nixon in his 1970 Indian Message to Congress 
called for a new federal policy of “self-determination” for the Indian peoples.  
Congress responded by enacting several new Indian statutes that confirmed the 
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would mitigate the federal takings incentive that implicitly derives from 
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model. Marshall’s model has effectively 
cloaked from judicial scrutiny spurious Indian land cession agreements or 
unilateral federal action that rapidly shrunk the Indian land base from its 
1848 size of a billion plus acres to some forty-million acres by 1934.13 
By contrast, a modern Indian takings doctrine would explicitly 
acknowledge the indispensable role that land plays in sustaining 
contemporary Indian societies as viable cultural, and economic entities.  
Ironically, Marshalls Indian bargaining model likewise acknowledged 
Indian lands as essential for the governmental, cultural and economic 
survival of the Indian peoples.  But his model grew out of assumptions that 
even by his era were patently untenable.  Marshall envisioned Indian 
treaties as the consensual means for organizing the chaotic field of Indian 
affairs over a wide array of subject-matter areas: trade, criminal 
jurisdiction, war and peace, and land transactions.14  Indeed, reigning 
nineteenth century economic theory suggested that such a consent-based 
system would yield sovereign bargains that represented “Pareto-superior” 
outcomes for both the federal government and the affected Indian 
peoples.15 
                                                 
inherent sovereign powers of the Indian peoples and sought to establish a meaningful 
“government-to-government” relationship between federal agencies and the affected 
Indian peoples.  GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 253–59. 
13. In 1903, the Supreme Court decided, based on Chief Justice 
Marshall’s Indian law opinions, that Congress enjoyed a “[p]lenary authority over 
tribal relations . . . not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the 
government.”  Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).  The Lone Wolf 
doctrine permits the federal government to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties if they 
conflict with an overriding federal interest or no longer serve the best interest of the 
affected Indian people. 
14. Indian treaties were multifaceted diplomatic instruments that allowed 
for the mutual adjustment of military, jurisdictional, trading, and land issues between 
the federal government and the Indian peoples.  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 46. 
15. The Pareto principle assumes that as “long as individuals know what 
is best for themselves, they can enter only into those bargains that are best for 
themselves.”  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 8–9 (1993).  The 
Indian peoples and the federal government are regarded by the treaty-making process 
as if they were a single person that knows “its” preferences when measured against 
the pretreaty circumstances.  Epstein concludes that assuming the “stringent Pareto 
conditions are satisfied,” there is no “reason to worry about the terms and conditions 
that the (federal) government attaches to its bargain.”  Id. 
The absence of constitutional limits on state power creates a socially 
destructive “prisoner’s dilemma,” wherein disorganized land owners are unable to 
prevent the state from imposing “collateral or unrelated” conditions upon their 
continued use of their lands.  Id. at 79. 
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But Marshall’s seemingly laissez faire system of Indian 
bargaining was undermined from the outset by background demographic 
changes and evolving military realities.  The Indian peoples should have 
expected, given the nature of bargaining process that they were free to 
bargain regarding any issue and that bargains, once made, would bind both 
the federal government and the affected Indian peoples.16  But these 
idealized background conditions have rarely, if ever, governed Indian 
bargains with non-Indians regarding land cessions.  Some of the eastern 
Indian peoples may have possessed a temporary bargaining equality with 
the European colonizers that made land cession agreements between them 
both feasible and practicable.17  But fundamental practical and 
                                                 
16. Richard Epstein and other constitutional scholars recognize that there 
must be a limit to state coercive power over private property rights because the 
“creation of (state) monopoly power (over those rights) poses a great danger of abuse.”  
Id. at 78. 
17. Whether the Indians ever willingly sold their lands to the European 
colonists and fully appreciated that they were forever giving up their land titles has 
long been a subject of historical debate.  Some historians argue that the eastern Indian 
tribes had fairly well-developed concepts of land tenure especially with regards to the 
assignment of territory for the purposes of planting and residence.  Actual property 
rights in the Indians’ lands resided in the individual or family unit.  See ALDEN T. 
VAUGHN, THE NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER: PURITANS AND INDIANS, 1620–1675, at 105–
07 (1979). 
The historian Wilcomb E. Washburn also challenges the “prevailing 
assumption among Americans that the bulk of the land of the United States was simply 
appropriated from the Indians without benefit of law or compensation.”  WILCOMB E. 
WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND, WHITE MAN’S LAW 109 (2d ed. 1995).  He cites 
Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia (1787) wherein Jefferson asserts: 
 
That the land of this country [was] taken from them [(the Indians)] 
by conquest, is not so general a truth as is supposed.  I find in our 
historians and records, repeated proofs of purchase, which cover a 
considerable part of the lower country; and many more would 
doubtless be found on further search.  The upper country we know 




Other historians agree that early colonial land practices generally observed 
the formal niceties of purchase of Indian land title.  The respective Puritan 
governments apparently controlled their subjects’ purchases of Indian title and 
required that any potential purchaser of Indian lands obtain prior governmental 
consent or that they purchase Indian lands through governmental agents.  These non-
Indian purchasers used standard deed forms but many times required the signatures 
not only of the individual land claimant but of the tribal “sachem” as well.  These 
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demographic changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
substantively undermined the Indian peoples’ ability to negotiate fair 
terms and conditions of land cession agreements.18  The Indians’ ability to 
prevent non-Indian takings of their lands increasingly depended on their 
diplomatic acumen in forging trading or military alliances with rival 
European or colonial interests.19  But the triumph of the British Crown 
over the French in 1763, followed by the successful American revolution 
against British rule in 1783, effectively eliminated the Indians’ 
opportunity for strategic alliances that would preserve their lands from 
non-Indian intrusion.20 
The substantial erosion of the Indian populations and their military 
capability directly contributed to their reduced nineteenth-century legal 
status.  This reality  was  candidly  acknowledged  by  Chief  Justice  
                                                 
colonial era purchasers were also careful to make their deeds of purchase as specific 
as possible to avoid later challenge from competing non-Indian claimants. 
But Indian land, because the epidemics of 1616–17 and 1633–34 had 
devastated the eastern Indian populations, became a surplus commodity in New 
England.  The colonialists offered the Indians hoes and metal knives—implements of 
great value to a neolithic people—and in exchange acquired vast tracts of Indian lands.  
VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 107–08. 
18. The eastern Indian tribes’ power to upset the delicate balance of 
European power in the New World of the early eighteenth century was exploited by 
the Iroquois and the southern Indian nations—the Choctaws, Creeks, Chickasaws, and 
Cherokees—as a means of protecting their lands and economic resource bases. 
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 26–27. 
19. Cornell contends that the major eastern Indian tribes were able to 
resist non-Indian encroachment on their lands through a “fortuitous combination of 
elements: military strength, European alliance and practical economics.” Id. 
20. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, French power in the New 
World collapsed with the Treaty of Paris in 1763, by which France ceded all of its 
territory east of the Mississippi to Britain.  The eastern Indian tribes could no longer 
play off the European powers against each other in order to preserve their lands and 
resources.  Id. at 27. 
By the Treaty of Paris of 1783 ending the American Revolutionary War, the 
British Crown transferred its territorial claims east of the Mississippi to the United 
States.  The newly formed Continental Congress took a radically different attitude 
toward these territories; whereas the British Crown considered those lands “Indian 
Country,” the American Congress viewed its new territories as a source of revenue 
and as a means for pacifying and paying off restive war veterans.  Id. 
As a practical matter, the Eastern Indian peoples now faced one single 
power, the United States, and were no longer able to play off competing European 
powers against one another for their own security and advantage.  1 PRUCHA, supra 
note 5, at 31. 
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Marshall  in  his  Indian  law opinions.21  He referred to the Indian peoples’ 
diminished political and legal status as the “actual state of things.”22  This 
contemporary reality justified their incorporation as “domestic dependent 
nations” into the body of the United States.23  Marshall had earlier 
concluded that it justified the incorporation of the Indians’ aboriginal land 
titles into the federal system of property rights.24 
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model envisioned the federal 
government as the senior partner and the Indian peoples as the junior 
partners in any future sovereign bargaining process.  Indeed, his opinions 
implicitly authorized a federal bypass of recalcitrant Indian bargainers by 
allowing the federal government to make out grants of Indian lands subject 
to continued Indian use and occupancy rights.25  Although modern legal 
parlance recognizes that imbalances in economic and legal powers make 
a mockery of the bargaining process,26 such power imbalances were 
hardwired into Marshall’s Indian bargaining model.  Marshall’s Indian law 
                                                 
21. Marshall’s Indian Law Trilogy includes the following decisions: 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
22. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591. 
23. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543. 
25. In Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1877), the Supreme Court held 
that the United States could grant good title to Indian lands: 
 
The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could not 
disturb the occupancy of the Indians: that occupancy could be 
interfered with or determined by the United States.  It is to be 
presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed 
by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian 
people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race.  Be 
that as it may, the propriety or justice of their action towards the 
Indians with respect to their lands is a question of governmental 
policy. . . . The right of the United States to dispose of the fee of 
lands occupied by them has always been recognized by this court 
from the foundation of the government. 
 
Id. at 525. 
Father Prucha emphasized that Marshall’s legal theory eventually evolved 
into a dictum that the United States held virtually absolute dominion over the Indian 
lands leaving the Indian peoples with merely a usufructuary interest in the lands they 
occupied.  1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
26.  The modern contract doctrine of “unconscionability” focuses on 
those disparities in bargaining power that are evidenced by a “party’s employment of 
sharp practices, . . . the use of fine print and convoluted language and an inequality of 
bargaining power.”  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 314–15 (1982). 
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opinions  undermined  the  Indians’  inherent  sovereignty  over  their 
aboriginal lands.27  He judicially restricted the Indians’ power to cede their 
lands to anyone but the federal government.28  He nonetheless insisted that 
they possessed sufficient legal capacity to ensure fair land dealing with 
their paramount sovereign, the federal government.29  Modern bargaining 
theory would candidly acknowledge that the Indian peoples’ subordinated 
legal status fundamentally compromised their ability to bargain fairly with 
the federal government.30  Thus, it is not surprising that Marshall’s Indian 
bargaining model has failed to preserve the Indians’ lands and cultures. 
Today’s near extinction of the Indian peoples’ cultures and 
economies cries out for a new land-based relationship with the federal 
government.  This new relationship would not presume that today’s Indian 
peoples are equal bargainers with the federal government.  Indeed, it 
would presume the opposite-that today’s Indian peoples face a heightened 
risk of federal takings of their lands given Congress’ now plenary power 
over their remaining lands.  Such a relationship would recognize that 
Indian lands are the essential means for the realization of the contemporary 
federal policy of tribal self-determination.  This new relationship would 
further acknowledge that the development of contemporary Indian 
economies and cultures are inextricably linked to the preservation of their 
lands.31 
A modern Indian takings doctrine would help mitigate the federal 
taking incentive that unavoidably arises from the congressional plenary 
power over Indian lands.  First, it would unequivocally require the 
payment of just compensation for the federal taking of any Indian lands.  
Second, it would require the award of, under the appropriate factual 
circumstances, substitute or replacement value for those lands.  The 
                                                 
27. Richard Epstein speaks of the government’s threat of force as the 
major destabilizer of any system of property rights.  Such property rights remain in 
Epstein’s “state of nature” absent not only their definition but their successful 
enforcement and protection, as well.  EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 76. 
28. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587. 
29. Indian treaties are misleading, Cornell asserts, because they suggest 
an “essential (sovereign) equivalence” between the United States and the respective 
signatory Indian tribes that the Supreme Court has never honored.  CORNELL, supra 
note 4, at 46–47. 
30. Epstein rejects as morally reprehensible the “bargaining game” 
wherein governmental threat may involve the use of force against an individual’s 
person or property.  EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 41.  The Indian peoples were on many 
occasions confronted with the federal government’s “offer they could not refuse.” 
31. Land is inextricably bound up within the Indians’ “webs of kinship, 
ritual and custom” so that at a conceptual and practical level each “received the imprint 
of the other.”  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 38–39. 
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federal judiciary would be empowered to ensure that the affected Indian 
peoples, like other land owners, are justly compensated for their lost 
resources.32 
Such a doctrine would not, by itself, ensure the preservation of 
contemporary Indian societies as viable economic and cultural entities.   
But coupled with other features of today’s Indian self-determination 
program, it would contribute to those goals. 
This Article develops a modern Indians taking doctrine by 
critically examining the unfolding of Marshall’s Indian bargaining model 
through three distinct eras: 
 
1. Chief Justice Marshall’s construction of the Indian 
bargaining model as an American adaptation of the 
European doctrine of discovery; 
 
2. the Supreme Court’s subsequent reformulation of 
that model as the Indian plenary power doctrine; and 
 
3. the Court’s failed reconciliation of the Indian 
plenary power doctrine with the just compensation 
command of the Constitution. 
 
These three eras are summarized and then fully analyzed as the backdrop 
that demonstrates the necessity for a modern Indian takings doctrine.  A 
sketch of such a doctrine is provided by a case study of the most 
egregious modern Indian taking: the 1949 taking of the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation.  This taking triggered a forty-three-year-long 
struggle by the Fort Berthold Indians for just compensation.  This 
struggle encapsulates the legal and practical disadvantages that confront 
Indian peoples who bargain with Indian congressional committees over 
the terms governing the taking of their lands.  From this case study are 
extracted economic and doctrinal principles that will form the backbone 





                                                 
32. Indian lands, especially treaty reserved lands, arguably qualify as 
“public facilities” whose taking require compensation measured by the reasonable cost 
of a “substantially equivalent substitute.”  4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 
2, § 12C.01(3)(d), at 12C-38. 
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A. Chief Justice Marshall’s Construction of the Indian Bargaining Model 
 
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model broke down for two simple 
reasons.  First, the Indian peoples had been disabled by Marshall’s 
opinions, which prevented the Indians from alienating their lands to 
anyone but the federal government.  The United States enjoyed the 
enviable, strategic position of a “super-monopsonist”—the sole, sovereign 
buyer of the Indian peoples’ lands.33  Second, the federal government was 
implicitly empowered by Marshall’s opinions to repudiate its Indian 
bargains if they later conflicted with overriding federal interests.34 
But the shadow of Marshall’s vision and the inertia of history has 
long prevented judicial reexamination of the Indian bargaining model.  Its 
historic weight squelched the Indian peoples’ taking claims based on 
alleged governmentally coerced Indian land transfers, inadequate 
compensation payments, or the disregard of federal trust or fiduciary 
obligations.  In its contemporary and refurbished version, it sanctions 
Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands by foreclosing judicial scrutiny 
of putative “good faith” federal takings of Indian lands.35  It is time now 
to fundamentally reassess that model that has so long countenanced the 
                                                 
33. Exclusive federal control over Indian lands must be viewed as one 
means for realizing emergent national interests in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.  
Stephen Cornell argues that intertwined nineteenth-century ideas of progress, 
nationalism, and religious mission forms the backdrop for understanding America’s 
attitudes towards Indians and their lands.  Chief Justice Marshall, and other Indian 
policy makers, confronted an American West that was controlled and peopled by 
Indians.  His task was the practical and hopefully fair incorporation of those Indian 
lands as the raw materials out of which a future vision of America would be shaped.  
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34–39. 
34. Marshall had casually analogized the Indian peoples’ relationship to 
the federal government as like that of “ward to his guardian.”  Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).  A later Supreme Court decision transformed 
that casual analogy into a “[p]lenary [congressional] authority over tribal relations . . 
. not subject to control by the judicial department of government.”  Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
The Lone Wolf doctrine permits the federal government to abrogate federal 
Indian treaties or agreements if those agreements conflict with an overriding national 
interest or are no longer deemed in the best interest of the affected Indian people.  Nell 
Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Taking of Indian Land: An 
Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. REV. 245, 254–55 (1982). 
35. Professor Newton traces the legal history of Indian taking claims 
against the United States and concludes that Congress’ plenary power over Indian 
lands still “qualif[ies] the extent to which a tribe can recover on the merits [of its 
claim].” Newton, supra note 34, at 254–55. 
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federal taking of Indian lands in derogation of the just compensation 
command of the Constitution.36 
The Indian consent provisions of many Great Plains Indian treaties 
were intended to mitigate the recognized disparity in nineteenth-century 
bargaining power between the federal government and the respective 
Indian peoples.  If they had been judicially enforced to their terms and 
tenor, there would doubtless be far more Indian lands than there are today.  
But these consent provisions were soon swamped by Congress’ obsession 
with national goals, which loomed far larger than its promises to the Indian 
peoples.37 
In his 1823 opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh, Marshall concluded 
that the federal government possessed the sovereign and exclusive power 
to acquire Indians lands via purchase or conquest.38  Thus, the Indian 
peoples’ aboriginal lands were subjected to Congress’ paramount 
authority.39  This underlying dynamic of federal paramount power over 
Indian affairs was fundamentally transformed as a congressional power to 
unilaterally redefine Indian property rights.  The Supreme Court held that 
Congress possessed this judicially unreviewable power over Indian lands 
in Justice White’s 1903 opinion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.40 
Indian land owners thus have been deprived of the constitutional 
protection afforded other land owners under the Just Compensation 
Clause.41  That clause prohibits the uncompensated or undercompensated 
taking of privately owned lands.  This Indian exemption has had stark 
consequences for these culturally distinct, land-based societies; once 
fiercely self-reliant and economically independent, Indians now constitute 
America’s most impoverished and insular minority population.42 
                                                 
36. Congress exercises plenary power over Indian lands and may take 
those lands as an incident of its trusteeship authority over the Indian peoples.  Id. 
37. Cornell cites the following ideas of “manifest destiny, dreams of 
empire and vision of Progress” as “fueling [the United States’] westward expansion.”  
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 38. 
38. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823). 
39. See id.  The noted historian Wilcomb E. Washburn views Marshall’s 
opinion in Johnson as “the basis of all subsequent determinations of Indian right.”  
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66. 
40. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
41. Newton emphasizes that Indian land owners do not enjoy the same 
constitutional protection from uncompensated takings as do other private landowners 
under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Newton, supra note 
34, at 248–49. 
42. “Per capita income for Native Americans in 1991 was slightly more 
than $8300, the lowest for all racial groups in the United States, and less than half the 
level for the entire population.”  GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 16.  The Indian 
unemployment rate as of 1991 was 45%.  That is 3% lower than 1989 but still more 
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B. The Giving and Taking of Indian America 
 
The Indian peoples are traditionally depicted as the willing and 
fairly compensated “givers” of their lands to the European colonizers.  The 
familiar painting of the Canarsie Indians’ bargain in 1626 that transferred 
Manhattan Island to Peter Minuet, Director of the Dutch West Indian 
Company, for twenty-four dollars in Indian trade goods, trinkets, and rum 
exemplifies this European view of Indian bargaining.43   But the Indians’ 
counternarrative views the Europeans as the “takers” of their lands.  The 
1948 photograph of the taking of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation 
powerfully depicts this reality.44  There, Tribal Chairman George Gillette 
of the Three Affiliated Tribes covers his eyes with his left hand as he 
openly weeps beside Interior Secretary Krug—the Indians’ trustee—as he 
signs the documents taking the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation as the site 
for a large federal water project.45  
                                                 
than 37% higher than the average unemployment rate for the United States as a whole.  
Id. 
43. Indian giving of land title did not always redound to the benefit of 
Europeans.  American humorist Nathaniel Benchley contends that the Dutchman 
Minuet was, in fact, the unwitting victim of the first Indian “bait and switch” con in 
America!  Chief Seyseys, the unscrupulous leader of the Canarsee Indians, exploited 
Minuet’s ignorance about which Indian tribe actually held the “use and occupancy” 
rights to Manhattan Island.  Nathaniel Benchley, The $24 Swindle, AM. HERITAGE, 
Dec. 1959, at 62. 
Benchley asserts that another Indian tribe, the Weckquaesgeeks, actually 
held title to the upper two-thirds of Manhattan Island.  As Benchley tells the story, the 
wily old chief Seyseys readily agreed to remove his few tribal members from lower 
Manhattan Island and “he took the sixty guilders’ worth of knives, axes, clothing, and 
beads (and possibly rum), and went chortling all the way back to Brooklyn.”  Id. at 
93. 
44. This photograph may be viewed in PETER IVERSON, PLAINS INDIANS 
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 144 (1985). 
45. Historian Roy Meyer describes “an emotion filled ceremony” on May 
28, 1948, in Secretary Krug’s Washington, D.C., office.  There, Chairman Gillette and 
thirteen other tribal council leaders signed a contract by which the Fort Berthold 
Indians relinquished title to over 153,000 acres of treaty-reserved lands as the site for 
the Garrison Dam and Reservoir.  Chairman Gillette remarked that “our Treaty of Fort 
Laramie, made in 1851, and our tribal constitution are being torn into shreds by this 
contract.”  Roy G. Meyer, Fort Berthold and the Garrison Dam, 35 N.D. HIST. 215, 
259 (1968). 
The Garrison site was selected by Colonel Lewis A. Pick of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers as essential to the success of the Pick-Sloan Project even though 
his predecessor had rejected that site as unsafe.  Major General Lytle Brown had 
reported to Congress in 1931 that the Garrison site was rejected because it was 
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The Indian peoples’ challenges to the underlying validity of Indian 
land cession agreements have long been stifled by uncritical adherence to 
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model.  Indian complaints that they did not 
understand the cession agreements that they had signed, or that the federal 
treaty commissioners had obtained their signatures by threat, or during 
their collective, liquor-induced stupor, or through outright fraud, have 
been shrugged off as not within the federal courts’ jurisdiction.46  Such 
Indian complaints were simply not heard by the courts unless Congress 
expressly granted them legal or equitable jurisdiction to do so.  But the 
widely varying jurisdictional terms of these statutory grants subjected 
Indian land rights to a “rigged lottery” approach to just compensation.47 
Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands has been only 
modestly limited by contemporary judicial decisions.48  Federal courts 
may now scrutinize federal Indian legislation under the rational basis 
test.49  But this modest review standard does not significantly alter the 
egregious power disparity that is exhibited most fulsomely in the federal 
takings of Indian lands.50  The Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in United 
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians51 reaffirmed the federal government’s 
plenary power over Indian lands.  While the Court in Sioux Nation rejected 
the irrebutable presumption of congressional good faith that it had 
declared in its Lone Wolf decision, and replaced it with a “good faith in 
                                                 
“entirely impracticable because of the lack of suitable foundation for a dam of such 
magnitude.”  Id. at 239 n.2. 
46. Because many Indian tribes were at war with the federal government 
in 1863, the Congress barred the Indian peoples from bringing any claims against the 
United States in the Court of Claims.  The tribes needed a special act of Congress that 
waived the sovereign immunity of the United States in order to bring and maintain 
such a claim.  GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 311. 
47. Rosenthal concludes that the admitted inadequacy and inconsistency 
of these special jurisdictional acts cried out for congressional reform in Indian claims 
processing.  H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN 
CLAIMS COMMISSION 20 (1990). 
48. Newton concludes that contemporary Indian law “grants too much 
deference to assumed congressional powers and too little weight to Indian rights.”  
Newton, supra note 34, at 250. 
49. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977). 
50. Newton, supra note 34, at 245. 
51. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).  The Sioux Nation rule does not allow a federal 
court to inquire into the adequacy of consideration that an Indian tribe received in 
compensation for a federal taking of its lands.  Instead, an Indian tribe whose lands 
have been taken by the federal government must overcome the Sioux Nation’s good 
faith test if it is to receive just compensation for its taken lands or resources. Newton, 
supra note 34, at 258–59. 
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fact” test, it did little to ensure that Indian peoples will be justly 
compensated for their taken lands.52 
 Indeed, the Sioux Nation decision judicially immunizes the federal 
government from liability for all but the most heavy-handed and patently 
self-interested Indian takings.53  The best evidence of this is the “good 
faith” defense that was offered by the federal government in Sioux Nation 
itself.54  The government theorized that, as the trustee of the Sioux peoples, 
it demonstrably acted in their best interests by agreeing to provide them 
subsistence rations in perpetuity in exchange for the Indians’ cession of 
the Black Hills.55  This “good faith” exchange arguably immunized the 
government from any takings liability despite the objective disparity in 
value between the Black Hills’ resources and the value of the Indian 
subsistence rations.56  The federal government vociferously insisted that 
its past provision of strategically motivated subsistence rations to the 
destitute and starving ancestors of today’s Indian claimants immunized it 
from any financial liability for the unjust taking of the Black Hills in South 
Dakota.57  
                                                 
52. The Indian plenary power doctrine permits the federal government to 
“take” Indian property and give it to others.  One constitutional scholar contends that 
the Constitution’s Takings Clause was intended to limit the federal government’s 
power to confiscate, seize, destroy, or regulate private property.  EPSTEIN, supra note 
15, at 3. 
53. Newton wryly concludes that in “less egregious instances of 
involuntary [Indian] land acquisitions, the plaintiff tribes have rarely been successful.”  
Newton, supra note 34, at 259. 
54. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407–17. 
55. Id. at 416–17. 
56. There must be a limit to state coercive power over private property 
rights because the “creation of [state] monopoly power” over those rights “poses a 
great danger of abuse.”  EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 78.  Epstein may have been 
referring to Native-American landowners when he describes the “prisoners’ dilemma” 
game that individual landowners face in direct bargaining with a state that seeks to 
impose “collateral or unrelated” conditions upon their continued use of their private 
property.  Epstein references the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a means of 
restraining state power over otherwise “disorganized citizens” so as to allow them to 
escape from the socially destructive game.  Id. at 79. 
The Court’s failure to specify an objective yardstick against which to 
measure the federal government’s assertion that it gave a good faith value for the 
Indians’ taken land, imposes an “illogical test [that] turns most [Indian land] 
confiscations into [the] actions of a trustee.”  Newton, supra note 34, at 261. 
57. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 420–21.  This decision sought to 
“harmonize” congressional plenary power over Indian affairs with the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause.  The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the federal 
government's role as the Indian peoples’ trustee with its sovereign eminent domain 
power over privately held land.  Newton criticizes the failure of that attempted 
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 These decisions mean that the federal government may no longer 
invoke the “slam dunk” immunity to Indian takings claims that it enjoyed 
under Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.58  But the death of the irrebutable 
presumption doctrine does little to limit Congress’ retained plenary power 
over Indian lands.  The Sioux Nation decision does little to ensure that just 
compensation is, in fact, paid to those Indian peoples who suffer 
devastating economic losses due to a federal taking of their lands.59  Its 
“good faith” standard of judicial review focuses on the wrong end of the 
just compensation telescope in Indian takings cases.  It focuses on the 
federal government’s legitimation of its exercise of plenary power over 
Indian lands, not on the actual economic losses suffered by those Indian 
peoples whose lands are taken for a federal purpose.60 
 
C. The First Era: Americanizing the European Doctrine of Discovery 
 
 Indian occupation of the American West presented a perplexing 
early nineteenth-century legal challenge.  Chief Justice Marshall seized on 
the 1823 case of Johnson v. M’Intosh61 as the means to resolve the ticklish 
and potentially dangerous issues that arose from the non-Indians’ unruly 
competition for the control of the western Indian lands.  Marshall invoked 
                                                 
synthesis.  This failure stems, she contends, from the “good faith” defense that allows 
the federal government to subjectively assert that it has “given compensation as a fair 
equivalent for the land taken, even though it is far less than the land’s fair market 
value.”  Newton, supra note 34, at 259. 
58. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
59. Newton illustrates this point by hypothesizing a contemporary Indian 
land sale by Congress on behalf of its Indian wards.  Because the federal government 
fails to conduct a geological survey or obtain competitive bids for these Indian lands, 
the lands are sold at a price that is three or four times lower than their actual fair market 
value.  She concludes that this congressional action would likely fall short of the 
blatant and egregious “bad faith” conduct that triggered Fifth Amendment liability in 
Sioux Nation.  For that reason, the United States would likely be shielded from fiscal 
or political accountability for the economically disastrous consequences that befell its 
Indian wards due to its actions.  Newton, supra note 34, at 262–63. 
60. Newton asks, why should the federal trust relationship immunize the 
federal government from Indian takings claims?  She concludes that the Sioux Nation 
Court’s focus on the federal trustee’s subjective judgment about the Indian peoples’ 
best interests undervalues and potentially ignores the “real world” economic losses 
that federal takings impose on the Indian peoples.  This decision does little to protect 
them from the federal government’s negligent or uninformed judgments that result in 
the taking of Indian lands.  See id. at 263–64.  This decision requires the federal 
judiciary to “abdicate its normal judicial role” in takings cases.  Id. at 264. 
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
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the European doctrine of discovery as the legal basis for his opinion.62  He 
established an exclusive preemptive right in the federal government to 
acquire Indian lands as the rightful successor to similar sovereign 
prerogatives that had been held by Spain, France, and Great Britain.63  But 
the Indian peoples were deemed by Marshall to retain their inherent right 
of exclusive use and occupancy of their aboriginal lands until those lands 
were acquired by the federal government.64  The purchase of those lands 
was to be the preferred means of legitimate federal land acquisition.65 
 Legal commentators understandably emphasize Marshall’s 
practical motives and result-oriented rationale in his opinion.66  First, they 
read Johnson as holding that the federal government possesses the 
exclusive authority to prescribe the terms and conditions for future non-
Indian settlement of the western Indian lands.67  Second, they read that 
decision as restricting the Indian peoples’ inherent sovereign power to 
alienate their aboriginal land titles to anyone but the federal government.68  
They view the Indians’ exclusive use and occupancy rights as a temporary 
accommodation that served primarily to ensure the federal government’s 
paramount ownership over a vast, federalized public domain that would 
eventually extend to the Pacific Ocean.69 
                                                 
62. Historical scholars agree that the Indian peoples’ right to “complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations” was diminished by Marshall’s opinion that 
European “discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”  WASHBURN, supra 
note 17, at 66. 
63. Despite Marshall’s personal misgivings about the justice of the 
discovery doctrine, he declared that “if the principle has been asserted in the first 
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if 
the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of 
the land, and cannot be questioned.”  Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591. 
64. Marshall viewed the Indian peoples as the “rightful occupants of the 
soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according 
to their discretion.”  Id. at 574. 
65. The Indian peoples’ “right of possession has never been questioned” 
by the federal government that has the “exclusive power of acquiring” Indian title.  Id. 
at 603. 
66. Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn emphasizes Marshall’s “practical” 
appreciation of the “economic and political demands of the millions [of non-Indians]” 
who populated the continent at the time of his decision.  WASHBURN, supra note 17, 
at 66. 
67. Professor George C. Coggins views that decision as laying the “legal 
predicates for the federal [land] disposition program and the westward expansion.”  
GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 49 (3d ed. 
1993). 
68. Id. at 54 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 468–93 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982)). 
69. Id. 
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 But Marshall’s accommodation of the Indian peoples’ exclusive 
use and occupancy rights in their lands derived from federal commitments 
to protect Indian land rights that were embodied in many federal Indian 
treaties.70  It likewise justified the federal government’s paternalistic 
interest in prohibiting unauthorized Indian land transactions by private 
parties, states, or rival foreign governments.71  Furthermore, it was the 
self-executing nature of the European doctrine of discovery that 
supposedly divested the Indian peoples of their inherent right to freely 
alienate their lands to anyone but the federal government.72  Marshall’s 
accommodation of this doctrine to nineteenth-century American 
circumstances was arguably intended to serve the complementary interests 
of the federal government and the Indian peoples. 
 The federal government, through its Indian treaties, defined the 
evolving boundary line between Indian Country and those lands available 
for non-Indian settlement.  Indian consent not only legitimated the treaty-
making process, but was the preferred means for defining Indian 
Country.73 
                                                 
70. Indians as “original inhabitants” of America were “admitted to be the 
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession 
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion.”  Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 
574. 
71. Washburn cites the Johnson decision as the federal government’s 
basis “for all subsequent determinations of Indian right.”  WASHBURN, supra note 17, 
at 66. 
72. Marshall weighed issues of conscience, expediency, and law in his 
recasting of what Washburn calls the “natural rights of Indians.”  Id.  He reworked the 
Indians’ land rights in terms of the “speculative” rights of the discovering European 
nations, the “juridical” rights of the successor American states, and the “practical” 
economic and political demands of those non-Indian settlers that came to populate the 
American continent.  Id. 
73. President George Washington and War Secretary Henry Knox both 
emphasized respect for the Indian peoples’ aboriginal land titles and rights.  President 
Thomas Jefferson described the federal government’s preemptive right in the Indian 
peoples’ lands: 
 
not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or 
paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a reminder 
after the extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no 
present right whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking 
possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had 
the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they 
choose to keep it, and that this might be forever. 
 
1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 59. 
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 Indeed, Indian diplomacy resulted in many Indian treaties, 
including those that confirmed vast roaming and hunting reserves to the 
powerful Great Plains Indian tribes.74  Some view these Indian treaties as 
a monument to Marshall’s Indian law legacy.75  But they would later loom 
                                                 
Henry Knox echoed that sentiment on pragmatic, moral grounds, writing to 
President Washington: 
 
that a nation solicitous of establishing its character on the broad 
basis of justice would . . . reject every proposition to benefit itself, 
by the injury of any neighboring community, however 
contemptible and weak it might be, either with respect to its 
manners or power. . . . The Indians being the prior occupants, 
possess the right to the soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by 
their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war. 
 
Id. 59–60. 
Marshall’s opinions describe the Indian peoples as independent political 
entities that despite their status as “domestic dependent nations” were assumed to have 
retained the power of self-governance over their members and their territories.  But 
Indian reformers after the Civil War began to agitate for the unilateral and coercive 
extension of federal law and jurisdiction into Indian Country.  The Board of Indian 
Commissioners declared in 1871 that “we owe it to them, and to ourselves, to teach 
them the majesty of civilized law, and to extend to them its protections against 
lawlessness among themselves.”  2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 676. 
74. The Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851 was drawn up at one of the most 
dramatic meetings of Indian peoples and federal treaty negotiators.  Some ten thousand 
Indians—Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapahos, Crows, Assiniboine, Gros Ventres, Mandans, 
and Arikaras—assembled along the Platte River at Horse Creek, where there was 
enough pasturage to support such a large gathering of Indian peoples and their horses.  
Francis Prucha describes the meeting as “slowly paced and formal” as Superintendent 
Mitchell’s comments had to be translated by interpreters on behalf of many tribal 
nations.  Despite some confusion and missteps by the treaty commissioners, the treaty 
was signed on September 17, just before the federal supply train arrived with goods 
for distribution to the Indians. 
The Indian peoples agreed in the treaty to cease hostilities among the tribal 
groups and to accept the respective hunting and roaming boundaries declared in the 
treaty for each of the respective tribal groups.  They also agreed to the United States’ 
establishment of roads and military outposts in Indian Country, and to pay restitution 
for wrongs committed against non-Indians who lawfully passed through their lands.  
The federal government, in return, agreed to protect the Indian peoples from non-
Indian depredations and to pay annuities of $50,0000 annually.  FRANCIS PAUL 
PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 238–
39 (1994). 
75. Charles Wilkinson characterizes these treaties and the resulting 
reservation system as “intended to establish tribal homelands for the tribes, islands of 
tribalism largely free from interference by non-Indians or future state governments.”  
CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 14 (1987). 
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as a major impediment to the United States’ realization of the late 
nineteenth-century dream of manifest destiny.  The task of empire building 
required a judicial revision of Marshall’s Indian bargaining model.  Only 
by fundamentally reformulating that model could Marshall’s opinions be 
made to serve the national imperatives of rapid western settlement and 
development.  In reformulating its inherited model, the Court unleashed 
the much criticized, but never repudiated, congressional plenary power 
doctrine to take Indian lands.76 
 Marshall’s opinions provided the context for the later judicial 
reformulation of the Indian bargaining model.77 
 
D. The Second Era: The Indian Peoples’ Descent from Sovereign to 
Wardship Status 
 
 Indian treaties inextricably bound the Indian peoples and federal 
government together in a land-based relationship.78  The treaties 
committed the federal government to protect the Indians’ exclusive use 
and occupancy rights from infringement by increasingly raucous and 
numerous non-Indian settlers who clamored for the opening of the Indian-
owned western lands.79  But federal Indian policy became inexorably 
driven by the late nineteenth-century notion of an American manifest 
destiny to acquire and settle all of the western lands to the Pacific Ocean.80 
 The Indian Country concept had assumed that sufficient land was 
available on America’s western frontier to accommodate the Indians’ and 
non-Indians’ settlement needs.  By the 1830s, the eastern Indian tribes had 
already been compelled to cede their lands east of the Mississippi and 
                                                 
76. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also PRUCHA, 
supra note 74, at 356. 
77. The Indian peoples did not possess “complete sovereignty” over their 
territories because their status had been diminished by “the original fundamental 
principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.” WASHBURN, supra 
note 17, at 66. 
78. See CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34–38; supra note 9. 
79. Congress originally sought to define and maintain a meaningful 
boundary around Indian Country for a variety of practical reasons.  For this reason, 
Congress asserted, under various Indian trade and intercourse acts, regulatory 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who intruded into Indian Country or sought to purchase 
Indian lands.  Id. at 47. 
80. William Gilpin wrote in 1846 of the American people’s 
“untransacted destiny . . . to subdue the continent—to rush over this vast field to the 
Pacific Ocean . . . to establish a new order in human affairs.”  Id. at 38.  But between 
Gilpin and the Pacific Ocean lay many Indian peoples who were willing to fight to 
preserve their land and territory.  Id. 
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remove to an Indian Territory west of the Mississippi.  President Jackson 
convinced himself and others that this Indian removal strategy could be a 
cornerstone of Indian policy.81  Indian peoples could always be removed 
farther west to arguably equivalent and conveniently distant western 
lands.82 
 Indian bargains could be fairly revised so as to accommodate 
emerging non-Indian settlement needs.83  This simple faith in a boundless 
western frontier made easy those treaty promises that the Indian peoples 
would retain their lands for as “long as the grass is green and the rivers 
flow.”84  But by the 1870s, this convenient view had proven a disastrous 
failure.  Non-Indian settlement of western lands proceeded at such a 
breathless pace after the Civil War as to make nonsense of any future 
Indian bargaining strategy.85 
                                                 
81. Removal of the eastern Indian peoples had been a central concern of 
federal policy makers since the War of 1812.  President Jackson’s warning in 1830 to 
the Chickasaws to either emigrate or submit to state law served to formalize the Indian 
removal idea as policy.  Id. at 47–48. 
82. The concept of a permanent Indian Country contemplated a secure 
western territory for the resident Indian peoples in which federally sponsored 
programs of acculturation and education would have sufficient time to transform many 
of the Indian peoples into civilized and acceptable neighbors.  PRUCHA, supra note 74, 
at 235–36. 
83. The earlier acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 allowed 
President Andrew Jackson to implement the Indian removal policy on a large scale in 
the 1830s.  President Jefferson had earlier suggested that the eastern Indian peoples 
could be granted western lands in exchange for their aboriginal lands that lay east of 
the Mississippi River.  President Jefferson’s notion of a western geographic expanse 
vaguely called “Indian Territory” took concrete shape by the 1860s when many of the 
eastern Indian peoples had been relocated into a concentrated area now known as 
Oklahoma.  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42. 
The westward removal of the eastern Indian peoples during the 1830s served 
a variety of goals held by the early federal Indian policy makers.  It quickly cleared 
Indian lands for non-Indian settlement.  It effectively insulated the removed Indian 
peoples from a proximate, unhealthy and conflict-ridden contact with non-Indian 
frontiersmen.  Cornell emphasizes that the federal government’s Indian policy goal 
was both the progressive extinction of Indian land title and the displacement of Indian 
cultures with non-Indian values and norms.  Id. at 40–41. 
84. Wilkinson cites promises by treaty commissioners that the Indian 
peoples would possesses their reservations as “permanent home(s) from which there 
will be no danger of your moving again.”  WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 17. 
85. Indian removal and assimilation policies were fused in 1887 by the 
General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 331–358, 381 (1994)).  It authorized the president to allot communally held Indian 
lands in severalty as among the members of the respective resident Indian peoples. 
Indian heads of households would generally receive 160-acre parcels and single Indian 
individuals or children would receive smaller parcels of tribal land.   Allotted lands 
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 Sovereign bargains can be enforced only through legally binding 
proceedings or at gunpoint.86  The Indian peoples, unable and unwilling to 
once again accommodate the federal government’s land cession demands, 
engaged in a lengthy, but ultimately futile, military defense of their 
roaming and hunting reserves.87  The Indian peoples’ resort to the gun 
ended with the ignominious 1890 massacre by federal cavalry of Big 
Foot’s ragtag band of a few Sioux warriors and many women, children, 
and old men.88 
 The Indian peoples’ resort to the federal courts to enforce their 
sovereign bargains came in Lone Wolf.89  The Comanches and Kiowas 
sued for an injunction to prevent the federal allotment and sale of their 
                                                 
were originally to be held in federal trust for twenty-five years for the individual 
allottees.  But Indian lands that were deemed surplus to the allotment requirements of 
a specific reservation could be put up for sale by the president to non-Indian settlers 
with the sales proceeds being placed in Treasury accounts for the benefit of the 
affected Indian people.  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42–43. 
86. Marshall’s Indian bargaining model presumed that later revision of 
the Indian peoples’ territorial rights would come through good faith bargaining that 
was reasonably free of federal coercion, threat, or unfair inducements to obtain the 
Indians’ consent to future land cessions.  But federal Indian policy soon deviated from 
this standard by countenancing treaty negotiation practices that bordered on the 
coercive, if not downright fraudulent.   CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45–50. 
87. Custer’s defeat by the combined forces of Sioux and Cheyenne 
warriors on June 26, 1876, at the Little Bighorn effectively bookends Stephen 
Cornell’s Indian conflict era, which stretched from the late eighteenth to late 
nineteenth centuries.  Id. at 14. 
88. A small Sioux band of some 100 Indian warriors and 250 women and 
children surrendered near the South Dakota Badlands to troops of the Seventh Cavalry 
on December 28, 1890.  These Indians were surrounded, as they camped near 
Wounded Knee Creek, by 500 soldiers and several pieces of Hotchkiss light artillery.  
Apparently, the frightened soldiers searched the Indian camp for firearms the next 
morning and a scuffle ensued in which an Indian warrior fired a gun.  Both Indians 
and soldiers exchanged fire and the non-Indian commander ordered the firing of the 
Hotchkiss artillery at the fleeing Indian women and children as they retreated into a 
ravine near the camp.  The Indian bodies would eventually stretch for miles as some 
200 Sioux Indians were killed by the federal troops.  Id. at 3. 
The military subjugation of the Apaches, Sioux, and Nez Perce by the federal 
cavalry in the 1870s marked the effective end of armed Indian resistance on the Great 
Plains and Far West.  The collapse of Indian military might left the Indian peoples 
vulnerable to retributive congressional action and the pressures of treaty 
negotiators.  Cornell cites the words of Shoshone Chief Washakie in 1878 as the 
closing elegy of this era: “Our fathers were steadily driven out, or killed, and we, their 
sons, but sorry remnants of tribes once mighty, are cornered in little spots of the earth 
all ours by right—cornered like guilty prisoners and watched by men with guns.”  Id. 
at 50. 
89. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
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treaty reserved lands in contravention of the Indian consent provisions of 
the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek.90 
 Congress decided in 1871 to repudiate future Indian treaty 
making.  Some non-Indians wanted Congress to go further and repudiate 
all existing Indian treaties.91  But the 1871 statute only prohibited the 
president from future negotiation or execution of treaties with the Indian 
tribes.92  Congress expressly declined to abrogate the many Indian treaties 
negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate before 
1871.93  Several of these treaties allocated vast tracts of hunting and 
roaming lands to powerful Great Plains Indian tribes.94  Further, those 
treaties required that at least a majority of the adult male members of the 
tribes consent to any future cession of their lands to the federal 
government.95 
 Congress avoided the wholesale abrogation of existing Indian 
bargains, but the Supreme Court was directly confronted with the 
abrogation issue in Lone Wolf.96  It had to decide whether the Kiowas and 
                                                 
90. Lone Wolf’s attorney, William C. Springer, filed an injunction action 
against Interior Secretary Hitchcock on June 6, 1900, in the equity division of the 
Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the allotment and sale of the 
Indians’ land violated their due process rights.  BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF V. 
HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS AND INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 62–63 (1994). 
91. Termination of Indian treaty making, Indian reformers believed, 
would allow individual Indians to be integrated into white society via a stringent 
educational program and the extension of private property rights into Indian lands.  
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 73. 
92. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)). 
93. Existing Indian treaties are expressly preserved by the statute's terms.  
WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 138 n.3. 
94. The 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749 (1859), with the Sioux, 
Cheyennes, Arapaho, Crow, Assiniboins, Gros Ventres, Mandans, and Arikaras 
spelled out the hunting and roaming boundaries for each signatory tribe.  But Prucha 
emphasizes that it was the Sioux, along with their Cheyenne and Arapaho allies, who 
“dominated the conference” and achieved federal acknowledgment of their “power” 
and effectively allowed them to dominate the reserved hunting grounds.  1 PRUCHA, 
supra note 5, at 343. 
95. See, e.g., Article 12 of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek with 
the Kiowa and Comanche peoples, which stated that “[n]o treaty for the cession of any 
portion or part of the reservation herein described . . . shall be of any validity or force 
as against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all 
the adult male Indians occupying the same.”  Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche 
Tribes of Indians (Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 
581, 585. 
96. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
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Comanche Indians could prevent the federal government from allotting 
their reservation and selling the so-called surplus tribal lands to non-Indian 
settlers in violation of the Indian consent provisions of the 1867 Treaty of 
Medicine Lodge Creek.97  Indian treaties—such as the Medicine Lodge 
Creek Treaty—had long legitimated the federal acquisition of Indian 
lands.98  Such Indian land agreements were portrayed as the outcome of 
mutually beneficial arms-length negotiations between the federal 
government and the affected Indian peoples.99 
 But Congress’ 1871 decision to abandon Indian treaty making 
presented the Supreme Court with a dilemma.  The Court had two options 
in Lone Wolf.100  It could accept Lone Wolf’s argument that the Indian 
consent requirement bound Congress and prevented the coerced allotment 
of their reservation.  That provision required that at least three-fourths of 
the adult male members of the tribes consent to any future tribal land 
cessions to the federal government.101  It had been inserted in the 1867 
                                                 
97. Art. 12, 15 Stat. at 585.  Clark reports that “[f]riends of the Indian 
approached the court appeal buoyed with an air of positive anticipation [because] 
never before had the executive, legislative or judicial branches seized Indian property 
and thrown it open without at least the tacit consent of the Indians.”  CLARK, supra 
note 90, at 67.  They were hopeful that the judiciary would enforce Article 12 of the 
1867 Medicine Lodge Treaty after Congress ratified the Jerome Commission 
agreement for the Indians’ cession of their reserved lands, even though far fewer than 
the required number of Kiowas and Comanches had consented to that agreement.  See 
Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 676.  This disregard of the Indians’ treaty-
guaranteed property rights was the basis for the suit of Lone Wolf, a Kiowa Indian, to 
enjoin Interior Secretary Hitchcock from implementing that act on his reservation.  
CLARK, supra note 90, at 67–76. 
98. CLARK, supra note 90, at 99. 
99. The Lone Wolf decision stripped away the Indian reformers’ delusion 
that the Indian peoples enjoyed the unqualified ownership of their treaty-reserved 
lands.  Congress, thereafter, proceeded with the opening of many treaty-established 
Indian reservations.  2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 775–76. 
100. Lone Wolf argued that Indian consent to the Jerome Agreement had 
been procured by misrepresentation or threat and that, in any case, fewer than the 
required three-fourths of the adult male members had signed the agreement.  The 
Court’s possible acceptance of this due process argument represented option one.  
Alternatively, the Court could choose to reformulate Marshall’s Indian bargaining 
model so as to allow Congress to exercise plenary power over the Indian peoples’ 
lands and resources.  PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 355–60. 
101. Article 12 of that treaty provided that: 
 
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation 
herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any 
validity or force against the said Indians, unless executed and 
signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians 
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treaty to specifically reassure those Indians who wanted a federal 
guarantee of their future, undisturbed use and occupancy of their reserved 
lands.102  But stringent judicial enforcement of this and similar Indian 
consent provisions would likely throttle any envisioned federal opening of 
the vast western Indian lands subject to similar treaty 
provisions.103  Alternatively, it could decide that Congress was morally, 
but not legally, bound to respect its Indian bargains.  Only by 
fundamentally reformulating Marshall’s Indian bargaining model could 
the Court sustain Congress’ coerced allotment and sale of Indian lands in 
defiance of its treaty commitments.104 
 The federal government was freed from its treaty promises by the 
Court’s redefinition of the relationship between the Indian peoples and the 
federal government.105  The Court seized on Marshall’s early dictum in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.106  Marshall had casually analogized the 
relationship of the federal government and the Indian peoples as like that 
of a guardian and its wards.107  But the Court in Lone Wolf transformed 
this casual analogy into a sweeping doctrine of federal plenary power over 
Indian affairs.  The repercussions of the Lone Wolf doctrine for the 
Indians’ land base were deep and long lasting.  It swept away any legal 
impediment to the coerced allotment and sale of Indian lands to non-Indian 
interests.  The short-and long-term effects of this decision on the Indians’ 
land base have been devastating.  Between ninety and one-hundred million 
acres of Indian lands were lost to Indian ownership.108 
                                                 
occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood 
or construed in such a manner as to deprive, without his consent, 
any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of land 
selected by him as provided in Article III of this treaty. 
 
Art. 12, 15 Stat. 581. 
102. Kiowa warriors such as Satanta were opposed to the reservation 
system.  He asserted that when Indians “settle down, we grow pale and die.”  CLARK, 
supra note 90, at 24.  These warriors much preferred a life of freedom.  The treaty 
negotiators held out the prospect of “gifts, annuities, [and] houses” as inducements to 
these warriors to agree to this treaty.  Id. 
103. Id. 
104. The new Lone Wolf doctrine conceived of the Indian peoples as 
governmental “wards [to be] confined on Indian reservations, with the power and 
dignity of independent nations supported by treaty guarantees all but forgotten.”  
PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 358. 
105. Id. 
106. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
107. Id. at 17. 
108. Congress’ 1887 allotment program fused earlier disparate Indian 
removal and assimilation policies in a dramatic and global manner.  Between 1887 
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 The Lone Wolf decision drove a stake through the heart of Indian 
consent doctrine.  Presumed congressional good faith in its Indian 
dealings, not Indian consent, would govern future Indian land cessions to 
the federal government.  Furthermore, Congress was judicially authorized 
to take Indian lands incident to its exercise of guardianship power over the 
Indian peoples.  The Court’s action unleashed the federal government’s 
forced Indian assimilation program that was aimed at the systematic 
dismantling of traditional tribal governance and cultural systems.109 
 The Lone Wolf decision authorizing the congressional allotment 
and sale of the Indian peoples’ treaty-reserved lands and birthing the 
federal plenary power doctrine represents the second era of Marshall’s 
Indian law legacy.110 
 
E. The Third Era: Judicial Indecision Regarding the Compensability of 
Indian Title 
 
 The demolition of the Indian consent principle signaled a low 
point for the Indian peoples.111  However, the Indian peoples and their 
advocates did not give up hope of somehow protecting their lands from 
                                                 
and 1934, when Congress officially repudiated its allotment program, some 60% of 
the remaining Indian land base—more than 86 million acres—had passed into non-
Indian hands.  These lands were transferred from Indian ownership through a variety 
of means.  Much of those lands were directly sold to non-Indians under the federal 
surplus lands acts.  Some of those lands were lost to Indian ownership through 
amendments to the Allotment Act that allowed individual Indians to sell or encumber 
their lands as a means of obtaining some income for subsistence needs on the new and 
substantially diminished Indian reservations of the twentieth century.  CORNELL, supra 
note 4, at 44–45. 
109. Professor Getches suggests that the Indian plenary power doctrine 
grew out of three basic assumptions: first, strict adherence to the terms of Indian 
treaties would have distributed an unfair share of the nation's wealth to Indians; 
second, federal courts declined the role of enforcing arguably imprecise treaty terms; 
and third, the Indian plenary power doctrine preserves federal flexibility to adapt 
Indian policy in light of fundamentally changed circumstances.  GETCHES ET AL., 
supra note 10, at 208. 
110. Indian allotment served as the characteristic dispossession device of 
the “reservation era,” dating from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s.  CORNELL, 
supra note 4, at 42–43. 
111. Allotment marked the beginning of a new process of incorporation of 
Indian lands into the surrounding American economy.  The Indian peoples’ descent 
under the federal plenary power doctrine from their historic status as semisovereign 
nation to dependent ward mirrors their cultural and economic subordination by 
assimilative and antitribal programs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
Id. at 44–50. 
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federal takings.112  Did Lone Wolf absolutely immunize the federal 
government from Indian takings claims?  This issue was squarely 
presented to the Supreme Court in the 1938 case of Shoshone Tribe v. 
United States.113  In Shoshone, the Court upheld the lower court’s 
judgment that awarded just compensation to the Shoshone Indians for 
Congress’ late nineteenth-century decision to settle another Indian tribe, 
over the Shoshone’s vehement objection, on those lands reserved for the 
exclusive use and occupancy of the Shoshone Tribe.114  That decision 
heartened Indian peoples.115  The Court seemed poised to overrule its 1903 
Lone Wolf decision.116  Did the Shoshone decision really establish a per se 
Indian just compensation rule?  Was the federal government required to 
pay just compensation to injured Indian peoples when it took their lands 
for federal purposes?117 
 Any hope for a broad-gauged Indian takings doctrine was soon 
derailed.  One factor in this derailment was Congress’ creation in 1946 of 
the Indian Claims Commission (“ICC”).118  The ICC was to hear and 
determine all those jurisdictionally defined claims for relief that the Indian 
peoples may have against the United States.119  The ICC’s creation, 
coupled with the Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in Tee-Hit-Ton Band of 
Indians v. United States, doomed any easy optimism.120  Tee-Hit-Ton 
                                                 
112. Professor Nell Newton contends that extending generally the just 
compensation principle to Indian lands “would strike a fair balance between the 
competing interests of federal power and Indian rights.”  Newton, supra note 34, at 
264. 
113. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938). 
114. Because the Shoshone Tribe held a federally recognized right of 
occupancy in their lands, Congress’ exercise of eminent domain to transfer them to 
the use and occupancy of another Indian tribe required the payment of just 
compensation to the wronged Indian tribe.  Id. at 115. 
115. Governmental interference with Indian lands, not the scope of title 
held by the Indians, has been regarded by some commentators as the Indians’ “key to 
recovery” in the Shoshone decision.  Daniel G. Kelly, Jr., Indian Title: The Right of 
American Indians in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 655, 666 (1975). 
116. Id. at 668. 
117. Id. 
118. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 
1049 (1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).  The Indian Claims 
Commission terminated on September 30, 1978, by the terms of 25 U.S.C. § 70v. 
119. President Truman signed the ICC legislation to allow the “First 
Americans” the opportunity to “vindicate their property rights and contracts in the 
courts against the violations of the federal government itself.”  ROSENTHAL, supra 
note 47, at 92. 
120. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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dashed the Indians’ hopes of realizing Fifth Amendment protection of their 
aboriginal use and occupancy rights.  That case reinterpreted Johnson so 
as to restore the Lone Wolf doctrine that courts must defer to Congress’ 
plenary power over Indian lands.121 
 The Court’s failure in Tee-Hit-Ton to circumscribe the federal 
plenary power doctrine by extending just compensation protection to the 
Indian peoples’ aboriginal use and occupancy rights represents the third 
era of Marshall’s Indian law legacy.122 
 
F. The Final Era: Reexamining the 1949 Taking of the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation 
 
 In 1949, Congress took 156,035 acres of Indian lands located 
within the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation as the site for a massive 
multipurpose water resource development project known as the Pick-
Sloan Program.123  The Fort Berthold Indians’ impassioned, but ultimately 
futile, struggle to preserve their historic reservation demonstrates the 
contemporary impact of Marshall’s Indian bargaining model.  As will be 
demonstrated in Part V, the clash between the Fort Berthold Indians and 
the combined forces of the Army Corps of Engineers and two powerful 
congressional Indian committees starkly illustrates the need for a modern 
Indian takings doctrine.124  Extending just compensation protection to the 
remaining Indian lands would require no heroic innovations in existing 
legal doctrine or practice.  The 1949 Fort Berthold taking reveals the deep 
disadvantages faced by contemporary Indian peoples who must bargain 
with the federal government to preserve their unique land-based tribal 





                                                 
121. Id. at 290–91. 
122. From a constitutional standpoint, Professor Newton contends that 
there is no defensible reason “for treating Indian property different from non-Indian 
property.”  Newton, supra note 34, at 264.  She concludes that shielding the federal 
government from potentially large Indian takings claims should not be deemed an 
overriding governmental interest that shields the federal government from liability in 
these cases.  Id. 
123. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 664, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887, 
897–98 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.). 
124. See Meyer, supra note 45. 
125. Id. 
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II.  THE FIRST ERA: AMERICANIZING THE EUROPEAN 
DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY 
 
A. The Prologue to Johnson v. M’Intosh 
 
Sovereign bargaining between the federal government and the 
Indian peoples would be unthinkable absent Marshall’s 1823 opinion in 
Johnson v. M’Intosh.126  He created the needed bargaining framework via 
the concept of Indian title.127  By federalizing Indian land titles he 
established Congress as the exclusive dealer in Indian lands.  Three 
foundational principles were declared by the Johnson decision: First, only 
the federal government may acquire Indian lands by purchase or conquest.  
Second, only the federal government may grant Indian lands, subject to 
their right of use and occupancy.  Third, only the Indian people have the 
right to use and occupy their lands, subject to future federal divestment of 
those rights.128 
The commodification of Indian lands reflected the nineteenth 
century’s changed valuation of the western lands.  Increasing scarcity of 
available lands for non-Indian settlement prompted states and private land 
syndicates to acquire vast tracts of land directly from the Indian peoples.  
Avoiding needless bloodshed and conflict between the encroaching 
settlers and those Indians who would fight to protect their remaining lands 
was the goal of early federal Indian policy makers.129 
Congress in 1790 had asserted its regulatory authority over Indian 
lands by enacting its first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act.130  But its 
meaningful enforcement was a problematic affair along the volatile 
frontier of Indian Country.  Although federal regulations prohibited the 
unauthorized acquisition of Indian lands, private land speculators and 
states’ rights advocates openly defied Congress’ assertion of an exclusive 
                                                 
126. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). 
127. Id. at 574. 
128. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 78. 
129. The federal government sought to establish a boundary around Indian 
Country via Indian treaties and the assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian land 
and commercial transactions under the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act.  This federal 
regulatory effort was directed at restraining private and state efforts to dispossess the 
Indian peoples of their lands.  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 47. 
130. President Andrew Jackson’s efforts to remove the Five Civilized 
Tribes—the Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Seminoles—from their 
lands in the southeastern United States helped to undermine the federal government’s 
commitment to protecting Indian lands.  Id. 
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police power over these resources.131  Indeed, similar initiatives by the 
British Crown to restrict private commercial intercourse with the Indians 
had prompted widespread evasion by rebellious colonial interests.  
Frontiersmen and private land-speculation syndicates likewise greeted the 
federal government’s feeble efforts to protect the Indian lands with 
disdain.  They openly challenged the federal government’s authority to 
restrict their asserted natural liberty to acquire land directly from the 
Indian peoples.132 
 
B. The Devolution of Original Indian Title 
 
Sovereign bargaining via Indian treaty making had arguably 
served the European nations’ need for exclusive control over Indian 
lands.133  Marshall assumed that it could also serve that same goal on 
                                                 
131. The 1796 version of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act specified a 
discrete boundary line between the whites and Indians.  Indian Trade and Intercourse 
Act, 1 Stat. 469, 469 (1796).  Prucha points to this as the first such formal statutory 
designation of Indian Country.  Despite frontiersmen dissatisfaction with a law that 
intended to frustrate their direct dealings with, or depredations upon, the Indians, 
Congress reenacted the statute in 1799 without amendment and with little debate.  
Apparently, Congress valued the friendship and pacification of its Indian allies more 
than it feared the outrage of those frontiersmen who felt they were deprived of their 
settlement opportunities or natural liberties by Congress’ high-handed treatment of its 
own citizenry.  1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 92–93. 
132. Enforcement of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act in frontier 
America of the early nineteenth century proved well-nigh impossible.  The American 
frontier had spawned a subculture of a breed of lawless, sometimes depraved, men 
who lived off clandestine intercourse with the Indians.  The Indian fur trade literally 
created these men who went off with their packs for months on end into the wilderness.  
Prucha emphasizes that though they often took Indian wives, they nonetheless 
“mercilessly exploited the Indians, debauched them with whiskey, and then robbed 
them of their furs.”  1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 95.  They totally disregarded legalities, 
and their well-heeled capitalist masters, such as John Jacob Astor of the American Fur 
Company, sought legislative relief against overstrong enforcement of federal Indian 
treaties and the various federal protective statutes.  Id. 
133. Id. at 113–14.  Marshall’s Indian law decisions laid the legal basis for 
such federal regulation of Indian Country by declaring the principles of federal 
preemption over Indian lands and tribal sovereignty.  Prucha reads these decisions as 
establishing the federal government’s exclusive power to extinguish the Indian 
peoples’ aboriginal rights of occupancy in their lands.  But the federal government 
was interested in exercising its legal power to protect Indian land rights only up to a 
point.  The federal government’s main interest was in policing the process of non-
Indian settlement of Indian lands so as to ensure that it was achieved with as little 
disorder and bloodshed as possible.  Indeed, the notion of Indian removal far west of 
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behalf of the federal government.134  Curbing non-Indian incursions into 
Indian lands was also an important goal of the early federal government.135  
Such bitter land-related conflicts helped convince the framers of the 
Constitution that an unregulated Indian commerce was unwise and 
dangerous.  Constitutional responsibility for regulating Indian commerce 
was explicitly assigned to the federal government by the 1787 
Constitutional Convention.136 
But a major practical issue was left undecided: who held legal title 
to the western Indian lands?  Whoever held that title would control the 
destiny of non-Indian western settlement.  Marshall recognized that the 
peculiar facts and issues presented in Johnson offered the Court an 
opportunity to domesticate Indian title in a manner favorable to the federal 
government.137 
Johnson involved private land transactions with Indian tribes in 
1773 and 1775, prior to the United States’ existence.138  The Court’s 
ostensible task in Johnson was to determine which of the two competing 
private claimants had the better title to a large tract of former Indian lands 
in the Ohio Valley.139  One of the non-Indian claimants traced his land title 
to private land purchases in 1773 and 1775 directly from the chiefs or 
headmen of the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians.140  The other non-Indian 
claimant traced his land titles to a later federal grant of those lands that 
was subsequent to a land cession agreement between the federal 
government and those same Indians.141 
Marshall seized the opportunity to address the broader question of 
who had the power to grant “good title” to Indian lands—the federal 
government or the respective Indian peoples?142  By a creative 
interweaving of sixteenth-century European notions of sovereignty over 
                                                 
the Mississippi convinced some Indian policy makers that they could forever defer the 
problem of non-Indian encroachment on Indian Country.  Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 108–14. 
136. The new Constitution vested exclusive authority in Congress to 
regulate trade and commerce and make treaties with the Indian peoples.  This was a 
“far simpler and clearer” declaration of federal legislative authority over Indian affairs 
than had been contained in the superseded Articles of Confederation.  GETCHES ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 70–71. 
137. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL 
CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 710–11 (1991). 
138. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571–72 (1823). 
139. Id. at 572. 
140. Id. at 543–71. 
141. Id. at 571–72. 
142. Id. at 572–73. 
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“heathen and infidel peoples” with the practical necessity for the orderly 
western settlement, Marshall established the federal government’s 
paramount title to Indian lands.143  Based on the European sovereigns’ 
preemptive rights over Indian lands, he concluded that only the federal 
government could grant “good title” to former Indian lands.144  Despite 
Marshall’s personal doubt that the Pope or the European monarchs 
possessed any such power to grant Indian lands to their colonizing 
expeditions or chartered companies,145 he nonetheless concluded that the 
American courts were bound by established European law and custom to 
recognize the federal government’s power over Indian lands.146 
The de facto success of the Europeans in incorporating the Indian 
lands into their respective domestic system of property rights established, 
for Marshall, a judicially unassailable “actual state of things.”147  By 
Marshall’s “velvet revolution,” the United States acceded to paramount 
title over Indian lands, without resort to a gruesome and expensive war of 
conquest against fierce tribal opponents who would fight rather than 
surrender their lands to non-Indians.148 
But Marshall was required to tweak the discovery doctrine to 
adapt it to American circumstances.149  Marshall’s moral disquiet about 
the seeming dispossession of the Indian peoples may have prompted his 
                                                 
143. Id. at 591. 
144. Id. at 587–92. 
145. Id. at 590–91. 
146. The discovering European nations had the “sole right of acquiring the 
soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it.”  Id. at 573.  The United 
States likewise “maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish 
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or conquest.”  Id. at 587. 
147. Marshall reasoned that the British Crown had successfully asserted 
its “limited sovereignty over [the Indian peoples], and the exclusive right of 
extinguishing the title which occupancy gave them.”  Id. at 588.  This sovereignty and 
preemptive right over the Indians’ land passed to the United States after its successful 
revolution against British authority in 1783. 
148. The discovery doctrine, however much it “may be opposed to natural 
right, and to the usages of civilized nations,” is yet “indispensable to that system under 
which (the United States) has been settled.”  Id. at 591. 
149. Marshall’s task in Johnson was to: 
 
consider not only law but conscience and expediency as well.  The 
“natural” rights of the Indians had to be seen in terms of the 
“speculative” rights of the earlier European monarchs, the 
“juridical” rights of their successor American states, and the 
“practical” economic and political demands of the millions who 
now populated the continent. 
 
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66. 
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action.150  Judicial confiscation of the Indians’ aboriginal land titles was 
arguably allowed by the European doctrine of discovery.  But he had also 
to elide a delicate public relations problem: such dispossession would have 
outraged international public opinion and led to the condemnation of his 
new nation.151 
Marshall could not confirm the Indian peoples’ inherent authority 
to alienate their lands to whomever they wished. That decision would have 
frustrated the revenue raising capability and expansionist ambitions of the 
federal government.152  He avoided this dilemma by legally bifurcating the 
Indian peoples’ land titles into two federally recognized property 
interests.153  The Indians, as first possessors of the soil, held the right of 
exclusive use and occupancy in their aboriginal lands.  This possessory 
right was declared to be as legally sacred as the Anglo-American right of 
fee ownership.154  However, the United States, as the sovereign successor 
in interest to the European discovering nations, held the paramount fee 
simple title to the Indians’ lands.155 
This bifurcation of Indian title both justified and necessitated a 
land-based relationship between the federal government and the Indian 
                                                 
150. Washburn characterizes Marshall’s opinion as balancing “conscience 
and expediency” in justifying what may be regarded as his dispossession of the 
Indians’ “natural right” to the full ownership of those lands they had occupied from 
time immemorial.  Id. 
151. G. Edward White described Marshall’s difficulty as arising from 
distinct legal principles that apply to the Indian peoples: 
 
The Indians had been the initial possessors of the American 
continent: the land and, presumably, the property rights emanating 
from it were theirs. . . . The Indian tribes had been recognized from 
the outset of white settlement as nations and had entered into legal 
relationships, such as treaties or contracts, with whites.  
Theoretically, then, Indian tribes holding land had not only rights 
of sovereignty but a bundle of natural rights deserving of legal 
recognition, rights related to the concepts of liberty, property, and 
self-determination that occupied so exalted a position in early-
nineteenth-century jurisprudence. 
 
WHITE, supra note 137, at 704. 
152. But the availability of this land and resources for American expansion 
“was dependent on the dispossession of the original inhabitants.” CORNELL, supra 
note 4, at 35. 
153. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591–94. 
154. Id. 
155. Marshall’s message in Johnson to the Indian peoples was that “the 
natural rights of human beings to dispose of property that they held by virtue of 
possession did not apply to Indians in America.”  WHITE, supra note 137, at 710. 
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peoples.  Doubtless, the Indian peoples would have charged, if they had 
been consulted, that the Johnson decision wrongfully impaired their 
preexisting sovereign authority over their lands.  They lost their inherent 
right to sell or alienate their lands to anyone but the federal government.156  
Doubtless, the non-Indian settlers and speculators, if they had likewise 
been consulted, would have charged that the Johnson decision ignored 
their God-given natural liberty to acquire lands from the Indians.  
Furthermore, the Indian peoples, private land dealers, and state rights 
advocates would have protested the judicially created and exclusive power 
of the federal government to prescribe those terms and conditions by 
which private parties would hereinafter acquire title to western Indian 
lands.157  Few of the now innumerable grantees of federal land titles know 
or care that the Indian peoples had originally granted those lands to the 
United States.158 
 
C. Marshall’s Creation of an American “Charter of Discovery” 
 
Marshall extolled the sacredness of the Indian peoples’ use and 
occupancy rights in their aboriginal lands.159  To some this seems mere 
                                                 
156. The natural law idea was reduced in Johnson to an “advisory 
capacity.”  White concludes that the Indians’ inherent right to dispose of property had 
been subordinated to the “positive enactments of American states and the federal 
government.”  Id. at 710–11. 
157. Theorizing about the Indian rights played little role in the thinking of 
the non-Indian settler or the eastern Indian land speculator.  Prucha remarks that “they 
saw the rich lands of the Indians and they wanted them.”  1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 
108.  John Sevier’s natural liberties philosophy served to legitimate the aggressive 
attitudes of the frontiersmen.  He argued that the “law of nations . . . agree[s] that no 
people shall be entitled to more land than they can cultivate.”  Id.  His frontiersman’s 
philosophy triumphed because the federal government could make only sporadic and 
relatively feeble military efforts to regulate this non-Indian pressure to settle Indian 
lands.  Id. at 111–12. 
158. The incorporation of the Indian lands into the American property 
system was essential for the realization of nineteenth-century visions of America’s 
destiny.  Thomas Jefferson, as champion of the social agrarian movement, promoted 
the commercialization and appropriation of western Indian lands as the basis for 
founding an independent-minded “yeoman” class of free-holder farmers.  By contrast, 
William Gilpin focused in 1846 on the idea of progress and manifest destiny when he 
wrote: “The untransacted destiny of the American people is to subdue the continent—
to rush over this vast field to the Pacific Ocean . . . to establish a new order in human 
affairs.”  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 37–38.  Common to both of these visions is the 
need to incorporate the Indian lands as a commodity for future federal disposition. 
159. The United States government treated the Indian peoples as if they 
were autonomous foreign nations.  Marshall concluded that this treaty-making history 
confirmed an “autonomous nationhood” for Indian peoples.  But Marshall could not 
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judicial sugarcoating that shrouds a culturally biased taking of Indian 
lands.160  But contemporary efforts to mitigate or prevent the federal taking 
of Indian lands require a critical revaluation of Marshall’s Indian 
bargaining model. 
This analysis focuses on two elements: (1) Marshall’s adoption of 
a conflated notion of European sovereignty over the “heathen and infidel” 
peoples of the New World;161 and (2) Justice Reed’s later revision of the 
Johnson decision in holding that the Indians’ aboriginal use and 
occupancy rights are not compensable property interests.162  The federal 
government may take aboriginal use and occupancy rights without any 
payment of judicially mandated compensation.163 
But Reed’s opinion confounds Johnson and extends it beyond its 
facts and rationale.  By the time of Justice Reed’s opinion in 1955, the 
West had long been settled.164  Doubtless Johnson foreclosed Indian land 
                                                 
recognize that the Indian peoples retained full sovereignty over their aboriginal lands.  
Id. at 57–58. 
The qualified character of Indian sovereignty over their aboriginal lands is 
evidenced in Jefferson’s proposed constitutional amendment that would have 
authorized the federal government’s acquisition of the Louisiana Territory from 
France in 1803.  Although he proposed a recognition of Indian land rights, he limited 
that recognition to an exclusive right of occupancy in their aboriginal lands.  The 
proposed language read: 
 
The right of occupancy in the soil, and of self-government, are 
confirmed to the Indian inhabitants, as they now exist.  Preemption 
only of the portions rightfully occupied by them, & a succession to 
the occupancy of such as they may abandon, with the full rights of 
possession as well as of property & sovereignty in whatever is not 
or shall cease to be so rightfully occupied by them shall belong to 
the U.S. 
 
Id. at 59. 
160. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN 
LEGAL THOUGHT 308–17 (1990). 
161. The European doctrine of discovery was intended to broker discovery 
claims of “new lands” between competing European monarchs.  1 PRUCHA, supra note 
5, at 15.  But Marshall turned this doctrine against the governmental and property 
rights of the Indian peoples as the aboriginal occupants of America. 
162. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–85 
(1955). 
163. Id. 
164. The noted Indian historian Wilcomb E. Washburn interprets 
Marshall’s opinion in Johnson as holding that the “Indians of the United States did 
not possess an unqualified sovereignty despite the centuries of relations conducted 
with them in terms of treaties and diplomatic agreements.”  WASHBURN, supra note 
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claims by foreign governments, private parties, or states that were based 
solely on ostensible agreements with Indian tribes.165  But did it authorize 
the federal taking of Indian lands without compensation as claimed by 
Justice Reed? 
Contemporary historical scholarship reveals that the European 
doctrine of discovery was a hotly contested notion by sixteenth-century 
legal and religious scholars.  Indeed, by the time of Marshall’s Indian law 
opinions it was clearly rejected as an international normative principle for 
the regulation of Europeans’ treatment of indigenous peoples and their 
lands in the New World.166  Furthermore, Marshall’s interpretation of the 
discovery doctrine also conflicted with the purpose, tenor, and intent of 
French, British, colonial, or American treaties with those many and 
powerful eastern Indian tribes.167  Many influential sixteenth-and 
seventeenth-century European jurists and thinkers who soundly 
condemned the Europeans’ treatment of the Indios of the New World 
would have also condemned Marshall’s interpretation of the discovery 
doctrine in Johnson.  A cursory examination of those thinkers’ writings 
flatly contradicts Marshall’s claim of an extant and clear European 
consensus that would legitimize his interpretation of the European 
doctrine of discovery.168 
 
                                                 
17, at 66.  He cites Marshall’s dictum that the European doctrine of discovery 
governed American law: because “the property of the great mass of the [non-Indian] 
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned.”  
Id. (quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823)).  Washburn 
asserts that Marshall recognized that “title to the real estate of the nation,” as well as 
the “economic and political demands of the millions [of non-Indians] who now 
populated the continent,” hinged upon his decision in Johnson.  Id. at 65–66. 
165. Id. at 66. 
166. L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE 
NEW WORLD 201–26 (1989). 
167. Conciliation of the Indian peoples and centralization of Indian 
commerce was the motivating force that directed British Imperial policy toward the 
Indian peoples.  Indian trade was the economic lifeblood of colonial life in America 
and it behooved the European and colonial government to cultivate diplomatic 
relationships that ensured the continued flow of Indian goods and furs into the larger 
European economic system.  See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 18–28. 
168. The Indians’ legal status provoked sharp debate between, among 
others, Juan Gines de Sepulveda (1490–1573) and Fray Bartolome de Las Casas 
(1484–1566) at Valladolid, Spain, in 1551.  Las Casas denounced Spain’s reliance on 
the papal bulls of 1493 as conveying any title to the Indian peoples’ lands.  Sepulveda, 
relying on the authority of Aristotle and St. Augustine, concluded that the Indian 
peoples were obligated to “accept Spanish domination because of the their idolatry 
and human sacrifice.”  GREEN & DICKASON, supra note 166, at 201–09, 204. 
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D. Reassessing the Contemporary Value of the Charter 
 
Justice Reed later candidly admitted that America’s nineteenth-
century dream of a manifest destiny would not have been realized but for 
the Johnson decision.169  But Reed mistakenly read Johnson as a “just so” 
story that explained that the United States’ ascension to power necessarily 
doomed the Indian peoples.170  Reed bluntly acknowledged the spurious 
logic by which Marshall extended preemptive federal title over a vast 
expanse of Indian lands that were occupied by numerous and powerful 
tribes who were prepared to militarily contest the federal government’s 
claimed ownership of their lands.171 
Reed implicitly rejected Marshall’s touted reliance on the 
established “actual state of things” as mostly wishful thinking that 
anticipated the federal government’s successful conquest of the Indian 
West.  Many of the western Indian tribes continued to exercise full 
sovereignty over their lands well after the Johnson decision.172  Marshall 
and Reed’s shared grim vision of the Indian peoples’ future derived not 
from a hypothetical sixteenth-century European charter of discovery but 
from the nineteenth-and twentieth-century desire to possess Indian 
lands.173 
Substantial growth in the nineteenth-century non-Indian 
population, supplemented by the influx of many landless European 
immigrants, required the states and private land syndicates to shift from 
an Indian “trading” to an Indian “raiding” strategy as the more efficient 
means of acquiring Indian lands.174  The Johnson decision, by 
monopolizing federal control over Indian lands, effectively closed this 
troublesome gap in federal authority.  Only Congress may prescribe the 
                                                 
169. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1955).  
170. Id. at 279–91. 
171. Justice Reed described Marshall’s opinion in Johnson as 
rationalizing the subordinate legal position of the Indian peoples.  Id. at 279. 
172. Justice Reed concluded: “Every American schoolboy knows that the 
savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force.”  Id. 
at 289–90.  
173. Justice Reed’s opinion is noted for its arguably “pejorative” 
references to the Indians’ “nomadic” stage of development and “savage” land-tenure 
concepts.  He deploys these notions as the basis for his conclusion that aboriginal 
occupancy rights may be extinguished without just compensation.  WASHBURN, supra 
note 17, at 114. 
174. Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An 
Economic Model of Indian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39 (1994). 
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terms and conditions for the future non-Indian settlement of the American 
West.175 
But Marshall’s theory of federal ownership of Indian lands would 
have left many sixteenth-century jurists and theologians dumbfounded.176  
They would have flatly rejected his hypothesized charter of discovery as 
wrongfully dispossessing the Indians of their lands.  The Indios of New 
Spain were considered by most reputable European theologians and jurists 
to be entitled to the possession and ownership of their aboriginal lands.177  
But the key distinction between the Johnson decision and the ruling 
sixteenth-century opinion regarding the Indians’ land rights in the New 
World is this: the Spanish Crown of the sixteenth century sought to 
incorporate the Indian peoples into the larger political and social order, 
whereas the federal government of the United States sought only to 
incorporate the Indian lands into its domestic legal order.178 
                                                 
175. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279–80 (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587–88 (1823)). 
176. Brutality toward the Indians of New Spain endangered the Spaniards’ 
souls, according to Father Bartoleme de Las Casas, who was to become known as “the 
protector of the Indians.”  Las Casas’ personal conversion to the cause of the Indians 
may have been hastened by a Dominican priest’s refusal of the sacraments in 1614 
because he owned and exploited Indian slaves.  Nonetheless, Las Casas devoted his 
life to persuading both the temporal and spiritual authorities of the sixteenth century 
that the Indians’ rationality as men entitled them to respect and protection under 
Spanish law.  His entreaties to Emperor Charles V were rewarded with authority to 
establish an Indian mission colony at Terra Firme in Venezuela.  Others, such as Fray 
Antonio de Montesinos, challenged the conquistador community to honor the royal 
edict that proclaimed Indians to be free men in a sermon that asked: “Are these Indians 
not men? Do they not have rational souls?” FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE FOUNDERS OF 
AMERICA 131–32 (1993). 
177. GREEN & DICKASON, supra note 166, at 196–97.  Vera Cruz, a 
Spanish professor of theology at the newly created University of Mexico, lectured 
extensively on Amerindian rights and concluded that the Indians had been “true lords 
of their lands” from time immemorial and that the Spanish Crown had no right under 
natural law to grant their lands to anyone without their express consent.  Id. at 197. 
Professor Green surmises that Vera Cruz’s lectures are “another . . . 
indication [that] Europe’s expansion into the Americas did not accord with proclaimed 
principles.”  Id. at 198. 
178. The Spanish Crown accepted its “special obligation” to protect and 
preserve its Amerindians.  Id. at 203.  Las Casas and other Spanish theologians 
denounced the institution of encomienda as an “iniquitous and tyrannical” usurpation 
of the Amerindians’ land and political rights.  Id. at 202.  Las Casas specifically 
rejected the civilizing rationale for Spanish conquest of the Amerindians by observing: 
 
Not only have [Amerindians] shown themselves to be very wise 
peoples and possessed of lively and marked understanding, 
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But the Johnson decision can be read as far more than a temporary 
accommodation of the Indians’ use and occupancy rights pending ultimate 
federal disposition of their lands.179  Indian use and occupancy rights were 
to be protected by federal regulatory and military action, if necessary, as 
against defiant non-Indian settlers.  Ironically, the minimal successes by 
the federal government in this regard seemed only to hasten the Indian 
peoples’ undoing.  The federal military forays undertaken to protect the 
Indian use and occupancy rights served only to outrage frontiersmen and 
states’ rights advocates.180 
But the Indian bargains generated via Marshall’s model proved to 
be a potent barrier to non-Indian settlement of the American West.181  The 
Indian peoples proved to be far more astute bargainers than Marshall may 
have anticipated.182  Many of the federal treaties with the powerful Great 
Plains tribes required an express Indian consent to the future cession of 
Indian lands.  Unless three-fourths of the adult male tribal members 
                                                 
prudently governing and providing for their nations [as much as 
they can be nations, without faith or knowledge of the true God] 
and making them prosper in justice; but they have equaled many 
diverse nations of the world, past and present, that have been 
praised for their governance, politics and customs, and exceed by 
no small measure the wisest of all of these, such as the Greeks and 
Romans, in adherence to these rules of natural reason. 
 
Id. at 208–09. 
179. Marshall concluded that “Indian title [is] entitled to the respect of all 
courts until it should be legitimately extinguished.”  Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592. 
180. The federal government did use military force to drive illegal settlers 
off Indian lands.  1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 112–13.  But the settlers always seemed 
to win out eventually in their goal of settling Indian lands.  Prucha cites the 
insufficiency of federal military forces and the unwillingness of civil authorities to 
fairly prosecute non-Indian violators of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act.  Id.  
Prucha also surmises that the federal government acquiesced in illegal settlements on 
Indian lands that had gone on so long and thoroughly as to be irremediable in nature.  
Id. 
181. Marshall’s Indian law decisions and related federal treaties confirmed 
the Indian peoples’ exclusive use and occupancy rights in vast hunting and roaming 
reserves in the American West.  Cornell argues that the federal government had to 
“back-peddle” on its treaty commitments so as to facilitate the further incorporation 
of Indian lands under the allotment program of the late nineteenth century.  CORNELL, 
supra note 4, at 45–50. 
182. Wilkinson cites as common treaty language those provisions that 
guarantee the Indian peoples’ “permanent” possession of their lands for their 
undisturbed “use and occupancy.”  WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 15. 
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consented to a future land cession, the federal government could not get 
their lands.183 
The self-limiting character of the Johnson decision became clear.  
The federal government emerged from that decision as a “super-
monopsonist”: the sole sovereign buyer of the Indians’ lands.  But its 
dominant market power position over Indian lands would prove radically 
insufficient to achieve its later nineteenth-century goal of rapid western 
settlement and development.184 
 
III.  THE SECOND ERA: THE INDIAN PEOPLES’ DESCENT FROM 
SOVEREIGN TO WARDSHIP STATUS 
 
A. The Rise and Fall of the “Measured Tribal Separatism” Policy 
 
The vast expanse of western lands could presumably 
accommodate the divergent and increasingly antagonistic land uses by 
encroaching non-Indian settlers and the resident Indian peoples.  War 
Secretary Henry W. Knox believed that an Indian Territory could be 
carved out of the American West.185  Congress indeed legislated in 1834 
an expansive definition of Indian Country that encompassed virtually all 
the lands west of the Mississippi River to the Sierra Nevada Mountains.186 
Indian peoples, Knox believed, should be allowed the necessary 
time, space, and opportunity to adapt their cultures and economies to a 
non-Indian way of life.187  His idea of a “measured tribal separatism” was 
                                                 
183. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
184. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45–50. 
185. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 58–60. 
186. Congress provided a statutory definition of Indian Country in the 
Nonintercourse Act of 1834: 
 
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not 
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of 
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the 
Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title 
has not been extinguished, for the purpose of this act, [shall be] 
deemed to be the Indian Country. 
 
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (1834) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 194 (1994)). 
187. Knox’s Indian policy grew out of practical motives.  Prucha cites 
Knox as saying that “[i]f our modes of population and War destroy the tribes the 
disinterested part of mankind and posterity will be apt to class the effects of our 
Conduct and that of the Spaniards in Mexico and Peru together.”  1 PRUCHA, supra 
note 5, at 65–66. 
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later implemented through federal “peace and friendship” treaties with the 
strong Great Plains Indian tribes.188  These treaties confirmed vast 
roaming, hunting, and gathering reserves for the use and occupancy of 
these tribes.189  These treaties also preserved the Indians’ lands by 
requiring that at least a majority of the adult male members of the affected 
tribes consent to any future land cessions to the federal government.190  
But Knox’s assumption that there was enough western land to 
long accommodate the Indian peoples’ hunting and roaming way of life 
was soon proven mistaken.  A tsunami wave of non-Indian demand for 
western lands swamped Knox’s strategy of a measured tribal separatism.  
The demand for Indian lands skyrocketed after the Civil War, fed by 
successive waves of new European immigrants and an unexpected 
increase in America’s indigenous non-Indian population.191  Constituent 
pressure grew for the congressional repudiation of its Indian bargains so 
as to open the vast hunting and roaming reserves of the Great Plains 
Indians to non-Indian settlement.192 
By the 1870s, both the enemies and friends of the Indians grew 
disenchanted with existing Indian treaties.  Their practical objection to 
these treaties was simple: the Indians had too much land!  They faulted 
these Indian bargains for not forcing the Indian peoples to adopt civilized 
habits such as farming or ranching.  The Indians were largely left free to 
pursue their traditional subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering ways 
of life on their large reserves.193 
The Great Plains tribes had driven hard bargains with the federal 
treaty negotiators.  They succeeded in establishing a formidable legal 
barrier to non-Indian incursions into their lands.194  But critics argued that 
these bargains thwarted the highest and best economic uses of these lands, 
                                                 
188. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 14–15. 
189. Id. at 14–19. 
190. Indians and their congressional allies attacked proposed territorial 
bills for Oklahoma in the 1870s as conflicting with treaty promises of self-governance 
without non-Indian interference.  2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 741–43. 
191. Cornell cites “[w]hite demand” for Indian lands in the 1860s as a key 
impetus for the development of the Indian reservation system.  CORNELL, supra note 
4, at 42. 
192. The reform-minded Board of Indian Commissioners had come to 
support the principle of Indian allotment as a means of assimilating and civilizing the 
Indian peoples.  At the famous Lake Mohonk Conference in 1884, the Board endorsed 
“heartily” the allotment concept.  Non-Indian settlers supported Indian allotment 
because it would eventually release millions of acres of Indian lands as “surplus lands” 
for non-Indian entry and settlement.  2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 659–71. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
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locked up, as they were, in large roaming and hunting reserves.  These 
lands could be “unbundled” into highly valued products, goods, and 
services only through intensive use, substantial capital investment, and the 
extension of private property rights into those lands.195 
 
B. Reformulating Marshall’s Indian Bargaining Model: The Birth of the 
Plenary Power Doctrine in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 
 
By the 1870s, many non-Indians were convinced that the tribal 
separatism policy had proven to be a disastrous failure.196  The Great 
Plains Indians clung tenaciously to their ancestral lands and cultural 
traditions.  They evinced little obvious interest in adapting to a non-Indian 
way of life.  Furthermore, Indian peoples were regarded as 
semiautonomous governmental entities.  But contemporary critics viewed 
Indians as dependent governmental wards, not as quasi-independent 
peoples.197  They urged that the federal Indian treaties be repudiated and 
that Indian peoples be dealt with as the dependent subjects of 
congressional will.198 
Three congressional actions in the late nineteenth century 
combined to transform Marshall’s Indian bargaining model.  First, 
Congress decided in 1871 to end Indian treaty making.199  Second, 
Congress decided in 1887 to break up the Indian peoples’ communally 
held lands into small homestead-size land parcels that were to be assigned 
to each tribal member for farming or ranching purposes.200  Third, 
Congress decided to offer those “surplus” Indian lands that were released 
by the Indian allotment process to non-Indian settlers.201 
                                                 
195. Stephen Cornell frames the Indian-White conflict over land as a 
struggle between precapitalist and capitalist views of land use.  CORNELL, supra note 
4, at 34–39.  Capitalist “commercialization means that labor and land are no longer 
controlled by social bonds or cultural practice but are subject instead to market 
forces.”  Id. at 36.  By contrast, in Indian society, “[l]and, labor, and the productive 
process are inextricably bound up in webs of kinship, ritual, and custom, which 
themselves render the different aspects of social reality mutually intelligible and 
interdependent.”  Id. at 38. 
196. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 19–23. 
197. Bishop Whipple, among other influential friends of the Indian, 
wanted President Lincoln to treat the Indian peoples as governmental wards, not as 
members of quasi-sovereign political entities.  1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 470. 
198. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 659–86. 
199. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)). 
200. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358, 381 (1994)). 
201. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 668–69. 
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Many friends of the Indian, including Caleb H. Smith, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, supported both the repudiation of Indian 
treaties and the forced Indian allotment program.202  By 1869, Smith 
argued, Indian treaty making had degenerated into a “cruel farce.”  He 
urged that Indians be expressly recognized by Congress as the dependent 
wards of the federal government.203  Ending Indian treaty making, Smith 
argued, would mark the beginning of a more humane and rational Indian 
policy.  The Bureau of Indian Affairs, headed by Smith, would become the 
primary authority to regulate the Indians’ lands and lives.204 
But the end to Indian treaty making came as the pragmatic 
outcome of an institutional revolt led by a handful of congressmen who 
demanded a greater role for the House of Representatives in the 
formulation of Indian policy.  Historically, the president and his treaty 
commissioners had directed Indian policy.205  But some House members 
grew increasingly resentful of the Senate’s exclusive legislative power to 
ratify proposed Indian treaties submitted to it by the president.  The House, 
for its part, was expected to routinely appropriate the monies necessary for 
the implementation of any Indian treaties agreed to by the president and 
the Senate.206 
The House demanded and ultimately achieved in 1871 the passage 
of an appropriations rider that ended Indian treaty making.207  It thereby 
obtained a role in the development and control of future Indian policy.  
This fundamental shift to congressional, rather than executive, 
administration of Indian affairs was rationalized as unifying Indian policy 
and reducing the substantial transaction costs of bargaining on a 
                                                 
202. It was believed that the end of treaty making with the tribes and the 
beginning of congressional direct rule by statute would be the departure point for a 
rational and more effective, if not more humane, Indian policy.  COHEN, supra note 





207. Critics of Indian treaty making increasingly advocated that Indian 
tribes should be dealt with by general congressional legislation rather than through 
treaties that acknowledged Indian tribes as semiautonomous government bodies.  
Instead, the tribes should be considered as wards of the government and not “quasi-
independent nations.”  Id. at 105.  The end to the process of treaty making, however, 
was more a product of traditional political jealousies than of rigorous policy.  
Members of the House of Representatives resented the senatorial power to ratify 
Indian treaties without any role for the House in treaty formulation.  The House 
therefore demanded, and received in 1871, an end to treaty making, and a greater role 
in the development and control of Indian affairs.  Id. at 105–07. 
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“government to government” relationship with each Indian tribe.208  But 
Congress did not go so far as to abrogate, as many non-Indians had 
advocated, existing Indian treaties.  These Indian bargains remain today as 
bulwarks protecting the Indian peoples’ quasi-sovereign status.209 
Congress’ enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887 
likewise represented a clear repudiation of measured tribal separatism.210  
That policy had sought to preserve the traditional Indian cultures, 
economies, and lands from undue or premature disruption by the non-
Indian settlement of the West.211  But the federal allotment program 
expressly contemplated breaking up the Indian roaming and hunting 
reserves into individual, Indian-owned agricultural homesteads.212 
Each Indian family and individual tribal member would receive a 
federal trust patent to a homestead-sized parcel of land.213  Only a lone 
senator, Henry Teller from Colorado, opposed the General Allotment Act.  
He reviled the Indian allotment policy as a thinly veiled “Indian land grab” 
that was dressed up in “save the Indian” garb.  He predicted that the Indian 
allotment process would only serve to impoverish, not improve, the Indian 
peoples’ lives.214 
But the Indian allotment program ran headlong into a potentially 
lethal road block.  Many Indian treaties required that future land cessions 
be approved by at least a majority of adult male members of the affected 
tribes.215  Could Congress unilaterally revise these Indian bargains?  
Indeed, the Kiowas and Comanches invoked just such an Indian consent 
provision, Article 12 of the 1867 treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, in an 
effort to enjoin the federal government’s coerced allotment of their 
reservation.216  That article required that any further cessions of Indian 
lands be approved by “at least three-fourths of the adult male” Kiowas and 
Comanches who were residing on the reservation.217 
                                                 
208. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 527–33. 
209. Id. 
210. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358, 381 (1994)). 
211. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 19–23. 
212. Id. at 14–19. 
213. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 666–71. 
214. Id. 
215. Blue Clark surmises that the allotment policy implicated fundamental 
express and implied treaty pledges made to Great Plains’ Indian tribes in the post-
Civil War era.  CLARK, supra note 90, at 2–3.  Common phenomena of the allotment 
era were “assimilation pressures, land hunger and Indian resistance.”  Id. at 2. 
216. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
217. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians (Treaty of 
Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585. 
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Indian Treaty Commissioner David H. Jerome was assigned the 
unenviable task of persuading those Indians to consent to the allotment of 
their reservation and to the sale of the surplus lands to non-Indians.218  He 
met with the assembled Kiowas and Comanches at Fort Sill in 1892.  He 
talked candidly to those Indians about the very limited options that the 
Kiowas and Comanches faced if they refused to accept the allotment of 
their reservation: 
 
If the Indians will do what the Great Father wants them to 
do, and do their part well, it will result in your having 
plenty of food and clothing; and instead of having, as you 
sometimes do, only one meal a day, you will have three 
meals a day and have plenty of clothing and things that 
will make you comfortable through the winter.  Instead of 
having to wait for an issue of beef every two weeks, you 
can go out and kill a beef of your own and have a feast 
every day if you please.  I told you a little while ago that 
for twenty-four years the Indians had increased very little 
if any in numbers.  Now, if you follow the plan that we 
have told you about you will not have your babies die 
from the cold, but you will have them grow up good, 
strong, healthy men and women, instead of putting them 
in the ground.219 
                                                 
218. David Howell Jerome was a former Michigan governor who replaced 
General Lucius Fairchild as head of the so-called Cherokee Commission that had been 
charged in 1889 with the negotiation of the cession of Indian Territory west of the 
96th degree of longitude and the “opening” of those ceded lands to non-Indian 
settlement.  The newly styled Jerome Commission would later facilitate 11 land 
cession agreements with Indian tribes in Indian Territory that would affect some 15 
million acres of Indian lands.  CLARK, supra note 90, at 36–37. 
219. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 200.  Clark contends that the 
Jerome Commission came with “fixed conceptions regarding private ownership of 
land, the democratizing effects of yeomanry, and the necessity for American Indians 
to enter the national marketplace of competitiveness for private gain.”  CLARK, supra 
note 90, at 39. 
From the Jerome Commission’s viewpoint, communal land ownership was 
unworkable, tribal governments had to be abolished, and Indian lands allotted to 
individual tribal members if Indians were to survive in American society.  By contrast, 
the Kiowa Indians approached the negotiations “with their own well established 
opinions” and they knew already what the commission wanted and why they came.  
Id. at 39.  The older warriors who had helped negotiate the 1867 treaty wanted the 
federal government to adhere to the treaty’s guarantee that they would have no less 
than 30 years in which to hold their ancestral and traditional lands.  Jerome opened 
the negotiations with ill-chosen remarks saying, “I want you to remember that the 
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Indian Commissioner Warren Sayre was even more direct when 
he spoke to the assembled Indians.  He told them that the president could 
force them to accept allotments whether they wanted them or not.  He 
reminded them that this forced allotment program had already occurred on 
other Indian reservations.220  But Lone Wolf answered that his people were 
not ready for the allotment of their lands and that they did not possess the 
skills or inclination to succeed as farmers and ranchers.221  Commissioner 
Jerome responded to Lone Wolf by pressing the Kiowas and Comanches 
even harder to accept his proposed agreement.  Every tribal member would 
be allotted a 160-acre trust parcel of land.  The Kiowas and Comanches 
would be paid a lump sum of two million dollars for two million acres of 
tribal lands that would then be opened to non-Indian settlement.222 
But Quanah Parker and other Indians played for time, arguing that 
the treaty commissioners should either give the Indians more money for 
their lands or that the negotiations should be delayed so as to allow the 
Indians to consult with legal counsel regarding the proposed agreement.223  
However, Jerome would hear none of it.  He wanted the Indians’ decision 
regarding the proposal as presented.  By the time he and his colleagues had 
left the reservation he felt he had done the job that he had been sent to do: 
he had successfully collected 456 Indian signatures.  These were enough 
Indian signatures to allow Indian agent George Day to certify that well 
over three-fourths of the adult male tribal members had consented to the 
Jerome Agreement as required by Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine 
Lodge Creek.224 
Jerome transmitted the Indians’ signed agreement to President 
Harrison in January 1893.  The Indians had only grudgingly agreed to the 
allotment and sale of their reserved lands, Jerome admitted in his 
transmittal letter to the President, but he believed that the agreement was 
legally binding.225  Jerome was proven premature in his assessment of the 
agreement’s validity.  Interior Secretary Bliss decided to have a new tribal 
census taken before Congress acted on the Jerome Agreement.226  This 
census revealed that Jerome had severely undercounted the adult male 
members of the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes: there were 725 Indian adult 
                                                 
Government wants nothing from you.”  Few of the assembled Indians likely gave 
credence to that remark.  Id. at 41. 
220. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 201. 
221. CLARK, supra note 90, at 41. 
222. Id. at 42. 
223. Id. at 42–46. 
224. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 203. 
225. CLARK, supra note 90, at 43–44. 
226. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 200. 
SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/9/2017 11:39 AM 
 
 
2017 SOVEREIGN BARGAINS 61 
 
males who were eligible to vote on the Jerome Agreement.  Treaty 
commissioner Jerome had collected only 456 signatures, which fell 
considerably short of the required three-fourths majority.  Secretary Bliss 
recommended to the congressional committees that the Jerome Agreement 
not be ratified.  He pointed out that the proposed Indian allotments were 
far too small to support tribal families by livestock grazing or farming.  He 
suggested that negotiations be held with the affected Indian tribes.227 
Despite doubts about the validity of the Jerome Agreement, the 
Fifty-sixth Congress chose to move forward with final action on the 
ratification of the Jerome Agreement.  The Kiowas and Comanches 
petitioned Congress not to ratify the Jerome Agreement.  They contended 
that the allotment of the reservation would mean their “destruction as a 
people and [would bring them] to the same impoverished condition to 
which the Cheyenne Arapaho and Indian tribes have been brought from 
the effects of prematurely opening their reservations for the settlement of 
white men among them.”228  But Congress chose not to listen to the 
Kiowas and Comanches or to Secretary Bliss, and by the Act of June 6, 
1900, Congress ratified the Jerome Agreement.229 
 
C. The Effect of Lone Wolf on the Indian Land Base 
 
Lone Wolf sued in federal court to enforce his people’s sovereign 
bargain by enjoining Interior Secretary Hitchcock from allotting or selling 
the Kiowas’ and Comanches’ lands.  His complaint alleged that the 
proposed allotting of the reservation constituted a taking of their lands in 
violation of Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek.  His lawyer, 
William Springer, filed an injunction action on his behalf in the equity 
division of the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia.  His action 
asked the court to prevent the Interior Department from implementing the 
General Allotment Act.  Lone Wolf urged in his petition that the court hold 
illegal the Act of June 6, 1900 as contravening the express terms of the 
1867 treaty.230 
But Justice A. C. Bradley denied Lone Wolf’s request for a 
preliminary injunction against the federal government’s allotment and sale 
of the Indians’ lands.231  Lone Wolf had argued that this unilateral federal 
action would deprive the Kiowas and Comanches of their treaty-protected 
                                                 
227. Id. at 204. 
228. Id. at 205. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, No. 1109, 
4 Mar. 1902, RG 267, File 18454, National Archives. 
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property without the due process of law.  But the judge disagreed and 
reasoned that it was within Congress’ prerogative to allot any Indian 
reservation regardless of alleged tribal misunderstandings, deception by 
treaty commissioners, or a demonstrable failure of tribal consent.  Only 
Congress had the constitutional power to decide this issue, not the courts.  
Therefore, Lone Wolf’s due process objections to the forced allotment and 
sale of their lands, the court held, should be dealt with by the body that 
could appropriately balance the competing public interests and the rights 
of the Indian.232 
But time and events had overtaken Lone Wolf.  By the time that 
Lone Wolf’s appeal from the lower court’s decision was scheduled for 
appellate hearing, more than 150,000 non-Indians had already registered 
with the federal land office for some 13,000 homesteads in what had once 
been Kiowa and Comanche land.233  Those homesteads were sold to the 
non-Indian settlers at a price of $1.75 an acre.234  It came as no surprise 
when the court of appeals quickly affirmed the lower court’s ruling.235 
Whether the Secretary’s allotment and sale of the Kiowa and 
Comanche lands should be enjoined as violating Article 12 of the 1867 
treaty would be decided by the Supreme Court.  Lone Wolf urged the 
Court to hold that Article 12 plainly prohibited the unconsented allotment 
or sale of the Indians’ lands.236  But requiring Indian consent as a condition 
for the federal allotment or sale of their lands was unacceptable to the 
Court.  The judicial imposition of an Indian consent condition, Justice 
White reasoned, would actually hurt the Indian people.  It would “deprive 
Congress . . . [of its ability] to partition and dispose[] of tribal lands . . . if 
the assent of the Indians could not be obtained.”237  Justice White readily 
agreed with Lone Wolf that the Indians’ right of occupancy in their lands 
was legally regarded as “sacred as the fee [title] of the United States in the 
same lands.”238  But only private parties and the states—not Congress—
were legally bound to respect Indian land titles.239  Congress, unlike 
private citizens or states, was possessed of a plenary authority over the 
Indians’ lands.240  It would be fruitless, therefore, Justice White 
concluded, to require the federal courts to hear Indian testimony that 
                                                 
232. CLARK, supra note 90, at 62–63. 
233. Id. at 66. 
234. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 206. 
235. CLARK, supra note 90, at 66. 
236. Id. 
237. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 554 (1903). 
238. Id. 
239. See id. at 564–65. 
240. Id. at 565–66. 
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would demonstrate that their signatures to the Jerome Agreement had been 
procured by the fraud or that three-fourths of the adult male tribal members 
had not signed that agreement.241  The unquestioned tribal status of the 
affected Indians, coupled with Congress’ declared purpose to give 
adequate consideration to the Indians for their lands, meant to Justice 
White that there were no viable issues for judicial decision.242 
From White’s viewpoint, the Indians’ complaint that Congress 
had illegally taken their lands was wide of the mark.243  Congress’ 
allotment and sale of the Indian peoples’ lands was not a taking so much 
as it was a transmutation of those lands into equivalent financial assets.  
Justice White concluded his opinion with the notorious admonition that 
the federal courts must “presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith 
in dealing with the Indians.”244  The Court’s decision affirmed the federal 
government’s demurrer to Lone Wolf’s petition for injunctive relief.245 
The Lone Wolf decision fundamentally reformulated Marshall’s 
Indian bargaining model.  It replaced its “government to government” 
relationship with a new judicial creation—the federal plenary power 
doctrine.  That doctrine freed Congress to allot and sell the Indian peoples’ 
lands without their consent.  Congress was empowered as the Indians’ 







                                                 
241. Id. at 567–68. 
242. CLARK, supra note 90, at 71–72.  But from Justice White’s viewpoint, 
the Indians’ right of occupancy was not equivalent to ownership of their lands.  The 
federal government was the owner of the Indian lands and could effectuate a change 
in the Indians’ use of those lands if it was necessary for the Indians’ benefit.  Id. 
243. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568. 
244. Id.  Justice White characterized Congress’ allotment and sale of the 
Indians’ land as effecting “a mere change in the form of the investment of tribal 
property.”  Id. 
245. CLARK, supra note 90, at 73. 
246. Id. at 102–03.  Clark places Lone Wolf in the larger, international law 
context when he analyzes Henry Cabot Lodge’s reliance upon that decision, among 
other Indian law decisions, as the basis for the United States’ assumption of 
guardianship over foreign “domestic, dependant nations” during Senate debates for 
the federal government’s assumption of guardianship over the “dark skinned” peoples 
of the Philippines.  Id. 
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IV.  THE THIRD ERA: JUDICIAL INDECISION REGARDING THE 
COMPENSABILITY OF INDIAN TITLE 
 
A. Judicial Confirmation of Compensability: The Impact of United States 
v. Shoshone Tribe 
 
Sovereign bargaining had been the historic means by which Indian 
peoples sought to preserve their lands from federal takings.  But the idea 
of an Indian Country wherein the Indian peoples were free to create their 
own laws, cultures, and economies had seemingly collapsed under the 
weight of the federal plenary power doctrine.  No longer did the federal 
government pledge to use its military forces to ensure that states and non-
Indians respected the Indian Country boundary.247  The Lone Wolf 
doctrine breached this boundary by recognizing a judicially unfettered 
federal plenary power over Indian lands.248  The Indian peoples were 
forced to seek a new strategy to preserve their remaining lands. 
The federal courts would clearly not enjoin a congressional breach 
of Indian bargains, but would the courts require the payment of just 
compensation for the federal taking of Indian lands?249  Such a 
requirement would provide the Indian peoples with some measure of 
substantive protection against Congress’ unprincipled exercise of plenary 
power over their lands.250 
The Indian allotment program and the sale of “surplus” Indian 
lands reduced the total Indian land holdings by some ninety to one-
hundred million acres.251  Congress’ primary purpose in the allotment 
program was to spur the non-Indian settlement of America’s western 
lands.  Many non-Indian constituencies—railroads, homesteaders, mineral 
prospectors, and land speculators—benefitted from Congress’ largess in 
disposing of the Indian peoples’ lands.252  Indeed, Justice Reed later 
remarked that the rapid and efficient development of the American West 
would have been inconceivable absent Marshall’s Indian law decisions.253 
                                                 
247. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42–43.  Cornell contends that Indian 
“assimilation and removal” joined hands in the late nineteenth century as reflected in 
federal Indian policy.  Id. 
248. Id. 
249. See Kelly, supra note 115, at 668. 
250. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How 
Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 751–53 (1993). 
251. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 196. 
252. See CORNELL, supra note 4, at 37–38. 
253. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289–90 
(1955); see supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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But by the advent of the New Deal Era in the 1930s, America’s 
western frontier had long since closed.254  In 1934, Congress repudiated 
its Indian allotment policy and adopted fundamental Indian land and 
governmental reforms as the hallmark of its “Indian New Deal.”255  These 
reforms were intended to promote the new federal policy of tribal 
economic development and political self-determination.256  But only forty-
eight million acres of Indian lands remained by then.257  Those lands were 
owned by either Indian tribes or individual Indian allottees.  Indian land 
reform became a central focus of Roosevelt’s Indian policy.  This policy 
expressly rejected the flawed and failed Indian allotment policy of the late 
nineteenth century.258  A judicial rethinking of the Johnson-Lone Wolf line 
of decisions that had made Indian allotment and the surplus lands sales 
possible seemed likewise justified. 
Renewed respect for Indian land rights was the Supreme Court’s 
contribution to the goal of tribal revitalization.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Shoshone Tribe259was hailed by Indians as a 
major step toward the judicial protection of Indian lands.260  The facts of 
the Shoshone case were straightforward: the federal government had 
decided to settle an additional band of Indians upon the Shoshone’s 
reservation without their consent.  By an earlier Indian treaty of 1863, the 
United States had set aside a vast area of some forty-four million acres for 
the hunting and gathering use of the Shoshone people.  However, Congress 
                                                 
254. Homestead filings on “opened” Indian lands had by the late 1920s 
dwindled to almost nil.  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 89.  Land acquisition that had been 
the “motor” of Indian policy was no longer to shape Indian policy as it had in the late 
nineteenth century.  New social goals of progressivism, cultural pluralism, and 
economic rejuvenation would have their resonance in the reshaping of federal Indian 
policy in the 1930s.  Id. 
255. David Getches points to section 1 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1994)), 
which ended the Indian allotment program and section 4, id. Stat. at 985 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 464 (1994)), which prohibited future alienation of Indian land 
without tribal consent as evidence of this land reform impulse.  GETCHES ET AL., supra 
note 10, at 218–19. 
256. Cornell contends that the protribal rhetoric of the Indian New Deal 
only thinly disguised its assimilative character.  Indian tribes were required to choose 
between “an alien constitutional form of government and the uncertainties of the pre-
IRA period.”  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 94. 
257. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 196. 
258. Id. 
259. 304 U.S. 111 (1938). 
260. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 294.  Getches concluded that this 
decision “removed considerable confusion over the extent of tribal property interests 
relative to the interests of the United States.”  Id. 
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prevailed on the Indians to cede all but three million acres of those lands 
to the federal government by the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868.261  Those 
lands were “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation 
of the Shoshone Indians.”262 
The Shoshone Court emphasized that the federal government 
knew in 1868 that the Shoshone’s lands contained valuable mineral 
deposits of gold, oil, coal, and gypsum.263  Those lands also included more 
than 400,000 acres of timber, extensive well-grassed bench lands, and 
fertile river valleys that were readily irrigable.264  The lower court ruled 
that the settling of the Northern Arapaho Tribe on the Shoshone’s Wind 
River Reservation had amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of one-half 
of that reservation as of March 19, 1878.265 
The lands so taken amounted to 1,171,770 acres, for which the 
trial court awarded the tribes $1.35 an acre or $1,581,889.50.266  But the 
United States disputed the trial court’s inclusion of certain additional 
elements of value in its calculation of the just compensation owing to the 
Shoshone Tribe.  It argued that the Indians’ right of the use and occupancy 
of the taken lands should be valued “net the value of the timber or mineral 
assets.” 267 
The Shoshone Court responded to this contention with a 
resounding affirmation of Chief Justice Marshall’s bold and sweeping 
principle that the Indians’ right of occupancy is “as sacred and as securely 
safeguarded as is fee simple absolute title.”268  It held that the federal 
government’s appropriation of that tribal interest rendered the government 
liable for the payment of just compensation.269  The Court limited its 1903 
Lone Wolf decision as holding only that Congress had the power to 
“prescribe title by which individual Indians may hold (allotments and) to 
pass laws regulating alienation and descent.”270  In affirming the lower 
court’s just compensation award, the Court observed that this federal 
                                                 
261. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. at 114. 
262. Id. at 113. 
263. Id. at 114. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 112. 
266. Id. at 114–15. 
267. Id. at 115. 
268. Id. at 117. 
269. Id. at 118.  The Lone Wolf doctrine allows Congress to “prescribe title 
by which individual Indians may hold tracts . . . within the reservation [, but this 
power] detracts nothing from the tribe’s ownership.”  Id. 
270. Id. 
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guardianship power over Indian lands “detracts nothing from the tribe’s 
ownership.”271 
 
B. Judicial Indecision Regarding the Compensability of Aboriginal 
Indian Title: The Two Decisions in United States v. Alcea Band of 
Tillamooks 
 
The Shoshone Tribe decision gave new life to those sovereign 
agreements that guaranteed the Indians’ use and occupancy rights in their 
lands.  But that decision seemed to cut deeper by recognizing the sanctity 
of the Indian peoples’ aboriginal use and occupancy rights.272  Some 
thought that the Shoshone Tribe decision had substantially limited, if not 
overruled, the Lone Wolf doctrine.  Because the Court had resoundingly 
reaffirmed the Indians’ right of “use and occupancy,” it seemed poised to 
extend just compensation protection to the aboriginal right of “use and 
occupancy.”273  But this hope would soon be dashed by subsequent 
judicial decision. 
Commentators have various explanations for the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to extend just compensation protection to aboriginal 
lands.274  Some suggest the Court concluded that it be would be financially 
imprudent to constitutionalize all Indian land titles.  That step potentially 
would have required the United States to pay billions of dollars in just 
compensation to satisfy those Indian takings claims.275  Some suggest that 
                                                 
271. Id. 
272. See id. 
273. Id. at 115, 118.  The jurisdictional act allowing the Indian tribe to 
bring suit against the United States created no new cause of action.  Therefore, 
whatever legal or equitably compensable rights the Indians had unavoidably derived 
from their aboriginal use and occupancy of those taken lands.  Kelly, supra note 115, 
at 668. 
274. The Court’s analogy of aboriginal title to treaty title strongly 
suggested a Fifth Amendment basis for recovery in United States v. Alcea Band of 
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946) [hereinafter Tillamooks I].  But soon after, in Hynes 
v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949), the Court began to retreat from that 
position.  Justice Reed suggested in Hynes that the Indian right of occupancy is not 
compensable without a special statutory direction to make payment for such a taking.  
Id. at 105–06 & n.28. 
275. The “specter of huge, fiscally ruinous interest recoveries in Indian 
title litigation—recoveries far in excess of the fair market value of the appropriated 
lands—may have dissuaded (the Court in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 
341 U.S. 48 (1951) [hereinafter Tillamooks II]) from constitutionalizing its prior 
decision.”  Kelly, supra note 115, at 669–70. 
Given that the Court has chosen to “characterize the Indian land issue as 
primarily a matter for congressional determination, the future of the Indian title 
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the Court conceived of the federal plenary power doctrine as a logical 
complement to the federal trust authority over Indian lands.276 
The Supreme Court, whether motivated by timidity or prudence, 
struggled in the 1940s and 1950s to develop a workable concept of Indian 
title that would reconcile Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands with 
the just compensation command of the Fifth Amendment.277  But the Court 
failed in its effort to synthesize a modern Indian takings doctrine.  Instead, 
the Court recategorized Indian title into two classes: a judicially protected 
class of Indian title based on federal recognition and an unprotected class 
of Indian title based on aboriginal “use and occupancy.”278 
The Court had earlier refused to differentiate types of Indian title 
in Tillamooks I.279  Its plurality decision seemingly abolished any 
constitutional distinction between aboriginally based Indian title and 
federally recognized Indian title.280  That decision seemingly protected 
aboriginal use and occupancy rights from taking by the federal 
government.281  Justice Vinson concluded in Tillamooks I that the Indians 
had more than a mere moral claim for just compensation.282  Some lower 
                                                 
concept remains as vulnerable to political pressure as it had been in the past.”  Id. at 
686. 
276. Newton, supra note 34, at 254–55. 
277. Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn traces the Court’s struggle in the 
1940s and 1950s to reconcile Indian taking claims with the just compensation 
command.  He characterizes the “fundamental constitutional issue” as whether the 
federal taking of aboriginal lands required that just compensation be paid to the 
affected Indians.  Washburn concludes that the Court was clearly troubled by the 
federal government’s assertion that it could take aboriginal lands without any liability 
to pay compensation.  WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110–15. 
278. Id. at 255. 
279. 329 U.S. 40.  Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn notes that the 
“fundamental constitutional issue” of the compensability of taken Indian title was not 
confronted until the Tillamooks I & II decisions.  WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110–
11.  This Indian band had been statutorily authorized to sue the United States in 1935 
for “any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing out of the original 
Indian title, claim, or rights in, to, or upon the whole or any part of the lands and their 
appurtenances occupied by the Indian tribes or bands.”  Id. at 111. 
Given that the usual federal practice was “not to coerce the surrender of 
[Indian] lands without consent and without compensation.”  Id. at 112.  This federal 
practice led the Court to conclude that more than “sovereign grace prompted the 
obvious regard given to Indian title.”  Id.  Washburn concludes that the Court 
expressly rejected the federal government’s proffered distinction between 
“recognized” and “unrecognized” Indian title as the basis “to rule out” the Tillamooks’ 
compensation claim.  Id. 
280. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 50–54. 
281. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110–15. 
282. 329 U.S. at 49–50. 
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federal courts thought that the Court’s decision in Tillamooks I extended 
Shoshone’s just compensation protections to the Indian peoples’ purely 
aboriginal use and occupancy rights.283 
But this assumption was rudely dispelled by the Court’s decision 
nine years later in Tee-Hit-Ton.284  That decision sharply differentiated 
between those Indian takings claims based on mere aboriginal use and 
occupancy and those based on federally recognized Indian land 
titles.285  Two intervening factors may help explain this decision.  First, in 
1946, Congress created the ICC,286 which was authorized to hear a wide 
variety of Indians’ claims against the federal government consistent with 
a broad jurisdictional grant that was set forth in its organic act.287  Second, 
the Department of Justice and the General Accounting Office advised the 
Court of the potential liability involved if the United States were required 
to pay interest from the time of taking on all pending Indian takings 
claims.288  This advice arguably influenced the Court’s decision in 
Tillamooks II.289  There, the Court noted  that the principal value of the 
taken Indian lands was some three million dollars, but the interest 
                                                 
283. The three dissenters in Tillamooks I, led by Justice Reed, seemed to 
think so as well.  Despite their agreement with the majority regarding the necessity of 
judicial limits on Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands, the dissent did not think 
that meant “Indian lands unrecognized by specific actions of Congress were protected 
by the Fifth Amendment.”  WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 112. 
284. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
285. The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians were a small band of Tlingit Indians who 
resided in Alaska and claimed compensation for the federal cutting of timber from 
lands that they claimed they held by original Indian title.  WASHBURN, supra note 17, 
at 113. 
286. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 
1049 (1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3). 
287. Interior Secretary Ickes and Associate Solicitor Felix S. Cohen urged 
the congressional committee to amend the pending ICC legislation so as to allow for 
the “broadest possible jurisdiction to hear all manner of [Indian] claims, guarantee 
finality, establish an investigation division and allow review by the Court of Claims 
and the Supreme Court.”  ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 84–85. 
288. Separation of powers concerns arguably explain Justice Reed’s 
opinion in Tillamooks II.  His citation to a Department of Justice’s estimate that the 
interest component alone on pending Indian taking claims amounted to some nine 
billion dollars recognizes that it is Congress, not the judiciary, that controls the 
nation’s expenditures.  Kelly, supra note 115, at 670. 
289. In Tillamooks II, 341 U.S. 48 (1951), the Court held that an award of 
interest against the federal government requires a specific statutory direction to do so.  
Because the 1935 jurisdictional act that authorized this band to sue did not contain 
such direction, the Court of Claims award of 14 million dollars in interest was in error.  
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 113. 
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component of the award amounted to fourteen million dollars.290  The 
Department of Justice, in the interim, advised the Court that the estimated 
total liability of the federal government, in terms of accumulated interest 
owing from the time of taking of the Indian lands, exceeded nine billion 
dollars!291 
Tee-Hit-Ton involved a takings claim by a small Indian band 
regarding the federal sale of all the merchantable timber within a 350,000-
acre area of the Tongass National Forest in Alaska.292  The Tee-Hit-Tons 
claimed title based on their aboriginal use and occupancy of this 
area.293  They sued for just compensation for value of the taken timber 
based on either their demonstrated aboriginal use and occupancy of those 
lands or by virtue of the federal government’s recognition of their title to 
the lands in question.294 
The Tee-Hit-Tons contended that, unlike the nomadic Indian 
peoples of the lower forty-eight states, their band had a well-developed 
social order that included a clear conception of property rights and 
ownership.295  But the Court found that the Tee-Hit-Tons’ conception of 
property ownership was based on shared communal use and ownership.296  
The band did not, Justice Reed opined, recognize or enforce individual 
rights of ownership in distinct parcels of land.297  He quoted the only 
expert witness that was offered at trial by the Indian band.  That witness 
testified: 
 
Any member of the tribe may use any portion of the land 
that he  wishes, and as long as he uses it that is his for his 
own enjoyment, and is not to be trespassed upon by 
anybody else, but the minute he stops using it then any 
other member of the tribe can come and use the area.298 
 
                                                 
290. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 283 n.17 
(1955). 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 273. 
293. Id. at 293. 
294. Id. at 277. 
295. Historian Washburn cites Justice Reed’s “pejorative references” to 
the Indian band’s “savage status” and “nomadic pattern of land use” as a basis for 
Justice Reed’s conclusion that Indian title can be extinguished by Congress without 
compensation.  WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 114. 
296. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 287–88. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 286. 
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This testimony convinced him, as it had the trial judge, that the Tee-Hit-
Tons had only evolved to “a hunting and fishing stage of civilization.”299 
Given its status as a nomadic tribe with nomadic concepts of 
property rights, Justice Reed concluded that the band possessed mere 
“claims of right to use identified territory,” which were indistinguishable 
from those enjoyed by the similarly nomadic Indian tribes of the lower 
forty-eight states.300  Further, because the Tee-Hit-Tons’ notion of 
property was indistinguishable from those held by Indians of the lower 
United States, the band’s claim was governed by the Johnson rule that 
“discovery gave an exclusive right [to the federal government] to 
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by 
conquest.”301 
Justice Reed also distinguished the Court’s holding in Tillamooks 
I.  That decision, which had awarded just compensation for a taking of 
clearly aboriginal Indian title, resulted from a specific statutory direction 
to pay that level of compensation to the wronged tribe.302  Justice Reed 
chastised the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for its wrong-headed reading 
of the Tillamooks decision regarding the compensability of aboriginal 
Indian title.303  In United States v. Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
federal taking of the Indians’ right of aboriginal “use and occupancy” 
entitled them to an award of just compensation under the Tillamooks 
rationale.304  Justice Reed sought to resolve this issue with a knockdown 
holding: Indian occupation of land without governmental recognition of 
ownership creates no right against taking or extinction by the United States 
protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law.305 
Justice Reed also expressed his moral disquiet regarding an 
arguably outsized award of just compensation to a small, possibly dying 
band of Indians.306  Imposing such a financial requirement on the federal 
government did not seem, given the circumstances of the Tee-Hit-Ton 
Band, to make moral or equitable sense to Justice Reed.  His language 
suggests reluctance to award a windfall that would be enjoyed by the few 
remaining members of a now significantly diminished band of Indians.  He 
pointedly emphasized that the Tee-Hit-Ton Band was comprised of some 
sixty-five members with only a “few women of child bearing age.”  His 
                                                 
299. Id. at 287. 
300. Id. at 287–88. 
301. Id. at 280. 
302. Id. at 282–83. 
303. Id. 
304. 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947). 
305. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284–85. 
306. Id. at 285–86. 
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factual citation illustrated his view of the contemporary Tee-Hit-Tons as a 
remnant band of Indians.307 
 
C. Justice Reed’s Revision of Johnson v. M’Intosh: Rationalizing the 
Brightline Distinction Between Recognized and Unrecognized Indian 
Title 
 
The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton seemingly sought to coordinate its 
judicial function with Congress’ 1946 creation of the ICC.  The ICC had 
been directed by Congress to evaluate those Indian claims that arose out 
of, among other things, the federal government’s takings of aboriginal 
Indian title.308  The prudential response to the ICC’s creation required the 
Court’s revitalization of the political question doctrine.309  The Court in 
Tee-Hit-Ton clearly wanted to close the courthouse doors to aboriginally 
based Indian taking claims.  The Court’s revitalized political question 
doctrine formed the “bright line” boundary that marked off takings claims 
based on federally recognized title from those based on aboriginal use and 
occupancy.  Indian takings claims based on aboriginal use and occupancy 
rights were relegated to Congress for relief.310 
Indians were entitled to just compensation for a taking of their 
lands only if they could meet two conditions.  First, they had to show that 
Congress had taken deliberate action to recognize their permanent use and 
occupancy rights.  Absent evidence of such recognition—usually 
embodied in an authoritative treaty, statute, or a demonstrated 
congressional course of conduct—they were deemed to hold only 
unrecognized and noncompensable Indian title.311  Second, they had to 
show that Congress had not acted in its Lone Wolf garb as Indian guardian 
when it took their lands.312  Congress, as the Indian guardian, had the 
power to make a good faith transmutation of those lands into equivalent 
financial assets.  If Congress made a prima facie showing on this issue, 
then it was immune from any just compensation claim regardless of the 




                                                 
307. Id. at 286. 
308. Kelly, supra note 115, at 675–76. 
309. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
310. Kelly, supra note 115, at 667–71. 
311. Id. at 672–73. 
312. Id. at 672–74. 
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D. Judicial Deference to Congressional Grace in Compensating Indian 
Peoples: Clearing Indian Title Through the Indian Claims Commission 
 
Justice Reed’s opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton must be read against the 
background of the 1946 creation of the ICC.313  The ICC’s purpose was to 
achieve a pragmatic and definitive settlement of longstanding Indian 
claims against the federal government.314  It was Congress’ exclusive 
prerogative, according to Justice Reed, to compensate Indians for the 
taking of their aboriginal use and occupancy rights.315 
The ICC grew out of the perceived need for a general mechanism 
for the adjudication of longstanding Indian claims against the United 
States.  Non-Indian groups had long pressured Congress to either repudiate 
or settle outstanding aboriginal Indian land claims.  They sought the 
enactment of a title-clearing mechanism that would remove the troubling 
cloud of original Indian title from their lands.316  Those present-day 
occupiers of former Indian lands justifiably worried that Indians would 
seek the judicial enforcement of their aboriginal Indian titles through 
common law ejectment or trespass actions.  They sought congressional 
protection that would extinguish those Indian claims. 317 
By contrast, the friends of the Indians pointed to their well-known 
heroism during World War II and earlier as warrant for congressional 
action that would fairly settle the many outstanding Indian 
claims.318  These ideas converged as the ICC.  This administrative tribunal 
would maximize several values.  It would ensure congressional oversight 
of proposed ICC compensation awards to prevailing Indian tribes or bands, 
                                                 
313. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 
1049 (1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3). 
314. The ICC was established with the “explicit purpose of disposing of 
all pre-existing Indian claims against the government.”  Sandra C. Danforth, Repaying 
the Historical Debt: The Indian Claims Commission, 49 N.D. L. REV. 359, 360 (1972). 
315. Kelly, supra note 115, at 670–71. 
316. One purpose of the commission was to “wipe the slate clean” of 
Indian claims “that weighed upon the white conscience.”  ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, 
at 49. 
317. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 311–18. 
318. Congress’ desire to right moral wrongs to Indians focused on two 
issues: first, the ICC mechanism would eliminate the historic discrimination that 
Indians had faced in being barred from bringing takings and other claims against the 
United States; and second, the ICC mechanism would allow resolution of all 
outstanding Indian claims, not only those with a basis in law or equity.  Danforth, 
supra note 314, at 366–67. 
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and would provide an efficient and flexible vehicle for the liquidation of 
Indian claims against the United States.319 
The ICC’s expected efficiency and flexibility was a relative 
concept.  Historically, Indian claims could be heard only if Congress 
enacted a jurisdictional grant that authorized a particular tribe or band to 
bring suit against the United States.320  This Indian claims process was 
both time consuming and cumbersome.  It functioned much like a lottery 
in that chances for recovery were arbitrarily allocated by widely varying 
jurisdictional grants of authority to the Court of Claims.321 
Congress sought to standardize the jurisdictional guidelines under 
which the ICC would hear and determine authorized Indian 
claims.322  However, critics of the ICC fault the process as not achieving 
either flexibility or efficiency in its administrative implementation of its 
jurisdictional authority.323  The ICC’s failure stems from many factors.  
First, only Indian tribes, not individual Indians, were authorized to 
prosecute any claims within the purview of the ICC’s jurisdictional 
grant.324  Second, the ICC could only adjudicate those Indian claims that 
arose on or before August 13, 1946.325  Third, although the federal 
government agreed to waive its defenses that it may otherwise have 
asserted to bar those Indian claims, it exacted concessions from the Indian 
claimants as well.326  Indian claimants were not entitled to receive interest 
from the time of taking regardless of whether their claims arose in 1846 or 
                                                 
319. The Indian claims processing policy contemplated that the ICC’s 
jurisdiction would extend to recommendeding claims awards to Congress, but 
Congress would be the “focal point” in that it could “finally dispose of claims, by 
rejecting them or granting awards, or it could stipulate that a court hearing was 
necessary to resolve all relevant issues.”  Id. at 372. 
320. Id. at 362–63. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. Danforth concludes the ICC became “more concerned with 
accomplishing its task than ensuring that all just claims receive a hearing and 
appropriate compensation.”  Id. at 402. 
324. Only groups of Indians, not individuals, were authorized by the ICC 
statute to file claims with that commission.  Id. at 388. 
325. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 24, 
60 Stat. 1049, 1056 (1946) ) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3). 
326. Danforth, supra note 314, at 388. 
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1946.327  Furthermore, the taken Indian property was to be appraised as of 
the time of taking, not at its contemporary highest and best use value.328 
Fourth, the ICC failed to fully utilize its jurisdictional grant so as 
to achieve the full remedial intent of the statute.329  Few innovative or 
novel Indian takings claims were heard by the ICC, despite its broad grant 
of authority to do so.330  By a crabbed interpretation of its authority, the 
ICC heard only a limited claims docket of standard Indian claims.  By its 
narrow construction of its authority, the ICC arguably eviscerated the “fair 
and honorable dealings” provision of the ICC Act.331  The ICC’s practice 
was to disallow Indian damages claims that were based on novel legal 
theories.332  For example, it refused to hear those Indian claims that alleged 
real, but intangible, injuries such as the destruction of aboriginal hunting 
or fishing reserves; or the purposeful destruction of tribal governmental 
structures; or the imprisonment of tribal members in remote detention 
sites.333  The actual cases decided by the ICC fell into a narrow bandwidth 
of its potential jurisdiction.  A cursory assessment of the ICC’s docket 
reveals standard Indian land claims and claims that were based on the 
federal government’s failure to perform specific treaty obligations or to 
pay specified amounts of annuities.334 
Fifth, the ICC limited its remedies to damage awards, while some 
prevailing Indian claimants clearly desired the replacement or restoration 
                                                 
327. The ICC adopted the general rule that, in the absence of a specific 
statutory direction to pay interest or unless the taking occurred in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, no interest was to be paid to the prevailing Indian parties.  Id. at 397. 
328. Valuations of Indian lands were to be made at the time of taking with 
no consideration of the element of future profits that could have been made by the 
Indians from their exploitation of their agricultural, mineral, or timber resources.  Id. 
329. Danforth cites the ICC’s view that it “had no role in claims filing” 
and the lawyers’ conservative claims strategy that led them to avoid the “risks of using 
new causes of action . . . for which there were now precedents to indicate how 
assessments might be made and thus how large recoveries would be.”  Id. at 391. 
330. Id. at 389–90. 
331. Section 2, clause 5, of the ICC Act authorizes the commission to 
“hear and determine . . . claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not 
recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.”  Indian Claims Commission Act, 
ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (1946) ) (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).  Danforth believes that the “most important reason . . . 
was related to the nature of compensation to be awarded and to the novel character of 
parts of Section 2.”  Danforth, supra note 314, at 390.  She concludes that lawyers that 
represented the Indian claimants on a contingent fee basis were, by nature, wary of 
novel claims that may not result in large monetary awards.  See id. at 391. 
332. See Danforth, supra note 314, at 391. 
333. See id. 
334. See id. at 389. 
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of their taken lands.335  Certain intangible values—the lands’ roles as 
sacred cultural or religious sites—could not be addressed via a damages 
award.  Furthermore, the futility and failure of small per capita 
distributions of Indian claims awards as meaningful remedies is well 
documented.336  Those per capita distributions were patently insufficient 
to allow injured Indians to replace, at contemporary market prices, their 
taken lands or resources.  History shows that these meager per capita 
distributions were quickly expended to meet current subsistence needs.  
Only a small amount of the accumulated ICC claims monies were used to 
provide meaningful substitutes for taken tribal resources so as to provide 
injured Indians with replacement subsistence values or incomes.337 
Eight-hundred million dollars in ICC awards was hailed by Felix 
S. Cohen as having finally and fairly “closed the books” on the federal 
government’s duty to fairly compensate its Indian wards.338  But this idea 
of retrospective justice, Cohen would likely agree, is elusive given the 
historic harms done to the Indian peoples.  Cohen’s conclusion was not 
intended to address the contemporary need for an Indian takings doctrine 
that will protect today’s vestigial Indian Country from similar 
depredations.339  Today’s Indian peoples seek practical approaches, not 
retrospective remedies, to preserve their lands.  This desire must translate 
into practical means for enforcing sovereign bargains that guarantee their 
use and occupancy of their lands.340 
                                                 
335. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 250. 
336. See id. 
337. Rosenthal characterizes the ICC as a “legal-bureaucratically oriented 
structure more concerned with accomplishing its task than insuring that all just claims 
receive a hearing and appropriate compensation.”  Id. at 245 (citation omitted). 
Rosenthal cites legal scholar Morton E. Price’s conclusion as evidence of the 
ICC’s overall failure to treat the Indians justly: 
 
If there had been full compensation, the Indians would have 
gathered enormous wealth, either in land or money.  Economic 
development—in the sense of providing immediate financial 
security—would have been assured. . . . On the other hand, it was 
preposterous to recognize fully such extraordinary claims of a 
handful of poor people, even to the extent that they were based on 
legitimate entitlement. 
 
Id. at 245–46. 
338. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34–
43 (1947). 
339. See id. 
340. See id. 
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The Tee-Hit-Ton decision represents the extreme parameter of 
judicial thinking on this issue.341  It suggests that Indian lands remain in a 
judicially declared “state of nature” wherein federal plenary power can 
trump the Indian peoples’ rights.342 
 
V.  RECONSTRUCTING MARSHALL’S INDIAN BARGAINING 
MODEL: A SKETCH OF A MODERN INDIAN TAKINGS 
DOCTRINE 
 
Analyzing the 1949 congressional taking of the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation aids in reconstructing Marshall’s Indian bargaining 
model.  The Fort Berthold Indians ostensibly bargained with the federal 
government for a fair agreement for the taking of their lands.343  But the 
forty-three-year-long struggle by those Indians to obtain just 
compensation exemplifies the power disparity that allows Indian 
congressional committees to ignore basic principles of just compensation 
doctrine and practice.  The formulation of modern Indian takings doctrine 
encompasses three basic issues.  First, should the plenary power doctrine 
immunize Congress from an Indian taking claim regardless of the 
economic and governmental injuries imposed on the affected Indian 
people?  Second, should congressional guardianship power over its Indian 
                                                 
341. Newton points out that the decision “greatly narrowed the protection 
of the fifth amendment for Indian land.”  Newton, supra note 34, at 255.  The Court 
narrowed the definition of Fifth Amendment protected property so as to exclude 
aboriginal Indian land titles established by use and occupancy.  See id. 
342. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 39–49. 
343. Meyer quotes anthropologist Ruth Hill Useem regarding the 
dominant assumptions that govern the federal government’s relations with the Indian 
peoples: 
 
(1) That over the years, the Indian can expect no consistency in 
policies regarding him; (2) That the interests of the dominant 
society will take precedence over the interests of Indians in any 
policy decision; (3) That the Indian can do little to affect decisions 
concerning Indians; (4) That whatever the policy enacted, the 
Indian will be told that such policy “is in his best interests” or is 
“for his own good”; and (5) That the stated goals of a policy may 
be and usually are quite different from the consequences, with the 
goals being more favorable to the Indians than the consequences. 
 
Meyer, supra note 45, at 349. 
Meyer concludes that the Fort Berthold Indians likely shared in these beliefs 
given their “disillusioning experiences” that “characterized the period of negotiations 
over the Garrison project.”  Id. 
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wards limit judicial scrutiny of federal takings of Indian lands?  Third, 
should subjective legislative valuation of Indian lands be deemed just 
compensation when it is plainly at odds with the “make whole” command 
of the Just Compensation Clause?344 
 
A. The Fort Berthold Indians’ Challenge to the 1949 Congressional 
Taking of Their Reservation 
 
Congress decided in 1949 to take 156,035 acres of the Fort 
Berthold Indian Reservation as the site for a federal dam and 
reservoir.345  The Army Corps of Engineers determined in 1946 that it 
needed those lands as the preferred engineering site for the Garrison Dam 
and Reservoir.346  This dam was to be the main structural component of 
the large Pick-Sloan Program for the harnessing of the Missouri River for 
basinwide economic and social development purposes.347  The Flood 
Control Act of 1944 had earlier authorized a plan that directed the Bureau 
of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers to harness the Missouri 
River for the multipurpose water resources development: hydroelectric 
power production, navigation improvement, irrigation development, flood 
control, and public recreation.348 
The Fort Berthold Indians had been required to bear a substantial 
and disproportionate share of the needed public investment for the Pick-
Sloan Program.349  The Garrison Diversion Unit Commission (“GDUC”), 
                                                 
344. See Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60. 
345. Fort Berthold Taking Act, ch. 790, Pub. L. No. 81-437, 63 Stat. 1026 
(1949). 
346. Colonel Lewis A. Pick, head of the Missouri River Division of the 
Army Corps of Engineers, was determined to go ahead with the Garrison Dam even 
though that site had reportedly been considered and rejected earlier by the Corps’ 
engineers as impracticable.  See Meyer, supra note 45, at 239. 
347. See id. 
348. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat 887, 897.  
The states in the lower and upper Missouri River Basin differed as to why the Missouri 
River should be controlled by a series of federal dams and reservoirs.  The upstream 
states (North and South Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming) were interested primarily in 
developing the irrigation potential of the river. The downstream states (Nebraska, 
Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri) were more interested in flood control.  Meyer, supra note 
45, at 239. 
349. This was the finding of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission 
(“GDUC”), an 11 member congressional commission that had been created in 1984 to 
assess the impacts of the Garrison Project on the peoples of North Dakota.  
Recommendations of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission and H.R. 1116, A Bill 
to Implement Certain Recommendations of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission 
Pursuant to Public Law 98-360, Hearings on H.R. 1116 Before the Subcomm. on 
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an eleven member congressionally appointed body, made this finding 
based on its review of the legislative record of the 1949 taking act.350  It 
was convinced that the Fort Berthold people had suffered devastating 
economic, cultural, and social losses due to the federal taking of their most 
productive agricultural lands.351  It also found that Congress may have 
failed to make the Fort Berthold Indians whole for losses arising from the 
1949 taking.352  It therefore directed the Indians’ trustee—the Secretary of 
the Interior—to hold administrative hearings on the Indians’ just 
compensation and related claims.353 
Interior Secretary Donald Hodel was directed by the GDUC report 
to establish a secretarial commission that would examine the Fort Berthold 
Indians’ claims that arose from the 1949 Garrison taking.354  He was also 
directed to recommend appropriate implementing legislation if his 
                                                 
Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th 
Cong. 114 (1985) [hereinafter GDUC Recommendations]. 
350. The GDUC was charged by section 207(c)(2)(A) of its authorizing 
statute to assess the “costs and benefits incurred and opportunities foregone” by 
affected stakeholder groups due to the construction of the Garrison Dam. Energy and 
Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-360, § 207(c)(2)(A), 98 Stat. 
403, 412 (1984).  The commission concluded that the “Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation bore an inordinate share of the cost of implementing Pick-Sloan Missouri 
River Basin Program mainstem reservoirs.”  GDUC Recommendations, supra note 
349, at 114. 
351. GDUC Recommendations, supra note 349, at 114. 
352. Id. 
353. It recommended that the Interior Secretary establish a five-member 
commission to assess and report on the steps necessary to “complete the 
indemnification of Indian communities of North Dakota that were disrupted by 
construction of Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program dams and reservoirs.”  Id. at 74. 
The GDUC recommended that the Interior Secretary appoint the five-
member commission no later than January 31, 1985, that would address the following 
issues on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation: 
 
—Full potential for irrigation; 
—Financial assistance for on-farm development costs; 
—Replacement of infrastructures lost by the creation of Garrison Dam; 
—Preferential rights to Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin power; 
—Development of shoreline recreation potential; 
—Return of excess lands; 
—Additional financial compensation; 
—Protection of reserved water rights; 
—Other items the five-member Commission may deem appropriate; 
—Funding of all items from Garrison Diversion Unit funds, if authorized. 
 
Id. at 187. 
354. See id. at 74, 187. 
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commission concluded that the federal government had failed justly to 
compensate the Fort Berthold Indians.355  He established the Joint Tribal 
Advisory Committee (“JTAC”) by secretarial charter in 1985 to hear and 
evaluate the Fort Berthold Indians’ claims arising from the 1949 
taking.356  That commission construed its charter so as to allow the Fort 
Berthold Indians to present relevant lay and expert testimony regarding 
their just compensation claim.357  The Indians urged the JTAC to review 
the entire circumstances surrounding the federal taking of their 
lands.358  Such a comprehensive review was essential for a reliable inquiry 
into the fairness of the 1949 federal taking of the affected Indian lands.359 
                                                 
355. The GDUC cited section 207(c)(2)(H) of Pub. L. No. 98-360, 98 Stat. 
412, the institutional equity section of that statute, as the legal basis for directing the 
Secretary to establish the Joint Tribal Advisory Committee (“JTAC”) and to 
“recommend corrective measures, if warranted.”  GDUC Recommendations, supra 
note 349, at 188. 
356. Secretary Donald Hodel created the JTAC on May 10, 1985, and that 
committee submitted its final report to the Secretary on May 23, 1986.  See S. REP. 
NO. 102-250 (1992). 
357. The JTAC report documented the devastating effects of the Garrison 
and Oahe Dams, which caused the removal of tribal peoples and communities and 
flooded “prime tracts of the Missouri River bottomlands.”  Id. at 3. 
It also recommended a range of just compensation for the respective injured 
Indian tribes—between $181.2 million and $349.9 million for Standing Rock and 
$178.4 million and $411.8 million for Fort Berthold.  This just compensation 
recommendation was “intended to substitute for or replace the [tribal] economic base 
that was taken as the site for Lake Sakakawea and Lake Oahe.”  Id. 
358. Chairman Edward Lone Fight testified in oversight hearings 
regarding the JTAC Report that the lengthy negotiations from 1946 to 1949 between 
the Fort Berthold Indians and the federal government demonstrated the Three 
Affiliated Tribes’ entitlement to just compensation in the amounts recommended by 
JTAC.  Final Report and Recommendations of the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory 
Committee, Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, Senate 
Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, and House Comm. on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 100th Cong. 30–41 (1987). 
359. The Senate report on the JTAC recommendations recites that: 
 
The Pick-Sloan Plan was presented to the tribes as a fait accompli.  
The Corps of Engineers was so confident that it could acquire the 
Indian land it needed through the Federal power of eminent domain 
that it began to construct the dams on the reservations even before 
opening formal negotiations with tribal leaders.  Consequently the 
tribes realized that resistance was futile.  Gradually they resigned 
themselves to making the most of whatever compensation might 
be offered. 
 
S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 2. 
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Whether the federal government had made a good faith effort to 
justly compensate the Fort Berthold Indians was the most significant issue 
confronted by the JTAC.  That issue focused the JTAC’s attention on the 
administrative and legislative record that justified the 1949 Indian 
taking.360 
Testimony by natural resource economists and related experts 
aided the JTAC in its examination of the Indians’ claims.361  They 
provided the JTAC with a valuation theory of Indian lands that fulfilled 
the “make whole” standard of the Just Compensation Clause.362  Other 
expert testimony provided the JTAC with historical and sociological 
evidence of the 1949 taking’s devastating effects on the tribal farming and 
ranching economy.363 
                                                 
Chairman Murry of the JTAC testified before the Senate Select Committee 
on Indian Affairs that the federal government had in 1946 and 1947 given “specific 
and implicit promises of just compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians but that “in 
many instances [these promises] were never fulfilled and in other instances only 
partially fulfilled.”  Three Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Equitable 
Compensation Act of 1991, Hearings on S. 168 Before the Senate Select Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 15–19 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 168]. 
360. Chairman Murry’s testimony refers to the 1946 congressionally 
authorized Missouri River Basin Investigations (“MRBI”) as concluding that the Fort 
Berthold Indians were “for all practical purposes, self sufficient.”  His testimony 
emphasizes that “Congress recognized that the bottomlands of these reservations 
represented the sole remaining economic base for the tribes’ welfare and their social 
existence.”  Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16. 
361. See RONALD G. CUMMINGS, VALUING THE RESOURCE BASE LOST BY 
THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES AS A RESULT OF LANDS TAKEN FROM THEM FOR THE 
GARRISON PROJECT (1986) (unpublished report prepared for the JTAC, on file with 
author). 
Dr. Cummings valued these lost tribal lands by estimating the “flow of the 
land-base earnings or income that was attributable to that resource.”  Hearings on S. 
168, supra note 359, at 17.  Dr. Cummings then “capitalized [the expected income 
flows] at 3.5 percent, which was then the Congressionally mandated rate in 1950, and 
then he raised this [amount] to 1986 dollars at the time we were filing the report this 
totaled $178.4 million for the Fort Berthold Reservation.”  Id. 
362. The JTAC retained Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a leading natural 
resources economist, to prepare a valuation report that would assess the nature and 
amount of “damages to [tribal] infrastructure” that was caused by the construction of 
the Garrison Dam and Reservoir on the Fort Berthold Reservation.  See Hearings on 
S. 168, supra note 359, at 17. 
363. Chairman Murry testified that enactment of S. 168 “would move 
toward just compensation” for the Fort Berthold Indians as a means of helping that 
tribe re-establish a viable economic base “that was destroyed by the construction of 
the two dams and the resulting impoundments.”  Id. at 18. 
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The Fort Berthold Indians’ misfortune was to be in the way of the 
federal government’s proposed development of the water resources 
potential of the Upper Missouri River Basin.  Congress’ conflicting roles 
as Indian guardian and as the resource developer of last resort on behalf of 
its non-Indian constituencies in the Upper Missouri River Basin 
fundamentally compromised its institutional ability to justly compensate 
the Fort Berthold Indians.  Congress ultimately chose to sacrifice the 
Indians’ economic and cultural interests to achieve its latter goal.364 
But the Fort Berthold Indians’ claim for just compensation was 
strenuously opposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).365  Indeed, 
Secretary Hodel eliminated the just compensation issue from the JTAC’s 
charter despite the GDUC’s explicit direction to the contrary.  However, 
the JTAC construed the “other issues” portion of its charter so as to allow 
it to hear the Indians’ claim.366  The BIA argued that the taking act barred 
                                                 
364. Michael L. Lawson asserts that: 
 
Without prior warning the Corps of Engineers entered Fort 
Berthold Reservation to begin construction of the dam in April 
1946. The first of the army’s Pick-Sloan projects on the main stem 
of the Missouri River was Garrison Dam, which became America’s 
fifth largest dam at a cost of over $299 million. The 212-foot-high 
structure provided a storage capacity of 24.2 million acre-feet and 
a generating capacity of 400,000 kilowatts. Its long reservoir, Lake 
Sakakawea, was named for the famous Shoshone woman who 
helped guide Lewis and Clark on their expedition up the Missouri 
in 1804. 
 
MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI 
RIVER SIOUX, 1944–1980, at 59 (1982). 
365. The Senate report recounts that the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 
testimony was “strongly opposed to S. 168 [because] the United States is under no 
continuing legal liability to provide any additional compensation to either tribe.”  See 
S. Rep. No. 102-250, at 7 (1992). 
The BIA’s hearings representative contended that the Fort Berthold Indians 
had “already been compensated by the Federal Government for the taking of their 
land,” and the United States has “no legal liability to provide additional 
compensation.”  Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 53 (statement of Patrick 
Hayes, Deputy Assistant Director of Trust Services). 
366. The GDUC’s finding that “tribes of the Standing Rock and Fort 
Berthold Indian reservations bore an inordinate share of the cost of implementing 
Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program mainstem reservoirs” and its direction to the 
Secretary that he “find ways to resolve inequities borne by the tribes” were interpreted 
by the JTAC as a warrant for hearing the Indians’ just compensation claims.  S. REP. 
NO. 102-250, at 3. 
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this claim.367  But the GDUC’s express directive and its own secretarial 
charter persuaded the commission to hear the Fort Berthold Indians’ just 
compensation claim.368 
 
B. The Background of the 1886 Sovereign Bargain that Established the 
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation 
 
The Three Affiliated Tribes—the Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan 
peoples—had resided from time immemorial within the riparian lands and 
valleys of the Missouri River and its tributaries.369  The Missouri River, 
called the “Big Muddy” by unappreciative non-Indian settlers, once 
flowed freely through lands then carpeted with mixed grass prairie.  Its 
basin had been home to vast herds of buffalo and prong horn antelope.  It 
also served as home to the Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan peoples, whose 
material and spiritual cultures were inextricably linked to both these lands 
and herds.370 
The Mandans were especially dependent on the Missouri River for 
their subsistence.  They were farmers who cultivated the alluvial soils near 
the rivers where the water table was high enough to support their crops 
without using irrigation and where temperatures were more moderate than 
on the plains.371  But they also hunted the wild game that frequented the 
river valleys.  They used the river valleys’ abundant cottonwood and other 
trees for firewood and building materials.  They used the lush vegetation 
as pasturage for their thriving livestock herds.372  The Mandans were later 
                                                 
367. The BIA viewed the Fort Berthold Taking Act, Pub. L. No. 81-437, 
63 Stat. 1026 (1949), as a full and complete settlement of all Indian claims that may 
have arisen from that taking.  See Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 29. 
368. See id. at 30–31. 
369. Meyer, supra note 45, at 232–34. 
370. The Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1851 confirmed the Fort Berthold 
Indians’ rights to a large aboriginal area of some 12.5 million acres.  This area included 
the right bank of the Missouri River from the mouth of the Heart River to the mouth 
of the Yellowstone River.  This description enclosed a vast land mass that extended in 
line from the mouth of the Powder River in Wyoming to the headwaters of the Heart 
River.  See id. at 223. 
371. See id. at 233. 
372. The Fort Berthold Indians, Meyer notes, made a “satisfactory 
adjustment” to a “forbidding” country and climate during the “centuries they had lived 
in the Upper Missouri Valley.”  Id.  Meyer concludes that they had become “even 
more attached” to the land by the 1940s.  Id.  The Indians made full use of the available 
natural resources of their reservation: “the wild game, the fruits and berries, the timber 
that grew in the river bottoms and along the tributary ravines, [and] the lignite coal 
found here and there in readily accessible form.”  Id. 
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joined by two other Indian tribes, the Hidatsa and Arikara.  These three 
tribes banded together for common defense against the influx of 
woodlands Sioux who had flooded into the Great Plains from the forest 
lands of Minnesota in the early eighteenth century.373  In 1886, the Three 
Affiliated Tribes reluctantly agreed to occupy the present Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation that was established by agreement with the United 
States.374 
The Missouri River was a friend to the Fort Berthold Indians.  But 
non-Indian settlers and urban city dwellers viewed the river’s frequent 
floods as a menace to their lives and property.  Several times during the 
early 1940s, the Missouri River overflowed its banks and wreaked havoc 
on downstream cities, including Omaha, Nebraska.375  Colonel Lewis Pick 
of the Army Corps of Engineers had to ask civilian volunteers for help in 
manning the levees along the river in 1943.  On April 15 of that year, the 
river crested at twenty-two feet, some twelve feet above its normal level.376 
                                                 
Gordon Macgregor, the chief author of the 1946 congressionally mandated 
MRBI Reports, examined the impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians 
and concluded that “[p]eople and land make a virtually unbroken social and 
geographical unit.”  Meyer, supra note 45, at 233. 
Meyer comments that this fact is “usually overlooked” by “those who 
believed that the Indians could be adequately compensated for the loss of their land 
by a cash payment.  By far the greater part of their income was derived, directly or 
indirectly, from the land.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
373. Meyer describes the reduced state of the Fort Berthold Indians by the 
1860s.  Their numbers had been decimated by small pox and other diseases.  They 
were “penned up” in their agency-established village and unable to defend themselves 
against the increasingly aggressive Sioux.  Meyer, supra at 225.  Ironically, the hostile 
Sioux were able to obtain horses, firearms, and annuity goods from traders and 
government agents.  Chief White Shield of the Arikaras complained in 1870 that prior 
to becoming “agency Indians” they had been able to defend themselves; now “when 
we listen to the whites we have to sit in our villages, listen to [the Sioux’s] insults, and 
have our young men killed and our horses stolen, within sight of our lodges.”  Id. 
374. By that 1886 agreement the Fort Berthold Indians ceded all their 
lands north of the 48th parallel and west of a north-south line drawn six miles west of 
the most westerly point of the Big Bend in the Missouri River.  This agreement was 
not ratified until 1891.  Id. at 224. 
375. Constance Hunt contends that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 
channelization and diking of the Missouri River from 1912 to 1927 contributed to the 
flood potential that later devastated downstream cities such as Omaha during the 
1940s.  See CONSTANCE E. HUNT, DOWN BY THE RIVER: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL 
WATER PROJECTS AND POLICIES ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 116–17 (1988). 
376. Disastrous floods in the early 1940s led the downstream Missouri 
River states to demand a comprehensive congressional plan for flood control.  See id. 
at 117. 
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Congress, after the massive floods of 1943 subsided, directed 
Colonel Pick to propose a comprehensive approach for the multipurpose 
control and development of the Upper Missouri River Basin.377  But two 
rival water resource development plans were offered for congressional 
consideration: the Bureau of Reclamation’s plan, sponsored by W. Glenn 
Sloan, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ plan, sponsored by Colonel 
Pick.  At the behest of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s staff, these two 
plans were eventually merged in a “shotgun wedding” and emerged from 
Congress in 1944 as the Pick-Sloan Program.378 
The Pick-Sloan Program was hailed by its proponents as the 
answer to the region’s prayers for an end to the twin devastations caused 
by recurring summer dust bowls and spring floods.379  The program called 
for a mammoth multipurpose water development programs that entailed 
the construction of five major main stem dams along the Missouri River. 
The contemplated dams would include Gavins Point near Yankton, South 
Dakota; Big Bend at Fort Thompson, South Dakota; Oahe at Pierre, South 
Dakota; and Garrison at Riverdale, North Dakota.380  But the Pick-Sloan 
Program was as much a product of interagency political competition as it 
was of rational water resources planning.381  According to resource 
economist David C. Campbell: 
 
[T]he Pick-Sloan Program was a victory of politics and 
bureaucracy over economics and nature.  The Corps had 
lost a huge chunk of its jurisdiction with the creation of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority.  BuRec, which has 
converted much of California water resources into an 
intricate plumbing network, was looking to expand 
eastward.  There was serious talk of creating a Missouri 
Valley Authority [(“MVA”)] modeled on the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, which would have displaced both the 
Corps and BuRec.  They, along with the Federal Power 
                                                 
377. As a result of the disastrous 1943 flooding of the Missouri River, 
Congress directed the Army Corps of Engineers to draw up a flood control program 
for the Upper Missouri River Basin.  Colonel Pick responded with a brief ten-page 
plan that called for the construction of levees along the river, dams on several 
tributaries, and several major dams between Sioux City and Fort Peck.  See Meyer, 
supra note 45, at 239. 
378. HUNT, supra note 375, at 117. 
379. See id. 
380. See id. 
381. See id. at 117–118. 
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Commission and the Department of Agriculture, resisted 
the proposed MVA.382 
 
Both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) and the Bureau 
of Reclamation (“BuRec” or “Bureau”) had substantial roles in the 
development of the Pick-Sloan Program.  The Corps was assigned the job 
of constructing the multipurpose facilities on the Missouri River and flood 
control facilities on the tributaries.  The Bureau was assigned the job of 
building the program’s irrigation facilities on the Missouri River, as well 
as the multipurpose dams on the tributary streams.383 
The Corps and the BuRec carefully planned the Pick-Sloan 
Program so that its reservoirs would not inundate any non-Indian towns 
along the Missouri River.  But the Three Affiliated Tribes were not so 
fortunate.  The Garrison Dam was intended to serve as the “high dam—
the major regulating structure—in the Pick-Sloan Program.  It was to be 
sited on the Fort Berthold Indians’ last remaining riparian lands.”384  These 
lands were remnant of the Indians’ historic treaty lands of some 12.5 
million acres.  By its 1886 agreement with the Fort Berthold Indians, 
Congress had expressly guaranteed their exclusive use and occupancy of 
these riparian lands.385 
Congress commissioned in 1946 a comprehensive social and 
economic assessment of the likely impacts on the Fort Berthold Indians of 
the siting of the Garrison Dam and Reservoir on that reservation.386  These 
interdisciplinary assessments were based on extensive on-site work and 
analysis of the lives and economy of the Fort Berthold people.  The team 
                                                 
382. Id. at 118. 
383. See id. 
384. See JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE 
POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 65 (1994). 
385. Congressman Lemke from North Dakota made it clear that by taking 
the affected Indian lands, Congress was “again violating a treaty solemnly entered into 
[in 1886] with these tribes—a treaty in which we promised never to disturb them 
again.” CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 3. 
386. Meyer reports that the BIA began “making surveys as early as the 
summer of 1945 to determine who and what would have to be moved where.”  Meyer, 
supra note 45, at 265.  Additional contract planning staff was employed to complete 
a series of investigations regarding the impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort 
Berthold Indians.  These reports became part of the MRBI Reports that would help 
inform the Indian congressional committees about needed legislative action.  These 
reports, published as MRBI Report, No. 46, include H.D. McCullough, Social and 
Economic Report on the Future of the Fort Berthold Reservation, North Dakota (Dec. 
24, 1947), and Gordon Macgregor & John C. Hunter, Survey of Attitudes Regarding 
Resettlement Among the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indians (Nov.–
Dec. 1946).  Meyer, supra note 45, at 266 n.2. 
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of economists, anthropologists, and sociologists that compiled the 
Missouri River Basin Investigations Reports (“MRBI Reports”) confirmed 
what the Fort Berthold Indians had long asserted before the Indian 
congressional committees: siting one of the world’s largest earth-filled 
dams on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation would irretrievably disrupt 
the economic and social life of an ancient tribal people.387 
These reports recited the expected impacts of the Garrison Dam 
on the Fort Berthold people.  First, approximately ninety percent of the 
Indian people would have to be removed from their historic settlements 
along the bottom lands of the Missouri River.388  Second, the agricultural 
treaty purposes of the Fort Berthold Reservation would be frustrated due 
to flooding of the Indians’ arable land base.389  Third, the only 
agriculturally self-sufficient Indian tribe on the Great Plains would have 
its economic and social base destroyed by the proposed flooding and 
                                                 
387. Gordon Macgregor, a leading sociologist, commented on the future 
impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians and succinctly summarizes 
the reservation lands’ value to those Indians: 
 
The “reservation” is to the Fort Berthold Indian his homeland. 
Within it are abandoned village sites of the Gros Ventre and 
Mandan and the site of the last village where they and the Arikara 
lived in a common community following their old village life. They 
were never assigned this land and forced to reside on it as prisoners 
of war as were many tribes of the nomadic plains culture. The 
“reservation” is the last holding of their former lands where they 
farmed and hunted before the coming of the white man. 
 
Meyer, supra note 45, at 237–38 (quoting Gordon Macgregor, Attitudes of the Fort 
Berthold Indians Regarding Removal from the Garrison Reservoir Site and Future 
Administration of Their Reservation, 16 N.D. HIST. 56 (1949)). 
388. Ralph Shane, agency superintendent, estimated that the Garrison 
Dam would require “that 90% of the total population were moved ‘lock, stock and 
barrel’ from their old homes to new homes on the highlands.”  They were to be 
“uprooted, shuffled and mixed” and every “semblance of organization was destroyed.”  
Meyer, supra note 45, at 266. 
But the economic impact was even more devastating. Meyer estimates that 
while the Indians “lost one-fourth of the reservation lands, the Indians were losing 
nearly all of the Class I and II agricultural lands—the rich bottomlands on which they 
had lived for generations.”  Id. 
389. The MRBI Reports exhaustively and meticulously detailed the 
expected adverse effects of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians. More 
importantly, they how Congress should act legislatively to mitigate and ameliorate 
these impacts. Meyer, supra note 45, at 265–74. 
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would likely be reduced to dependence on the federal government for their 
future subsistence and maintenance.390 
Meanwhile, the Corps was working feverishly to lay the major 
earthen groundworks of the Garrison Dam.  Critics of the Pick-Sloan 
Program contended that project proponents hoped that by the time the 
MRBI Reports were made to Congress, so much time, money, and effort 
would have been sunk into the Garrison project that Congress would be 
loathe to cancel it or to force major project revisions on behalf of the Fort 
Berthold Indians.391  However, in 1946 Congress did respond to the Indian 
pleas to stop the dam’s construction.  Congress statutorily forbade the 
Corps’ building of any of the dam’s major structural features until the 
Secretary of War located and offered an adequate replacement reservation 
to the Fort Berthold Indians.392 
The Secretary of War was required to locate and offer this 
substitute reservation to the Fort Berthold Indians before he could actually 
                                                 
390. Meyer, supra note 45, at 235–37.  The House Subcommittee on 
Public Lands concluded that the Fort Berthold Indians in 1949 were “in sight of 
complete economic independence” due to their “strong and growing cattle industry 
and steadily expanding agricultural program.”  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 6. 
391. Meyer reports that “work was speeded up in 1946, and by August the 
construction of an access road to the damsite, the work bridge, and the town site of 
Riverdale was well under way.”  Meyer agreed with the “calloused” view of project 
proponents that the federal government would not abandon this six-million dollar 
investment regardless of the “Indians’ plight.”  Meyer, supra note 45, at 249. 
392. A tribal delegation was assured in 1945 by Congressmen that “no 
work can be done until some settlement is made as to their status.”  Id. at 246.  That 
assurance was statutorily embodied in the War Department Civil Appropriations Act 
for 1947.  Section 6 of that act stated: 
 
No part of the appropriation for the Garrison Reservoir herein 
contained may be expended for actual construction of the dam 
itself until the Secretary of War shall have selected and offered, 
through the Secretary of the Interior, to the Three Affiliated Tribes, 
land which the Secretary of the Interior approves as comparable in 
quality and sufficient in area to compensate the said tribes for the 
land on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation which shall be 
inundated by the construction of the Garrison Dam: Provided 
further, That said selection and offer by the Secretary of War and 
approval by the Secretary of the Interior shall be consummated 
before January 1, 1947, after which consummation actual 
construction of the dam itself may proceed. 
 
War Department Civil Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 79-374, § 6, 60 Stat. 167 
(1946). 
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construct the Garrison Dam,393 and had to provide them with replacement 
compensation for their lands.394  But dam proponents argued that such a 
standard of compensation was too high and would set a dangerous 
precedent for the Corps’ negotiations with the downstream Indian tribes 
who likewise opposed taking of their lands for the Pick-Sloan Program.395 
The Secretary of War suggested that it would be hard to convince 
local non-Indian communities to accept the creation of a large replacement 
reservation for the relocated Fort Berthold Indians.396  He nonetheless did 
locate and propose a couple of potential new reservation sites.  But the 
Secretary of the Interior rejected these sites as failing to meet the statutory 
requirement that the replacement lands be of “like quality and quantity” as 
the taken Indian lands.397  In the meantime, project proponents contended 
that the Indians’ refusal to accept these replacement lands demonstrated 
the impracticability of this congressional compensation scheme.398 
                                                 
393. The Secretary of War commenced his efforts to locate replacement 
reservation lands well before the statutory requirement to do so was enacted.  One 
such proposal was to add some 470,000 acres of land that lay to the west and southwest 
of the Fort Berthold Reservation.  However, tribal leader Martin Cross characterized 
that offered land as “good country for rattlesnakes and horned toads.”  His attitude 
was representative of the Indians’ unwillingness to exchange any of their present lands 
for the so-called “lieu lands” that were to be offered by the War Secretary in 
compliance with the statutory command.  Meyer, supra note 45, at 249. 
394. First Deficiency Act, 1946, ch. 589, Pub. L. No. 79-269, 59 Stat. 632, 
654 (1945). 
395. LAWSON, supra note 364, at 62–63. 
396. Meyer reports that only one non-Indian community in the proposed 
lieu land areas was at all “ambivalent.”  That was the town of Stanton, which would 
be excluded from the lieu lands grant but saw a money-making opportunity if it were 
to become the agency headquarters of the “new” Fort Berthold Reservation.  Meyer, 
supra note 45, at 253. 
397. The War Department’s “last offer” of the Stanton block of lieu lands 
was rejected by Interior Secretary Krug in January, 1947, as failing to meet the 
statutory requirement of “like quantity and quality” of the reservation lands.  Krug’s 
rejection signaled the death knell for the lieu lands proposal and congressional 
attention shifted to the possibility of a cash payment to the Indians for their taken 
lands.  Id. at 255. 
398. Governor Aandahl and Senators Young and Langer of North Dakota 
agreed that the Garrison Dam must go forward and that the Fort Berthold Indians must 
be removed to make way for the dam.  Senators Young and Langer proposed to 
introduce a bill that made possible either the piecemeal relocation of the Indians or a 
general cash settlement.  The governor pushed for a new Garrison Dam bill without 
any “Indian clause limitation,” which would allow the Indians to be removed upon 
payment for their lands on the same basis as the affected non-Indians in the area.  Id. 
at 255. 
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Substantial constituent pressure motivated Congress to move 
speedily on the construction of the Garrison Dam.399  Given the Indians’ 
and the Interior Secretary’s 1947 rejection of the proffered “Stanton 
Block” as the War Secretary’s last offer of replacement Indian lands, it 
rescinded the Garrison construction ban.400  The Fort Berthold Indians 
were now to be removed from their lands so as to make way for the 
Garrison Dam and Reservoir.401 
The Fort Berthold Indians continued their battle for just 
compensation.  But Colonel Pick intensely lobbied the Indian leaders to 
accept a proposed contract that would facilitate the removal of the Indian 
people and hasten the construction of the dam.  His proposed agreement 
treated the Fort Berthold Indians as if they were mere private condemnees 
whose lands were taken for a federal purpose.402  The proposed contract 
also required the federal government to pay for removing the Indians.403  A 
leading commentator concluded that the tribal leaders accepted this 
contract as the only way of ensuring that their tribal members had some 
                                                 
399. Congress’ rescission of the “Indian Clause” was regarded as a victory 
for the pro-dam forces represented by the Governor and State Water Commission of 
North Dakota.  Id. at 256. 
400. War Department Civil Appropriations Act, ch. 411, Pub. L. No. 80-
296, 61 Stat. 686, 690 (1947). 
401. Meyer comments that Pub. L. No. 80-296 represented “forced” 
legislation that ignored the interests and treaty reserved rights of the Fort Berthold 
Indians.  The language of the bill, regarded as a triumph for the Governor and North 
Dakota Water Commission, specified that the Indians would be paid $5,105,625.00 
for the “acquisition of lands and rights therein within the taking line of Garrison 
Reservoir which lands lie within the area now established as the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation, North Dakota, including all elements of value above or below the surface 
thereof including all improvements, severance damages and reestablishment and 
relocation costs.”  61 Stat. at 690.  This appropriation was contingent upon the 
conclusion of a contract between the Indians and the United States or the money was 
to return to the Treasury on a certain date.  Tribal representatives, such as Jefferson B. 
Smith, who appeared to testify regarding this bill were given the “cold shoulder” and 
were later told that they had agreed to accept this appropriation as compensation for 
their taken lands.  Meyer, supra note 45, at 256–57. 
402. Meyer ironically comments that this proposed contract gave the 
Indians a better deal than they were to ultimately receive via the 1949 Taking Act.  
For example, the Indians, under Article 10, were to have free use of the area between 
the taking line and the actual shoreline for hunting, fishing, trapping, and grazing uses 
as well as boat harbor and other recreational uses.  Under Article 12, they were to 
receive a one-eighth royalty from any oil or gas that may be later extracted from lands 
within the taken area.  Id. at 258–59. 
403. Id. at 259. 
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subsistence support after they were removed from their lands.404  Colonel 
Pick, believing that he had been insulted by tribal members at a meeting 
in 1947, characterized the Fort Berthold Indians as belligerently 
uncooperative, and used that incident as a “reason to dictate his own 
settlement terms to Congress.”405 
The Fort Berthold Indians objected to their treatment as mere 
private non-Indian condemnees.406  They insisted that their right to sue for 
just compensation in the appropriate judicial forum be preserved in any 
agreement.407  They argued that just compensation was owed for real 
losses that arose from the devastation of their tribal economy and 
governmental capabilities.408  A Corps-Indian contract was signed in an 
emotion-filled ceremony in Secretary Krug’s office on May 20, 1948.409 
Senator Watkins reasoned that Congress, not the courts, was the 
appropriate forum for the determination of a “just and generous” 
settlement for the Fort Berthold Indians, one that would “prevent[] the 
necessity for any further  action in the Court of Claims.”410  Senator 
Watkins urged his Indian committee colleagues to reject any Indian 
agreement that recognized the Indians’ right to just compensation.  
Terminating the Fort Berthold Indians’ right to a judicial determination of 
                                                 
404. Meyer comments that the Fort Berthold Indians accepted their 
inevitable fate and began “working out a contract so as to avoid losing the money that 
had been conditionally appropriated for them.”  Id. at 258. 
405. LAWSON, supra note 364, at 60. 
406. Meyer, supra note 45, at 257. 
407. The Indians were successful in inserting a provision that would allow 
them to bring a just compensation suit in the Court of Claims for any additional 
damages “of any treaty obligation of the Government or any intangible cost of 
reestablishment or relocation, for which the said tribes are not compensated by the 
said $5,105,625.”  War Department Civil appropriations Act, 1948, ch. 411, Pub. L. 
No. 81-296, 61 Stat. 686, 690 (1947). 
408. Meyer, supra note 45, at 261. 
409. Id. at 259. 
410. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 18.  The original version of House 
Joint Resolution 33 ratified the terms of the contract and added $9.5 million dollars in 
additional compensation to cover items not covered by the contract.  Attorney Case, 
on behalf of the tribe, argued that the capitalized value of the factors of income from 
the reserved lands totaled $24,561,000, from which he deducted $2,580,000 as the 
value of the residual reservation lands, leaving a just compensation claim of 
$21,981,000.  But the chairman of the House subcommittee accepted the BIA’s just 
compensation figure of $14,605,625.  This amount of compensation, coupled with a 
three million dollar readjustment fund and grant of 20 megawatts of preference power 
to the Indians from the future Garrison power plant, proved far too generous to Senator 
Watkins of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee.  His committee struck out everything 
in the contract, changed the purpose of the bill, and reduced the just compensation 
appropriation to four million dollars.  Meyer, supra note 45, at 261–63. 
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just compensation was appropriate, he reasoned, given the “substantial 
unanimity of opinion [in the Senate] to the effect that the Congress should 
provide for a definitive settlement with the Three Affiliated Tribes.”411 
Watkins’ counsel to his committee colleagues to formulate the 
“complete and final settlement of all [Indian] claims and demand[ed]” 
congressional plenary power over Indian lands.412  Nonetheless, he 
assured the Fort Berthold Indians that any congressional settlement would 
be “both just and generous . . . thereby removing any reason [or] necessity 
for any further action in the Court of Claims.”413  But the Fort Berthold 
Indians remained unconvinced of Senator Watkins’ sincerity regarding the 
justice of a congressionally imposed settlement.414 
 
C. The Doctrinal Basis for a Modern Indian Takings Doctrine 
 
The Fort Berthold Indians argued before JTAC that Senator 
Watkins’ Indian committee demonstrably failed to justly compensate them 
for their taken lands, that their lands should be valued on the same basis 
as non-Indian lands that serve comparable governmental or public welfare 
functions.415  They contended that this valuation standard would fulfill 
two important underlying goals of the Just Compensation Clause.  First, 
such a valuation standard would ensure the continued viability of the Three 
Affiliated Tribes as a recognized government consistent with the purposes 
                                                 
411. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 17.  Cummings quotes Interior 
Secretary Krug’s letter to Watkins’ Indian committee wherein Krug concludes that 
such a congressional settlement may eliminate the “more protracted and less certain 
remedy of a suit in the Court of Claims” given that there “might be a question of 
whether the real needs of the tribes, directly caused by the taking of their lands, could 
be made the legal basis of an award.”  Id. at 18. 
412. Id. at 18. 
413. Id. 
414. Cummings cites the fact that each “successive effort by Congress to 
propose a settlement for the Tribes’ taken lands seemed to offer less and less to the 
Tribes—a trend that did not escape the attention of the Tribes.”  Id. at 18–19. 
415. Cummings concluded that the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation 
represented a dedicated public or governmental entity whose lands and territory 
possessed a value to the tribal community that far transcended their fair market value.  
He cited the 1886 agreement between the Fort Berthold Indians and the United States 
as confirming the governmental and public welfare status of the Indians’ reserved 
lands: “[[T]his Reservation is formed] in order to obtain the means necessary to enable 
[the Fort Berthold Indians] to become wholly self-supporting by the cultivation of the 
soil and the other pursuits of husbandry.”  Id. at 14–15 (quoting Agreement of Mar. 3, 
1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1032). 
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of its 1886 agreement with the federal government.416  Second, such a 
valuation standard would discourage future “rent seeking” initiatives by 
Indian congressional committees that sought to exploit their plenary power 
over Indian lands for their non-Indian constituents’ benefit.417 
The 1886 sovereign bargain that established the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation declared that the reservation was formed in order for 
the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Tribes “to obtain the means necessary 
to enable them to become wholly self-supporting by the cultivation of the 
soil and other pursuits of husbandry.”418  This goal was to be realized by 
the Indians’ development of the agricultural potential of their reserved 
riparian farming and grazing lands along the Missouri River and its 
tributary streams.419  The 1946 MRBI Reports confirmed that without 
these riparian lands, the Three Affiliated Tribes would not achieve the 
treaty’s goal of economic and social independence.420 
                                                 
416. Cummings points to the Indian committees’ keen awareness, in light 
of the MRBI Reports, that the Fort Berthold Indians would lose the vast majority of 
their arable and irrigable land base that was the essential means for carrying out the 
purposes of the 1886 treaty agreement.  Id. at 23–24. 
417. See Lunney, supra note 250, at 753–61. 
418. 26 Stat. at 1032. 
419. The critical role of the Indians’ reserved Missouri River bottom lands 
as the keystone economic base for their tribal future and security is expressed in an 
August 1949 MRBI Report to Congress: 
 
Most of the natural resources upon which the Indians depend for 
subsistence will be wiped out by the completion of the Garrison 
project.  These losses must be replaced by cash income.  The 
reservoir area includes most of the timber land from which building 
materials, fence posts and firewood are obtained.  In these river 
bottomlands are the june-berries, wild plums and chokecherries 
which form such an important part of the Indian diet.  It is estimated 
that the wild life losses will cut off most of the supply of deer and 
other game since these animals and birds are dependent upon the 
brush and timber for their existence.  Most of the surface coal 
deposits from which Indians mine their coal will be flooded . . . 
families obtain almost all their fuel, a large portion of their meat 
and fruit, a considerable amount of garden vegetables, and most of 
their building material without the expenditure of any cash.  After 
the inundation of these natural resources by the Garrison Reservoir 
Project, the amount of cash required for subsistence will be greatly 
increased. 
 
CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 21. 
420. Mr. R. W. Rietz, Indian Agency Relocation Officer, concluded that 
although there were 420 Indian families on the historic reservation, the residual 
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In other words, these Indian lands formed the essential trust res of 
the Fort Berthold Indians’ Tribes’ economic and governmental 
infrastructure.421  That res was composed of the easily irrigable bottom 
lands of the reservation.  Destruction of these lands imposed on the Fort 
Berthold Indians economic losses to be measured by the capitalized value 
of the expected future incomes that would be generated by their lands.  The 
Corps’ flooding of the Fort Berthold lands destroyed the Indians’ 
governmental and economic resource base as completely as would any 
comparable natural cataclysm.422 
Private lands, assets, and capital are protected by the Just 
Compensation Clause from similar demolition by governmental 
action.423  But Senator Watkins worked to persuade his congressional 
colleagues that the Fort Berthold Indians deserved less compensation for 
their lost capital assets than similarly situated non-Indian entities.424  The 
value of these Indian lands transcended their individual parcel value, but 
Senator Watkins’ Indian committee failed to acknowledge this basic 
reality.425 
                                                 
reservation lands would be able to support only 175 families.  The rest would likely, 
in his opinion, have to be re-educated in vocational skills to survive in off-reservation 
job placement.  Id. 
421. The Indian committees recognized that the Fort Berthold Indians had 
abided by the terms of the 1886 agreement and that their development of a ranching 
and agricultural industry had rendered them in sight of complete economic 
independence and justified compensation for the “reestablishment of a sound 
economic base for the future of said tribes.”  95 Cong. Rec. 8930 (1949). 
422. The Indian committees recognized that the Fort Berthold Indians 
were bound by treaty agreement, tradition, and custom to their reserved tribal lands 
that were intended to serve in perpetuity as their homeland.  Unlike the non-Indian 
farmer or rancher who can take his condemnation payment from the government and 
buy like farmland in a nearby state, the Fort Berthold Indians could not replace their 
unique territory, social, and governmental status through the payment of fair market 
value.  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 20. 
423. The Supreme Court enunciated the equivalent value or “make whole” 
standard for just compensation in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 
U.S. 312, 326, 341 (1893).  The private owner of lands that are taken for public use is 
to be put in “as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.”  
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
424. Cummings cites the “log-rolling” between the House Subcommittee 
on Public Lands and the Senate Indian Affairs Committee that resulted in progressive 
and arbitrary reductions of the proposed just compensation amounts to the Fort 
Berthold Indians as evidence of an institutional failure to comply with anything 
resembling the “make whole” command of the Just Compensation Clause.  
CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 22–24. 
425. In October 1845, Acting Interior Solicitor Felix S. Cohen gave his 
legal opinion before Watkins’ Senate Indian Affairs committee regarding the Corps’ 
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However, the JTAC did recognize that the federal government had 
a legal duty to make the Fort Berthold Indians whole for their economic 
losses.426  Therefore, the JTAC directed Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a 
leading natural resource economist, to do an assessment of the Indians’ 
economic losses imposed by the 1949 taking.427  He was directed to use 
known and accepted 1949 valuation standards as the means to capitalize 
the stream of income the Indians would have received from those lands.428  
Such a valuation approach replicated Congress’ 1946 valuation standard 
that required the War Department to provide the Indians with the “in-kind” 
replacement value of their taken lands.429  The War Secretary had been 
instructed to provide the Indians with “land . . . comparable in quality and 
sufficient in area to compensate the said Tribes for the land on the Fort 
Berthold Reservation which shall be inundated by the construction of 
Garrison Dam.”430  Only “in-kind” replacement or substitute 
compensation would fairly compensate the Fort Berthold Indians for the 
taking of their lands.431 
The 1946 Congress expressly rejected the Corps’ claim that 
“parcelized” valuation of the Indian lands would provide just 
compensation to the Fort Berthold people.  Congress recognized that the 
Indians’ treaty-reserved lands were tribal public welfare and governmental 
facilities whose intrinsic value could not be measured by the Corps’ 
traditional land valuation approach.432  Those Indian lands had been 
                                                 
power to condemn the Fort Berthold lands.  He testified that a right of condemnation 
by the Corps did not exist over tribal lands and that if Congress exercised its plenary 
power to take those lands, it would be in breach of its treaty agreements with the Fort 
Berthold Indians.  Meyer, supra note 45, at 244. 
426. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16–19. 
427. Id. at 17. 
428. Id. 
429. Senate Report 102-250 emphasized that the JTAC’s recommended 
compensation amount was intended to “substitute for or replace the value of the 
economic base that was taken as the site for Lake Sakakawea and Lake Oahe.”  See S. 
REP. NO. 102-250, at 3 (1992). 
430. Meyer, supra note 45, at 246. 
431. Id. at 251–52. 
432. Chairman Murry emphasized the JTAC’s awareness that “Congress . 
. . required the War Department, by statute, [in 1946] to provide a suitable replacement 
reservation called ‘in lieu lands’ so that the reservation as an ongoing concern could 
continue.”  Recommendations of the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory Committee 
Regarding the Entitlement of the Three Affiliated Tribes and the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe to Additional Financial Compensation for the Taking of Reservation Lands for 
the Site of the Garrison Dam and Reservoir and the Oahe Dam and Reservoir, 
Hearings on H.R. 2414 Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102 
Cong. 109 (1992) (statement of Emerson Murry, Former Chairman of the Joint Tribal 
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perpetually dedicated to tribal governmental and economic uses by the 
1886 agreement.  These background factors persuaded the JTAC that the 
just compensation owed the Indians should be measured by the capitalized 
value of the expected stream of income that they would have derived from 
their lands.433 
The JTAC also rejected the BIA’s contention that the 1949 Taking 
Act barred the Indians’ claim for just compensation.  The JTAC read its 
explicit directive from the GDUC and its own charter as requiring the 
renewed scrutiny of the federal government’s conduct in the taking of the 
Fort Berthold Indians’ lands.434  It had been empowered to recommend an 
equitable solution as the basis for possible congressional 
legislation.435  Like the GDUC, its congressional predecessor, the JTAC 
was to investigate fully the impacts on Indians of the Garrison Project and 
to recommend remedial legislation that would redress those impacts in a 
                                                 
Advisory Commission) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2414].  Because the department 
was unable to do so, “Congress decided to pay [the Fort Berthold Indians] 
compensation in lieu of replaced lands, with the amount to be a substitute for the 
replacement valuation.”  Id. 
Chairman Murry described the valuation methodology undertaken by the 
JTAC to establish a just compensation amount for the taking of the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation in 1949. 
 
The JTAC, in an attempt to value these lands that were taken and 
damages to the infrastructure did procure the services of a Dr. 
Ronald G. Cummings, who specializes in resource economics, to 
prepare a report on the issue.  He emphasized that the 156,000 acres 
of land taken were the sole major resource available to carry out 
the purposes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  He chose the 
value of these resources by estimating the flow of land-base 
earnings or income that was attributable to that resource and the 
methodology he used contemplates the exchange of one income 
producing asset for another.  Of course, that “in lieu” or income 
producing asset to be exchanged was money damages.  He then had 
this cash that would have been received capitalized at 3.5 per cent, 
which was then the Congressionally mandated rate in 1950, and 
then he raised this to 1986 dollars at the time we were filing the 
report this totalled $178.4 million for the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation. 
 
Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17. 
433. Id. 
434. S. REP. 102-250, at 3. 
435. The JTAC was expressly created by Secretary Hodel “to find ways to 
resolve the inequities” borne by the Fort Berthold Indians.  Id. 
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fair and equitable manner.436  It concluded that only such an equitable 
remedy would put the Fort Berthold Indians in as good a position 
pecuniarily as they would have occupied if their property had not been 
taken.437  The JTAC concluded simply that just compensation had not been 
provided to the Fort Berthold Indians.438 
The JTAC then determined that replacement or substitute value of 
the taken lands would adequately compensate the Indians for their losses 
due to the 1949 taking.439  Such an alternative valuation standard has been 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in the federal taking of lands that served 
essential governmental or public welfare functions.  The Court held that 
the just compensation standard required that such essential governmental 
resources be valued at their substitute or replacement cost.440  The Fort 
Berthold Indians’ taken lands provided the social welfare and 
governmental benefits described by the Court, by their use in ranching and 
agricultural employment as was contemplated by the 1886 agreement.  
Only the continued existence of those lands, or the just compensation 
equivalent, would ensure that the Fort Berthold Indians would be able to 
fulfill the governmental and economic goals that were contemplated by 
the 1886 sovereign bargain between them and the federal government.441 
                                                 
436. Congress concurred in the JTAC’s findings that the Fort Berthold 
Indians had never been adequately compensated for their lands taken as the site for 
the Garrison Dam and Reservoir.  Id. at 8. 
437. Cummings cites fair market value as the baseline standard of 
valuation that the Supreme Court typically applies as the basis of just compensation 
to private parties whose lands have been taken for governmental purposes.  He 
synthesized the leading Supreme Court decisions on the appropriate valuation 
standard for private property or resources.  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 9–14. 
438. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17. 
439. Id. 
440. The taking of dedicated governmental or public welfare facilities 
triggers the application of the substitute valuation doctrine that was articulated in 
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923).  The Court recognized that when land or 
public welfare facilities are condemned or taken by the federal government, an 
alternate valuation standard other than fair market value may be used to make the 
wronged party whole.  The Court in Brown held that “(a) method of compensation by 
substitution would seem to be the best means of making the parties whole.”  Brown, 
203 U.S. at 82.  Cummings cites the post-Brown decisions that expanded the reach 
and scope of the substitute valuation doctrine as it applies to unique or irreplaceable 
lands or resources that are either not traded on any market or have elements of value 
that transcend market value.  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 12–14. 
441. Cummings points to the 1886 Fort Berthold treaty language and 
legislative history of Public Law 479 as clearly establishing the inextricable 
relationship between the “Tribe’s arable lands [virtually all of which were in their 
taken lands] and the basic purposes intended for the Reservation [to allow the Tribes 
to become ‘wholly self-supporting by the cultivation of the soil and other pursuits of 
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The JTAC fashioned an equitable remedy based on the substitute 
or replacement value of the taken Indian lands.442  It recognized that 
payment of the fair market value of any taken property generally satisfies 
the “full and perfect” equivalent and “make whole” standard of the Just 
Compensation Clause.443  But the Court in Olson v. United States held that 
it is “the property and not the cost of it that is safeguarded by state and 
Federal Constitutions.”444  The Court also made it clear that if a fair market 
price prevailed for private property taken for public use, then that ruling 
market price should define the just compensation amount owed to the 
injured private party.445  Conversely, if there is no active market for 
specialized public or social welfare resources, then a commission, like 
JTAC, is authorized to resort to alternative valuation methods other than 
fair market value.446  The JTAC recognized that the Court had stringently 
limited the application of this alternative valuation standard to those 
circumstances wherein the property taken was of a kind that is seldom 
exchanged on a market or that has a value transcending any ostensible 
market price.447  The Court in Miller v. United States further qualified the 
                                                 
husbandry.’]”  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 15 (citations omitted).  He concludes 
that the Tribe’s reserved bottom lands unequivocally represented treaty-established 
“public welfare facilities” that were intended to serve as the perpetual homeland for 
the Fort Berthold Indians.  Id. 
442. Cummings had been directed by the JTAC to recommend an 
equitable valuation methodology that addressed the Indians’ claims that their treaty-
reserved lands that were taken in 1949 had served as the unique situs for their 
governmental, associational, and cultural homeland pursuant to the 1886 Fort Berthold 
agreement.  He concluded that an equitable valuation methodology would have 
capitalized the values of all the n-factor and related incomes that the Fort Berthold 
Indians would have derived from their reserved lands in perpetuity.  Id. at 25–31. 
443. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17. 
444. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
445. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923) 
(“When private property is taken for public use, and there is a market price prevailing 
at the time and place of the taking, that price is just compensation . . . . More would 
be unjust to the United States and less would deny the owner what he is entitled to.” 
(citations omitted)). 
446. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). 
447. The testimony of JTAC’s Chairman Murry before the Senate Select 
Committee on Indian Affairs recognized that fair market value is not the exclusive 
valuation method for taken Indian lands.  Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.  
The JTAC’s valuation approach is likewise confirmed by a Second Circuit decision 
holding that “fair market value ‘is not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method 
of valuation’. . . . It should be abandoned ‘when the nature of the property or its uses 
produce a wide discrepancy between value of the property to the owner and the price 
at which it could be sold to anyone else.”’  United States v. Certain Property Located 
in the Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation omitted). 
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general applicability of the fair market value standard, holding that 
“[w]here, for any reason, property has no market, then resort must be had 
to some other data to ascertain its value.”448 
The JTAC was persuaded that the Fort Berthold Indians’ lands 
were a paradigmatic example of governmental or social welfare resources.  
Therefore, the JTAC concluded that the value of the taken Indian lands 
could not be reliably determined by resort to fair market value.449  The 
1946 Congress had recognized this same fact by its adoption of the 
substitute or replacement value as the basis of the just compensation award 
to the Fort Berthold Indians.450 
The JTAC’s valuation approach sought to do justice to both the 
federal government and the Fort Berthold Indians.  It refused to make a 
fetish of market value as the only or best measure of just compensation.  
But it was also appropriately wary of “those . . . special circumstances” of 
Indian lands that have no fair market value.  It sought expert testimony and 
evidence regarding the appropriate valuation methodology that would 
fairly value those lands from an objective viewpoint.451  It recognized that 
the fair market valuation method would not capture the unique 
                                                 
448. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374. 
449. The JTAC’s Chairman Murry cited Dr. Cummings’ extended 
treatement of the public welfare character of the Fort Berthold Indian lands as strongly 
influencing the JTAC’s recommendation of the equitable award of just compensation 
for those taken lands.  Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17. 
450. Id. 
451. Emerson Murry, Chair of the JTAC, testified before the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs that the JTAC employed Dr. Ronald G. 
Cummings, a natural resource economist, to prepare a valuation report regarding the 
just compensation issue raised by the Fort Berthold Indians.  Murry pointed out that 
the 156,000 acres of taken reservation lands were the “sole resource available to carry 
out the purposes of the reservation.”  Hearings on H.R. 2414, supra note 432, at 110.  
He emphasized that the JTAC wanted Cummings to construct an “exchange value” of 
the taken lands for an equivalent income-producing financial asset.  Id.  He explained 
the JTAC’s response to the “grossly inadequate amount” of compensation paid to the 
Indians under the 1949 taking act that did not allow the Indians sufficient 
compensation to “replace their economic base” that was taken as the site for the 
Garrison Dam.  Id.  Murry cited the MRBI Reports to Congress evidencing that the 
Three Affiliated Tribes were “self-sufficient, well-integrated Societies” before the 
advent of the Garrison Dam.  The just compensation amount of $178.4 million 
recommended by the JTAC was derived from Dr. Cummings capitalization of the 
factor returns or perpetual earning capacity of the Indians’ taken lands at a 1949 rate 
of 3.5%.  Chairman Murry hoped the House committee would recommend that amount 
of just compensation on behalf of the Fort Berthold Indians because it would 
“materially move the Tribes forward in their efforts to establish a viable economic 
base.”  Id. at 11. 
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characteristics of the Fort Berthold lands, and thus resorted to the 
alternative valuation approach announced in Brown v. United States.452 
The circumstances of the 1949 Fort Berthold taking strikingly 
resembled the facts presented in the Brown decision.  In Brown, the federal 
government took three-quarters of the business center of a town as the site 
for a water reservoir.453  The town’s lands had provided the region’s 
inhabitants with a wide array of economic and public welfare values.  The 
injured parties were the region’s inhabitants who had historically 
depended and relied on the services provided by this town.  The Court 
concluded that the real value of these nonmarket services and 
opportunities could not be captured by any market-based concept of 
value.454 
By adopting the alternative valuation approach, the JTAC 
acknowledged that the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation was established 
in 1886 for specific governmental and public welfare purposes: to provide 
a permanent homeland for the Three Affiliated Tribes.455  The Indians’ 
ethnographic and legal history persuaded the JTAC that the 1886 
agreement contemplated the perpetual use of the reservation’s fertile and 
productive bottomlands as the Indians’ resource base.456  The 1946 
Congress rejected the idea that the Fort Berthold Indians were only entitled 
to the fair market value of their individual parcels of trust lands.457  Thus, 
both JTAC and the 1946 Congress agreed that only replacement value for 
the taken lands would ensure that the Indians were made whole.  For that 
reason, the JTAC directed Cummings to prepare a land valuation 
                                                 
452. The Court reasoned that: 
 
A town is a business center.  It is a unit.  If three-quarters of it is to 
be destroyed by appropriating it to an exclusive use like a reservoir, 
all property owners, both those ousted and those in the remaining 
quarter, as well as the State, whose subordinate agency of 
government is the municipality, are injured.  A method of 
compensation by substitution would seem to be the best means of 
making the parties whole. 
 
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 82–83 (1923). 
453. Id. 
454. Id. 
455. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16–18. 
456. Id. 
457. The 1946 Congress required that the Fort Berthold Indians be 
provided “land . . . comparable in quality and sufficient in area to compensate the said 
tribes for the land on the Fort Berthold Reservation which shall be inundated by the 
construction of the Garrison Dam.”  War Department Civil Appropriations Act, PUB. 
L. NO. 79-374, § 6, 60 Stat. 167 (1946). 
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assessment that would allow the commission to reasonably ascertain the 
cost of providing property in substitution for the Fort Berthold Indian 
lands.458 
 
D. Why the Congressional “Good Faith” Standard Fails to Provide Just 
Compensation to Injured Indian Peoples 
 
The 1949 Congress’ alleged failure justly to compensate the Fort 
Berthold Indians was a key issue for JTAC investigation.  That 
investigation required an examination of the legislative record of the 1949 
Taking Act.459 Although Congress does enjoy a qualified immunity to 
Indian taking claims,460 it must make a good faith effort to provide the 
injured Indians with the fair value of their taken lands.461  The Indians 
argued that the legislative record demonstrated that Congress did not make 
such a good faith effort.462  They also contended that JTAC’s charter and 
the GDUC’s directive required a searching inquiry into the issue of 
congressional good faith.463 
Congress is no longer allowed to take Indian lands as a mere 
incident of its exercise of guardianship power over those lands.464  It must 
satisfy a reviewing federal court that it made a good faith effort to fairly 
compensate the affected Indians for their lands.465  The reviewing federal 
judge must evaluate the relevant legislative history and surrounding 
circumstances of an alleged taking in making this good faith 
determination.466 
But this good faith test may well prove illusory, as it did in the 
Fort Berthold experience, to ensure that the affected Indians are justly 
                                                 
458. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 15–16. 
459. Id. at 14–25. 
460. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
461. Id. at 416–17. 
462. Cummings concluded that “Congress was a sea in terms of a well 
developed line of reasoning as to just what would compensate the [Fort Berthold 
Indians] for their loss of an economic base.”  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 25.  This 
was true, despite the fact that it was “well established in economic theory” that 
governmental or public welfare resources “such as land, water and minerals may 
constitute a ‘resource base,’ or ‘economic base,’ whose value extends well beyond the 
market value of the resource per se.”  Id. 
463. Professor Newton emphasizes the difficulty that a reviewing court 
faces in implementing the good faith inquiry into Congress’ compensation of injured 
Indian peoples.  Newton, supra note 34, at 259. 
464. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371. 
465. Id. at 416–17. 
466. Professor Newton demonstrates the inquiry burden that the good faith 
standard imposes on a reviewing court.  Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60. 
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compensated for their taken lands.  Absent an objective valuation standard, 
there is simply no reliable reference point for the court’s evaluation of 
claimed congressional good faith.467 
Restricting the JTAC’s inquiry to a review of the legislative record 
of the 1949 Fort Berthold taking illustrates this point: two congressional 
Indian committees—the House Public Lands Committee and the Senate 
Indian Affairs Committee—agreed that it was necessary to take the Fort 
Berthold Indians’ lands as the site for the Garrison Dam,468 but there is 
little or no discussion regarding the value of those lands to the Indian 
people.469  The JTAC would have searched in vain for any principled 
guidance on the meaningful calculation by those committees of the just 
compensation amount that was owed to the Fort Berthold Indians.470 
Indian congressional committees, given their deeply conflicting 
interests, are rarely capable of objectively valuing Indian lands as is 
envisioned by the Court’s Sioux Nation decision.  They are neither 
sufficiently disinterested nor sufficiently expert to be entrusted with the 
task of calculating the just compensation amounts that are owed to injured 
Indian peoples.471 
                                                 
467. Cummings cites the congressional committees’ “admixture of 
interests” as the lead developer of the Pick-Sloan Project as preventing Congress from 
fairly valuing and compensating the Fort Berthold Indians for their taken lands.  He 
cites to the Court’s admonition that “[t]he right of the legislature . . . to apply the 
property of the citizen to public use, and then to constitute itself the judge to determine 
what is the just compensation it ought to pay therefor . . . cannot . . . be tolerated under 
our constitution.”  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 24. 
468. Meyer, supra note 45, at 260–64. 
469. Professor Newton perhaps would not find surprising the Indian 
committees’ failure to evaluate the Indians’ economic losses in objective economic 
terms.  Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60. 
470. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 19–24. 
471. Cummings rhetorically asks: 
 
In light of the above, we might well ask: what was Congress’ view 
of that amount of money that would justly compensate the Tribes 
for their taken lands?  $17 million, “more than” $20 million, $21-
plus million, or $30 million?  Moreover, we might inquire as to the 
logical grounds on which any of these possible settlements were 
derived.  In the end, of course, the “how much” question was 
resolved at still a different amount: $5.1 million for the Tribes’ 
lands and relocation costs . . . and $7.4 million for, essentially, any 
other claim that one might think of.  The question as to how the 
Congress arrived at these figures remains open.  We find no  
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Reliance on congressional Indian committees’ subjective land 
valuations renders the Just Compensation Clause nearly 
meaningless.472  A “make whole” standard that begins and ends with 
Indian congressional committees’ good faith assertions subjects Indian 
compensatory rights to the vagaries of the political process.473  The JTAC 
would have been unable to perform its mandate consistent with its GDUC 
directive and its secretarial charter if it had been bound by this review 
standard.474  It would have ignored the fundamental gap between what the 
1946 Congress promised as compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians and 
the amount that the 1949 Congress actually provided to them under the 
1949 Taking Act.475  The 1949 report of the Senate Indian Committee 
declared that “the real needs of the tribes directly caused by the taking of 
their lands” must be the basis for a legislative award of just 
compensation.476  But this rhetorical flourish is empty of meaning unless 
it is read in conjunction with the 1946 congressional directive to provide 
replacement or substitute compensation to the Fort Berthold 
Indians.477  The JTAC gave substance to this promise by “reading in” the 
                                                 
discussions in the Congressional records that describe the bases for 
this determination of what would be just compensation to the  
Tribes for their taken lands. 
 
Id. at 24–25. 
472. Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60. 
473. Id. 
474. Id. 
475. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 50. 
476. The Senate report accompanying H.R.J. Res. 33, 81st Cong. (1949), 
concludes that the: 
 
proposed legislation provides for a complete and final settlement 
of all claims and demands of said tribes for all damages sustained 
by reason of the taking of said lands and rights in the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation, and of all other claims and demands of said 
tribes whether of tangible or intangible nature, or any alleged 
claims or demands, arising out of the said treaty of September 17, 
1851 (11 Stat. 749), or any other treaty (including any unratified 
treaty) or agreement, prior to the approval and acceptance of the 
provisions of this resolution. 
 
S. REP. NO. 81-605, at 3–4 (1949). 
The Senate Report explains that this resolution “remove[s] any reason for 
further petition to Congress for additional money and prevent[s] the necessity for any 
further action in the Court of Claims.”  Id. at 6–7. 
477. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 18. 
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1946 Congress’ valuation of the affected Indian lands.478  The JTAC found 
that only this amount of compensation would enable the Fort Berthold 
Indians to survive as a viable economic and governmental entity.479 
The Indian committees were obviously aware of this issue.  The 
House Committee on Public Lands poignantly expressed its concern about 
the future survival of the Three Affiliated Tribes.480  But it did not translate 
its concern into any cognizable just compensation theory or valuation 
principle.  It found that the Fort Berthold Indians’ development of an 
agricultural livestock industry on their reserved bottom lands had rendered 
them “in sight of complete economic independence” as contemplated by 
the Fort Berthold agreement.481  It concluded that compensation was 
required “for the destruction of the basic industry of the said tribes; for the 
intangible costs of relocation and for the reestablishment of a sound 
economic base and the future of said tribes.”482 
These Indian committees were well aware of the critical role of 
the taken lands in light of the Department of Interior’s report in August of 
1949, which stated: 
 
Most of the natural resources upon which the Indians 
depend for subsistence will be wiped out by the 
completion of the Garrison project.  These losses must be 
replaced by cash income. The reservoir area includes 
most of the timber land from which building materials, 
fence posts and firewood are obtained.  In these river 
bottomlands are the june-berries, wild plums and 
chokecherries which form such an important part of the 
Indian diet.  It is estimated that the wild life losses will cut 
off most of the supply of deer and other game since these 
animals and birds are dependent upon the brush and 
timber for their existence.  Most of the surface coal 
                                                 
478. Hearings on H.R. 2414, supra note 432, at 109–10. 
479. Murry points to the original version of H.R.J. Res. 33, which called 
for a just compensation amount of $17.1 million to be paid to the Fort Berthold Indians 
for their taken lands.  Murry notes that not even this admittedly “inadequate 
congressional amount” was paid to the Indians.  Instead, the Indians were later offered 
$12.6 million by Congress on a “take it or leave it basis.”  See Hearings on H.R. 2414, 
supra note 432, at 109–10. 
480. The House Committee on Public Lands explained that because of the 
Garrison dam the Indians’ “homes will be lost, their cattle industry will be ruined, 
their churches and schools, and their social life will be completely disrupted.”  H.R. 
REP. NO. 81-544, at 3 (1949). 
481. Id. 
482. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 20–21. 
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deposits from which Indians mine their coal will be 
flooded. . . . [Indian] families obtain almost all of their 
fuel, a large portion of their meat and fruit, a considerable 
amount of garden vegetables, and most of their building 
materials without the expenditure of any cash.  After the 
inundation of these natural resources by the Garrison 
Reservoir Project, the amount of cash required for 
subsistence will be greatly increased.483 
 
But the Indian committees’ failure to fairly value the taken Indian 
lands reflects Senator Watkins’ power over the legislative process.  The 
harsh reality was that a “governmental subsystem” of western 
congressional delegations and related constituency interests 
disproportionately influenced Indian congressional committees.484  This 
influence is patently evident in the 1949 legislative hearing record 
regarding the Fort Berthold taking.  It is virtually silent regarding the just 
compensation that would respond to the economic costs imposed on the 
Fort Berthold Indians by the taking of their treaty-reserved lands.485  The 
House Committee on Public Lands and the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee did briefly debate this cost versus loss basis of just 
compensation.486  For example, the House committee was clearly uneasy 
with the Corps’ cavalier assertion that payment of fair market value to 
individual Indian allottees would adequately compensate Fort Berthold 
Indians: 
 
                                                 
483. Id. at 21 (quoting BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, REPORT NO. 94, SOCIAL & ECONOMIC REPORT OF FORT BERTHOLD 
RESERVATION 12, 17 (Supp. I 1949) (emphasis added)). 
484. Lunney, supra note 250, at 753–56. 
485. Cummings found this congressional silence puzzling given three 
factors that would have enabled Congress to fashion an appropriate just compensation 
methodology for the Fort Berthold Indians: First, he cited “legal precedents . . . which 
would provide guidance . . . to . . . insure[] that sufficient damages will be awarded to 
finance replacement for the condemned facility.”  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 19–
20.  Second, he cited Congress’ grasp of the Fort Berthold lands as a permanent 
“homeland to the Tribes” as expressed in the 1886 agreement, which specified the 
terms that the Indians were “‘to become wholly self supporting by cultivation of the 
(Missouri river bottom lands)’, . . . their sole resource base for pursuing agricultural 
activities.”  Id. at 20.  Third, he cited the Indian congressional committees’ failure to 
use established precedent to establish a baseline valuation of the taken Indian lands as 
an analytic departure point for providing the Fort Berthold Indians with just 
compensation for their taken lands.  Id. at 21–23. 
486. Id. at 22–24. 
SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/9/2017 11:39 AM 
 
  
106 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. Special Issue 
The Committee on Public Lands feels that ($17 million 
dollars) is small compensation for the disruption forced 
upon the 2,215 Indians.  A conservative estimate of the 
basic value of the lands and their annual use value is 
approximately $21,981,000.  Therefore, the United States 
by making the settlement (at $17 million), will obtain the 
reservoir right-of-way at about two thirds of its basic 
value and its annual use value to the Three Affiliated 
Tribes.487 
 
Individual congressmen, such as Mr. Lemke from North Dakota, 
expressed their dismay that the Fort Berthold Indians were to be paid an 
amount of compensation substantially less than the real economic value of 
their treaty-reserved lands.488  He colorfully expressed his opinion on this 
issue:  
 
Here is a factory . . . that produced a net income last year 
of $774,000.  That alone capitalized at 4 percent equals 
about twenty million.  Surely no one would voluntarily 
surrender an income of 4 percent on twenty million for 
less than twenty million cash. . . . In taking these lands, 
we are . . . depriving these tribes of their land for less than 
its value.”489 
 
Interior Secretary Krug commented ironically about the fairness 
of the House committee’s proposed $17 million payment as just 
compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians: 
 
[I]t is well to bear in mind that the Indians would much 
prefer to retain their existing reservation intact.  In the 
discussions preceding the execution of the contract, they 
expressed the belief that it would require $30 million to 
compensate them properly for what is being taken from 
them.  If they are willing to accept the lesser benefits 
provided for in the contract and in House Joint resolution 
33, I believe the approval of this compromise would be to 
the best interests of the United States.”490 
                                                 
487. H.R. REP. NO. 81-544, at 3–4 (1949). 
488. Meyer, supra note 45, at 263. 
489. 95 CONG. REC. 15052, 15051 (1949) (statement of Rep. William 
Lemke) (emphasis added). 
490. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 23–24 (emphasis added). 
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Secretary Krug was referring to the House committee’s proposed 
compensation package that was to serve as the basis for just compensation 
to the Three Affiliated Tribes.491  This proposed compensation package 
was embodied in House Joint Resolution 33 and included these elements: 
 
1.  $5.1 million for the fair market value of the Indian trust 
parcels of lands that were to be taken and related relocation 
costs;492 
 
2.  $3 million for a land readjustment fund that would be used to 
consolidate fragmented land holdings of tribal members into 
viable economic units and for purchasing private lands for needy 
tribal members;493 
 
3.  $6.5 million as additional compensation to the Three 
Affiliated Tribes for “values not compensated for under the 
contract;”494 
 
4.  20,000 kilowatts of electric power (when available from the 
Garrison Dam): for sale and distribution by the . . . Tribes . . . 
delivered at such point or points on the reservation . . . as may be 
determined by the Secretary of the Interior.  Payment shall be 
made for the power actually used at the lowest wholesale rate or 
rates, applicable to the same class of service made available to 
other customers. . . . The transmission and distribution system 
necessary for the delivery of such . . .  power . . . shall be 
constructed with funds made available . . . by the U.S. without cost 
to the said Tribes; 495 and 
 
5. Construction of “any irrigation works and related facilities 
which . . . the Secretary of the Interior determines to be feasible. . 
. .496 If constructed, the irrigation works must be operated on a 
basis not less favorable than to non-Indian lands, and the costs 
thereof must be repayable in accordance with the terms of other 
laws applicable to Indian lands.”497 
                                                 
491. Id. at 22–23. 
492. H.R. REP. NO. 81-544. 
493. Id. at 10. 
494. Id. at 11. 
495. Id. at 12. 
496. Id. at 13. 
497. Id. at 36. 
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This proposed compensation package—including the 20 
megawatts of future-delivered low cost hydroelectric power—was valued 
by the House Committee on Public Lands at approximately seventeen 
million dollars.498  The committee members stated that the seventeen 
million dollars proposed compensation to the Indians “would be to the best 
interest of” the federal government.499  The earlier MRBI Reports to 
Congress had capitalized the economic value of the taken Fort Berthold 
lands at a conservative estimate of $21,981,000.500 
The harsh reality was that the Fort Berthold Indians—when all the 
“horse trading” was completed between the House and Senate Indian 
committees—were to receive substantially less compensation than was 
recommended as the “bare minimum” by the House Committee on Public 
Lands.501  The Fort Berthold Indians did not receive an amount between 
the seventeen million to thirty million dollar range that was judged by the 
House committee as the minimum fair amount of compensation for the 
Indians’ taken lands.502  Indeed, the minimum just compensation amount 
proposed in House Joint Resolution 33 was substantially reduced by the 
Senator Watkins’ committee.503  This dramatic downward spiral of 
proposed just compensation did not escape the Fort Berthold Indians’ 
attention: 504 “We (the tribal council) advised them (the tribal members) 
that if we should reject the Act (P.L. 437), the next offer of the government 
would probably not be even as good as the one we are considering.”505 
The Fort Berthold Indians were well aware that the amount of 
compensation they would receive would be determined by the 
comparative power of the House Committee on Public Lands and the 
Senate Indian Affairs Committee.  Senator Watkins’ influence was 
reflected in that, in each negotiation round, the proposed amount of just 
compensation substantially went down.506  Ultimately, the House and 
                                                 
498. Id. at 12. 
499. Id. 
500. See CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 23. 
501. Meyer asserts that “unfortunately the bill did not survive long after it 
was referred to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.”  Meyer, supra 
note 45, at 263.  That committee struck out everything “except the legal description 
of the taking area,” and the additional just compensation amount was reduced to four 
million dollars.  Id. 
502. Id.  At conference on the rival bills, “some House members expressed 
dissatisfaction with the bill in its final form, as well they might, but a sense of urgency 
and perhaps of the futility of further wrangling led them to accept it.”  Id. 
503. Id. 
504. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 19. 
505. Id. 
506. Id. 
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Senate Indian committees agreed on a just compensation figure of $12.6 
million that would be offered to the Fort Berthold Indians in exchange for 
taking 156,035 acres of their reservation.507  On March 15, 1950, the Fort 
Berthold Indians reluctantly agreed to accept that amount of compensation 
and to remove from their historic reservation lands.508 
 
E. The Articulation of a “New” Compensation Standard in the Three 
Affiliated Tribes Equitable Compensation Act of 1992 
 
The JTAC issued its final report in 1986 and recommended that 
the Secretary of Interior propose legislation on behalf of the Three 
Affiliated Tribes that would award just compensation to the Three 
Affiliated Tribes for the 1949 taking of the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation.509  The JTAC recommended just compensation to the Fort 
Berthold Indians in an amount ranging between $178.4 million and $411.8 
million.  In calculating the amount, the JTAC directed Dr. Ronald 
Cummings to use two alternative formulas.  The JTAC’s range of just 
compensation values reflects the application of these alternative land and 
resource valuation formulas.510 
But Secretary Hodel declined to implement the JTAC’s 
recommendation.511  Instead, the Senate Select Committee on Indian 
Affairs and the House Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs initiated 
joint oversight hearings on the JTAC’s final report in 1986.512  The 
                                                 
507. Meyer, supra note 45, at 264. 
508. Meyer reports that “(t)he approval by the Tribes called for was 
obtained by a vote in which 525 affirmative votes were cast out of 900 eligible voters 
and on March 15, 1950, council chairman Carl Whitman, Jr., with a seven man 
delegation, presented a briefcase containing the ballots to Secretary Chapman.”  Id.  
Local newspapers described this as yet “another emotion laden ceremony.”  Id.  Meyer 
concludes that this ceremony marked the end of the “long struggle between the Fort 
Berthold Indians and the United States government over the Garrison Dam project.”  
Id. 
509. See S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 3 (1992). 
510. Id. 
511. Id. at 1. 
512. The Senate report notes that the Senate Select Committee on Indian 
Affairs held three oversight hearings on the JTAC recommendations beginning on 
March 31, 1987, with a joint oversight hearing with the Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee and the Water and Power Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.  That hearing examined the need for 
legislation to implement the recommendations of the JTAC report.  The second 
hearing was held on November 19, 1987, wherein the committee “urged” the Tribes 
to provide “further justification for the level of additional financial compensation to 
which the tribes felt they were entitled” and “explore a budget neutral mechanism to 
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JTAC’s just compensation recommendation was referred by the Senate 
Select Committee on Indian Affairs to the General Accounting Office 
(“GAO”) for its review and response.513  The GAO report, issued in 1990, 
concluded that, although it somewhat disagreed with the economic 
methodology utilized by the JTAC, the JTAC’s findings provided a 
substantial basis for Congress to consider an equitable award of just 
compensation to the Three Affiliated Tribes in the amount of $149.5 
million.514  Legislation to implement the JTAC’s just compensation 
recommendation was introduced by Senator Kent Conrad from North 
Dakota.515  It provided $149.5 million in just compensation to the Three 
Affiliated Tribes for the 1949 Fort Berthold taking.516  The BIA testified 
that it had no opposition to this legislation as long as it otherwise met the 
“pay-as-you-go” constraints of the controlling budget resolution.517 
The Fort Berthold Indians, after lengthy discussions with various 
interested groups such as the National Rural Electric Cooperatives 
Association were able to craft an agreement that would authorize the 
deposit of a specified amount of Pick-Sloan hydropower receipts into a 
Treasury account on behalf of the Three Affiliated Tribes.518  The Three 
Affiliated Tribes were required to submit an economic and social recovery 
plan for approval by the Secretary of the Interior.519  The Tribes would 
have access to the interest from their Treasury account beginning in fiscal 
year 1998.520  President Bush threatened to veto the legislation, but 
                                                 
finance the compensation needed to carry out the recommendations.”  The third 
hearing was held regarding S. 168 wherein the tribes “expressed their overall support 
for the bill” and the GAO “expressed its approval of the compensation figures set forth 
in (S. 168).”  Id. at 6. 
513. Id. 
514. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFF. (GAO), REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN ISSUES: 
COMPENSATION CLAIMS ANALYSIS OVERSTATE ECONOMIC LOSSES (May 1991). 
515. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 13–15. 
516. Id. 
517. The BIA representative testified that if the “Budget Enforcement Act 
provisions can be complied with . . . , the administration would look at that and give 
consideration to that additional compensation.”  Id. at 31–32. 
518. A brief exchange between Senator Conrad and Mr. Dennis Hill, 
executive vice president of the North Dakota Association of Rural Electric 
Cooperatives, made clear that, “as drafted,” the North Dakota rural electric 
cooperatives “did not oppose.”  Id. at 26. 
519. S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 9 (1992). 
520. Id. at 4. 
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nonetheless signed the Tribes’ compensation act into law in November 
1992 as part of a larger water resources development bill.521 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
The 1949 Fort Berthold taking demonstrates the need for a modern 
Indian takings doctrine.  Marshall sought to reconcile the competing 
interest of the United States and the Indian people in his Johnson v. 
M’Intosh opinion.522  By incorporating the Indian lands into paramount 
federal ownership, while simultaneously confirming the Indian peoples’ 
exclusive use and occupancy rights in those lands, he created an inherently 
unstable and ultimately untenable land-based relationship between these 
sovereigns.  The Indian peoples were recognized by Marshall’s opinions 
as possessing inherent sovereign authority over their lands.  But their 
subordinated status as governmental wards portended federal dominion 
over the Indian peoples and their lands. 
Indian Country was originally conceived as a federally protected 
territory wherein Indian peoples would be free to exercise self-
governance and to incrementally adapt to non-Indian ways of life.  But 
this Indian Country idea would not survive the later nineteenth-century's 
vision of an American manifest destiny. 523  Perhaps Marshall hoped that 
Indian Country would be preserved by his imposition of an Indian 
bargaining model.  That model contemplated that by mutual agreement, the 
Indian peoples and the federal government could ensure a safe haven 
for threatened tribal societies and cultures.  But Indian bargains over land 
soon degenerated into a diplomatic shell game.  Indian land cession 
agreements served as the transparent means for the Indian peoples’ 
systematic dispossession.  Lone Wolf’s resort to the courts to prevent 
the coerced allotment of his reservation prompted the Court to jettison 
Marshall’s model as inconsistent with the Indian peoples’ contemporary 
status as governmental wards. 524 
The contemporary survival of Indian societies requires their 
protection from the ill-advised federal takings of their lands.525  Indian 
treaties once recognized a vast “ Indian-only” zone in the American West: 
a geographic area wherein the Indian peoples were free to choose a legal, 
                                                 
521. Reclamations Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. 35, 106 Stat. 4731. 
522. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
523. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 36–38. 
524. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903). 
525. Newton, supra note 34, at 264–65. 
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cultural, and economic system that best suited their members’ needs.526  
The federal government pledged to use its regulatory and military 
capabilities to preserve this Indian Country boundary.527 
But federal protection of Indian lands was always halfhearted 
at best. Congress eventually repudiated its treaty commitments and 
bargains in favor of fulfilling its superseding goal of manifest destiny.528  
The federal plenary power doctrine became the engine that would drive 
Congress’ Indian allotment and assimilation policies.  Definitive 
resolution of the “Indian question” was expected in one generation or 
two at the most.529  But the Indian peoples proved far more resilient and 
resistant than expected to federal programs that were designed to 
destroy their tribal land base and their cultural structures.530 
The Indian peoples’ tenaciousness was rewarded by Congress’ 
repudiation of its allotment program in the 1930s and its adoption of a 
tribal revitalization program that championed tribal self-determination 
and self-governance.531  This contemporary federal Indian policy seeks 
to reinstate Marshall’s idea of Indian peoples as domestic, dependent 
nations.  But this policy will have little meaning unless it is accompanied 
by the effective judicial protection of Indian lands.  The contemporary 
Supreme Court seemingly wants to have it both ways: it rhetorically 
supports the concept of tribal self-determination while reaffirming the 
congressional plenary power doctrine.532  
The federal government’s plenary power over Indian lands 
threatens to reduce the Indian self-determination policy to rhetorical 
extravagance.  This power threatens those Indian lands that will make 
possible the hoped-for revitalization of Indian economies and cultures.533   
Just as Congress repudiated its Indian allotment program in the 
1930s, so should the Supreme Court now repudiate Lone Wolf’s plenary 
power doctrine.  Felix S. Cohen’s assertion that the Indian peoples were 
fairly compensated for the taking of their historic lands need not be 
debated anew.534  Such a retrospective assessment merely reinforces the 
                                                 
526. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 14–19. 
527. Id. 
528. Newton, supra note 34, at 251–52. 
529. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45–50. 
530.  Id. at 80–84. 
531.  Id. at 89–93. 
532.  Newton, supra note 34, at 264–65. 
533. Id. at 264. 
534.  GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 310. 
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contemporary need for judicial protection of the Indian peoples’ lands 
from congressional overreaching under the plenary power doctrine.535 
The American West has long been settled by non-Indians by 
virtue of the Indian allotment and land sales program of the late nineteenth 
century.536  Cohen may well be right that the books should be closed on 
this sad era of America’s treatment of Indian peoples.537  But Cohen would 
likely agree that any merit in retaining the plenary power doctrine is 
outweighed by its potential to thwart the contemporary Indian self-
determination and self-governance policy.538  
Objections to a modern Indian takings doctrine do not hold up 
against analysis.  First, a modern Indian takings doctrine will not cost the 
federal Treasury “too much” money.539 The 1992 congressional act that 
revisited the 1949 Fort Berthold taking illustrates the practical benefits of 
fairly valuing Indian lands.  The Fort Berthold Indians were provided with 
an equitable amount of compensation that will enable them to make a 
meaningful recovery from the devastating effects of the Garrison taking.  
Furthermore, Congress designated that compensation to be paid out of 
hydropower receipts derived from the sale of electric power from the Pick-
Sloan generating plants.  This approach effectively internalized the just 
compensation payment to the project itself.  This stream of income from a 
replacement resource—hydroelectric power—was intended by the 1992 
equitable compensation act to replace the Three Affiliated Tribes’ 
                                                 
535.  Newton, supra note 34, at 251–52. 
536. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 93–101. 
537.  Id. 
538.  Newton supposes a hypothetical “Indian Allotment Act of 1982” 
whereby the federal government unilaterally allots each tribal member a 2 acre 
“ceremonial parcel” and puts the balance of the Indian lands up for sale.  The 
legislative record states that this act intends that the Indians should use their retained 
lands as purely ceremonial sites for spiritual regeneration from time to time.  The sale 
proceeds from the lands are to be used to train the Indians to acquire marketable skills 
for deployment within the “civilized” urban areas of America.  She further supposes 
the federal government conducts no geological surveys of the lands’ value and does 
not require competitive bidding at auction.  She concludes that the affected Indians 
may well have no remedy against the federal government in light of the Sioux Nation 
rule.  Newton, supra note 34, at 261–62. 
539. Cummings’ analysis emphasizes that costs and benefits attributable 
to large federal works projects are simply the opposite side of the same coin.  
Congress’ undervaluing in 1949 to appropriately value the Fort Berthold Indians’ 
resource base is a project related “cost” insofar as Congress ignores the real economic 
value of that foregone public natural resource.  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 25–31. 
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expected revenue stream that would have been generated by its taken 
lands.540 
Second, a modern Indian takings doctrine would impose a salutary 
“stop and think” burden on federal agencies and Indian congressional 
committees.  Such a standard will likely tend to preserve the Indian land 
base.541  The War Secretary was effectively precluded under the 1946 
Garrison statute from taking the Fort Berthold Indians’ lands until he 
provided them with the replacement value of their taken lands.542  Just so, 
those federal agencies or congressional committees that face the true value 
of Indian lands will be motivated to more carefully deliberate about the 
need for taking Indian lands or for mitigation measures that will ameliorate 
the deleterious features of proposed projects.543 
                                                 
540. Reclamations Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. 35, 106 Stat. 4731.  Cummings suggests an analogous 
approach when he looks toward so-called Pick-Sloan “excess power revenues” that 
are not committed to repayment of project-related costs as the source of just 
compensation for the Fort Berthold Indians.  CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 43. 
541. Paragraph 2 of section 4(a) of S. 168 provided that: 
 
deposits equal to 25% of the receipts from deposits to the United 
States Treasury for the preceding fiscal year from integrated 
programs of the Eastern Division of the Pick-Sloan Missouri River 
Basin Project shall be deposited automatically in the fund each 
fiscal year.  The amounts so appropriated are to be “non-
reimbursable and non-returnable.  But the aggregate amount to be 
deposited in the recovery fund shall not exceed $149.2 million.” 
 
S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 8–9 (1992). 
542. Meyer, supra note 45, at 246–47. 
543. Lunney characterizes a measure of compensation as just if it redresses 
two “systemic mistakes” that a legislature will make under what he calls the 
“majoritarian” and “interest group” models.  Lunney, supra note 250, at 757.  He 
describes the two mistakes as follows: “(1) fiscal illusion will lead the legislature to 
impose improper burdens on a scapegoat; and (2) the scape-goating process will lead 
the legislature to refuse to compensate a scapegoat for a taking.”  Id. 757–58.   
He asserts that the compensation requirement must therefore meet two 
objectives: 
 
First, it must force the government to consider the full costs of its action 
when it would force a scapegoat to bear the burden of government action 
(and thereby) reduce the likelihood that . . . the scapegoat (will be required) 
to bear a significant government imposed burden either when a member of 
majority faction could better have borne the burden or when the government  
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Third, an Indian takings doctrine would give substance to the 
fiduciary duty that Congress owes to the Indian peoples.544  The 1992 
Three Affiliated Tribes Equitable Compensation Act provides the Fort 
Berthold Indians with the financial resources to replace their economic 
base that was lost to the 1949 taking of their lands.545  Requiring the 
federal government to fully compensate Indian peoples for their 
economic losses would allow them to more effectively replace those 
lands and resources that are essential to a viable tribal economy and 
society.546 
Fourth, an Indian takings doctrine would recognize that Indian 
lands many times serve as specialized public welfare and 
governmental assets—not merely fungible commodities.547  Indian 
peoples by custom, heritage, and treaty bargain are highly immobile.  
Their lands represent their collective entwinement with their 
spiritual, emotional, and economic lives.  Such immobility is an 
appropriate circumstance for judicial consideration under a modern 
Indian takings doctrine.548 
Fifth, an Indian takings doctrine requires no heroic innovations 
in existing federal takings law or doctrine.  The JTAC in the Fort 
Berthold case easily applied well known and judicially accepted 
resource valuation methodologies so as to arrive at a just compensation 
value for the 156,035 acres that were taken from the Fort Berthold 
Indians.549  This just compensation amount was accepted by the GAO 
as the basis for a congressional award of equitable compensation to 
those Indians in 1992.550 
Sixth, an Indian takings doctrine is a vital component of a 
contemporary Indian self-determination policy.  Those lands that form the 
economic and governmental base for tribal governments must be 
preserved just like lands held by the federal, state, and local 
                                                 
should not have taken the action at all.  Second, to ensure that the property 
interests of the scapegoat are protected when they should be. 
 
Id. 
544. Newton, supra note 34, at 264. 
545. S. Rep. No. 102-250, at 3. 
546. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 28. 
547. Id. at 12. 
548. Id. at 20. 
549. Id. at 32–39. 
550. Harry Finley testified on behalf of GAO that the Congress would be 
“using a very defensible method in determining compensation” if it relied on the lower 
bound of JTAC’s compensation recommendation for the Fort Berthold Indians.  
Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 23. 
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governments.551  How else can a legitimate “government-to-government” 
relationship between the federal government and the respective Indian 
peoples be expected to work?  Just as the just compensation principle 
prevents injury to similarly situated governmental entities, so too should 
the contemporary Indian peoples be shielded from overreaching by federal 
agencies or congressional committees under the guise of the plenary power 
doctrine. 
The fate of the Fort Berthold Indians in their direct bargaining 
with the federal government is a real and symbolic reminder of the need 
for a modern Indian takings doctrine.  Such a doctrine would impose no 
significant burdens on the federal government while ensuring that the 
Indian peoples’ bargains with the federal government would be reasonably 
respected. 
                                                 
551. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 12–13. 
